

GENOCIDE
in the
BALTIC STATES

By

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
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Published by
the Latvian National Fund in the Scandinavian Countries.

Stockholm 1952.

1942
307

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Latvijas Nacionālā
BIBLIOTĒKA

0301052 749



One purpose of this publication is to provide documentary evidence of the facts that the genocide carried out in Soviet Russia and in the countries annexed by her is an essential part of the administrative and economic system founded by the Bolshevik party. Another is to serve as a warning to the citizens of all sovereign states to realize what it would mean if they light-mindedly relied upon treaties and pacts which have been or are being concluded by their respective governments. The fate of Latvia and the other Baltic States during World War II was not an accident in foreign policy, but a carefully prepared and planned action of the Kremlin towards world domination, towards a *pax sovietica*.

In order to convey to everybody a clear and conclusive notion of the distance lying between the "Blessed Islands" of the western civilizations and the Soviet Hell and in order to show irrefutably that in the latter a kolkhoz ox is prized more highly by the "Workers' and People's Government" than the life of a Soviet citizen, it is necessary to know how everything began and how it ended in Latvia. For the way it ended in the Baltic States is the way it will end in any other country, which, owing to insufficient heedfulness on the part of her statesmen or because of a weakness of her armed forces, may become a satellite of the Kremlin.

In the peace treaty between Latvia and Russia, signed on August 11, 1920, in Riga, the Government of the Federal Socialist Republic of Russian Soviets declared: "Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence, self-subsistency and sovereignty of the Latvian State and voluntarily and for ever renounces all sovereign rights over the Latvian people and territory". At that time the western world did not yet know that the term "for ever" in the practice of Soviet diplomacy merely meant "to take breath before the next start".

And that was not long in preparing. On December 3, 1922, at an extraordinary meeting of the Politbureau, the Head of the War Information Department suggested that Poland should be encouraged to occupy Lithuania while, simultaneously, two army corps of the Red Army should invade Estonia. It was Lenin who severely criticized this plan, calling it an adventure which would shatter the international position of Russia and destroy her foreign trade. The discussions ended by a majority of votes accepting Lenin's thesis and by rejecting the scheme of the War Department. The dissentient votes were those of Stalin and of a member of the War Council. Stalin never forgot this failure. After Lenin's death he ordered the Estonian Communist party to organize a *putsch* at Tallinn on December 1, 1924, which in the case of success should be followed by the proclamation of the Estonian Soviet Republic. However, this *coup de main* failed and the plan of the Politbureau to occupy the Baltic had to be postponed. Some time afterwards, Chicherin, then Foreign Commissar, declared at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee on March 3, 1925, that the fear of the Baltic States of a possible aggression on the part of Moscow was groundless, because Moscow respected the treaties concluded by her. As usual in such cases, the beaten wolf played the part of the shepherd.

When Marshal Pilsudski assumed power and Germany became a member of the League of Nations, Foreign Vice-Commissar Litvinov started, in 1926, a vigorous activity in international policy, first of all by concluding a friendship and neutrality pact with Germany and afterwards offering such a one also to the Baltic States. On March 9, 1927, the Latvian Government concluded such a pact with Russia, but as the latter refused to accept a neutral chairman in a planned court of arbitration, the pact was never signed.

When Great Britain, on May 26, 1927, interrupted her diplomatic relations with Russia and revoked her trade covenant, the rate of exchange of the Russian chervonyets fell rapidly and the total of the Russian foreign short-term debts approached the figure of one milliard gold roubles. During this economic crisis Moscow urged to conclude the negotiations started as early as 1923 on a trade covenant with Latvia which was concluded in June 1927. It was the 21st trade agreement Latvia signed.

Apart from the considerable reductions of customs duties on Russian import goods (e.g. 100% on iron and crude oil) which this pact involved, Latvia built

an up-to-date free port at Liepaja for Russian requirements as well as storehouses in Riga, changed her principal railway lines to Russian gauge and carried out the transportation of Russian goods at a rate which was 75% below her own tariffs. Now the peace policy of another state is invariably interpreted by the Politbureau as a sign of weakness and exploited accordingly. The illegal Communist party of Latvia numbering, in 1928, only 650 members (out of a population of 1 845 000) and 1.2% of the total of workers, gathered in the trade unions, only being under communist influence, the extensive cadre of Russian commercial agencies in Latvia lavishly subsidized it with a view to activizing communist propaganda in Latvia and reconquering the positions lost after the land reform was carried out. These agencies made a point of emphasizing the dependence of the longshoremen and transport workers on the Russian export. Obeying the directions given by the Comintern, the bolsheviks participated in the Latvian parliament elections in 1928 with two camouflaged lists, thus obtaining 7% of all the votes. Such was Moscow's true answer to Riga.

No sooner was the so-called Kellogg Pact (which renounced war as an instrument of national policy) signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, than Litvinov hastened to exploit it in order to demonstrate to the world the peace-loving attitude of the Bolshevik Government. By means of a special protocol he appealed to the States on the Russian border to accelerate the coming into force of the pact, aiming in fact at transforming this multilateral agreement into bilateral protocols. However, the true purpose of the diplomatic intrigue started was to disunite the Baltic States which, in part, was achieved, because Litvinov's protocol was signed in Moscow on February 9, 1929, by Latvia and Estonia together with Poland and Rumania, not however by Lithuania and Finland. As a matter of course, the protocol was nothing but a political declaration without any real importance.

Being afraid of both Japan and Germany, the Kremlin now seeks an understanding with Poland and France, offering non-aggression treaties which are signed by Lithuania in 1931, and by Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and France in 1932. According to these pacts, the contracting parties promise to refrain from any kind of aggression against their reciprocal territories and sovereignties. By means of a supplementary protocol, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, on April 4, 1934, extended their non-aggression treaties till December 31, 1945.

After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Hitler's assumption of power, the fear of war continues to determine the foreign policy of the Kremlin. When the United States renew, in 1933, their interrupted diplomatic relations with Russia, the latter begins to collaborate closely with the western democracies and soon becomes a member of the League of Nations. As an introduction to this new course in Russian policy, Litvinov suggests to all the Border States and also to the Little Entente to supplement the Kellogg Pact with a special convention for the definition of aggression, which is signed on July 3, 1933, by Estonia, Latvia and Poland, and at a later date by Lithuania and Finland.

According to this convention, "the aggressor in an international conflict shall be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions: a) declaration of war upon another State; b) attack by its land, naval or air forces etc" (§ 2). In the annex to the convention "the High Contracting Parties declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article 2 can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others: A) the internal condition of a State, e.g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strike, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war. B) The international conduct of a State, e.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; frontier incidents etc."

Now that so many peace instruments were created, it might seem that Russia no longer had any reason to be worried about her security. However, according to an ancient Russian proverb, fear has large eyes. This applies still better to Soviet Russia where everybody, from the member of the Politbureau down to the factory worker or kolkhoz farmer, lives in an atmosphere of constant fear.

For once, it was the fear of a German aggression. Six months had not yet passed since the London Convention was signed, when Litvinov, on December 20, 1933, submitted to Mr. Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister, a proposal to guarantee in a common declaration the political and economic independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the course of the negotiations it appeared that the planned declaration would entitle the two guarantors to regard as a threat to their independence almost every change in their internal and foreign policy, constitution and international relations. It practically meant

the division of the Baltic area into Russian and Polish influence spheres. With the exception of Lithuania, the rest of the Baltic States rejected this proposal of the Kremlin.

However, Litvinov did not acquiesce in it. In order to sound the designs of the national-socialists in the region which the bolsheviks regarded as a spring-board for a possible jump of the German army on Leningrad, he handed over a secret proposal to the German ambassador in Moscow on March 28, 1934, purporting to the signing of a protocol about the guaranty of the independence of the Baltic States, motivating it with the necessity to improve the Russo-German relations. In her reply of April 11, Berlin indeed sympathized with the idea of a mutual *rapprochement* of the two countries, but at the same time pointed out in a sarcastic way that the artificial construction of a guaranty to the Baltic States would scarcely serve this purpose, since neither Germany nor Russia intended to attack them. When afterwards Litvinov tried to urge upon Germany a pact of mutual assistance, Berlin immediately rejected it in her answer, dated June 13, 1934, because Germany was still too weak to profit by such a premature pact with the bolsheviks.

Parallel to these diplomatic *démarches* which actually tended towards rendering inoperative the mutual non-aggression pact, concluded between Poland and Germany on January 26, 1934, the Kremlin delivered notes to France and Great Britain, on February 21, 1934, suggesting the making of regional agreements of assistance, the so-called Eastern Pact. As early as September 1927, a similar plan was submitted by Mr. Cielens, Latvian Foreign Minister, to the Plenary Meeting of the League of Nations which rejected it.

It was M. Barthou, Foreign Minister of France, who prepared the draft of the new Eastern Pact on collective securities to the Baltic States. According to this draft, the pact was to be signed by eight eastern and central European States while an additional security was to be granted through the Franco-Russian guaranties which had to bridge the gap between the Locarno Pact and the Eastern Pact. However, Poland was categorically opposed to this scheme and demanded the exclusion of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania from this pact. Herr von Neurath, German Foreign Minister, in his memorandum of September 1, 1934, gave an elusive answer, pointing out that Germany could not assume new military obligations while she was not yet rehabilitated as far as her armament

was concerned. Under these circumstances the Baltic States decided to take up an observing attitude, although, during a confidential conversation on November 20, 1934, Litvinov informed their ministers: "Should the conclusion of the Eastern Pact prove a failure, Russia will open direct negotiations with Germany."

The Italo-Abyssinian conflict and the civil war in Spain kept the Big Powers busy trying to localize these fires which were menacing world peace. Actually, the second world war was already introduced. Though officially the Eastern Pact was only postponed, it gradually fell into oblivion. The course of the international events was no longer to be stopped by diplomatic intervention.

In 1938 Hitler openly initiated his "Anschluss" policy by marching into Austria on March 13. Next, he demanded the incorporation of Sudetia into the Reich, to which Great Britain, France and Italy gave their consent at the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938. By this fateful decision a revision of the borders of the new States, laid down at the Versailles Peace Conference, was sanctioned. Having ascertained the inability of the western democracies to check the German aggression, Hitler took further measures. On March 15, 1939, Dr. Hacha, President of Czechoslovakia, accepted Germany's ultimatum and signed the covenant of the Protectorate which put an end to the existence of the Czechoslovakian State. On March 22, Lithuania was compelled to cede the Memel region to Germany.

In this situation Russia again actively interfered in the Baltic affairs, which, however, did not prevent her foreign policy, directed by Litvinov, to continue officially in the old fairway, while unofficially, under Stalin's high command, a new course was being looked for. On March 29, 1939, Litvinov handed to the Latvian and Estonian ministers in Moscow a declaration informing them that Russia would be unable to continue her role of observer if there existed treaties and agreements which tended in an open or camouflaged way to restrict the independence of their States. By this declaration the Kremlin had unilaterally determined that the Baltic States were in the Russian influence sphere. To this Latvia and Estonia answered that they would defend their neutrality and that they could not allow a third State in a direct or indirect way to influence their freedom of action. On receiving these answers Litvinov added: "The

responsibility of the Soviet Union begins at the moment when Latvia stops taking care of her independence or when this care proves insufficient under the existing threatening circumstances."

A week after Latvia's answer to Russia, Mr. Roosevelt proposed to Hitler and Mussolini to guarantee a 10 years' peace to 21 European and eastern States. Among these were mentioned also the Baltic States. However, three days before, diplomatic negotiations were opened between Great Britain and the Soviet Union on possibilities of forming an anti-aggression front. The Russians suggested to conclude a military alliance with France and Great Britain, which the latter refused, suggesting, in her turn, a three-power mutual assistance pact.

During the negotiations, on May 3, Stalin quite suddenly dismissed Litvinov, who had since 1921 been directing the official Soviet foreign policy, from his office, and replaced him by V. Molotov, a member of the Politbureau. These changes were received in Berlin with obvious satisfaction. It meant that Moscow renounced the system of collective agreements hitherto practised, the League of Nations and collaboration with the western democracies. Since the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties (1918), with which Imperial Germany saved the bolshevik regime from ruin, Stalin consistently maintained the view that it was in the Russian interests to lead a germanophile policy. Despite the anti-Hitlerite bolshevik propaganda, he highly prized the Führer and national-socialist Germany, despising, at the same time, all parliamentary States. After the French and British capitulation at Munich, the Politbureau concluded that the agreements of these democracies with the Kremlin will be unable to keep Russia out of a war and that a second world war might even mean the destruction of the Soviet regime.

In order to make Hitlerite Germany understand Moscow's readiness to open separate negotiations with Berlin, Stalin delivered a speech at the 18th Congress of the Bolshevik party on March 10, 1939, in which he mentioned that the French, British and American press were spreading provocative rumours with a view to setting Russia against Germany. Berlin, indeed, understood the meaning of this allusion. Both parties tried to find clandestine ways to get into touch with one another in an unofficial manner, pleading negotiations on a German-Russian economic agreement. The Russians chose for their mediator Draganov,

the Bulgarian minister in Moscow, while Germany's authorized representative was count Ciano.

When Hitler had agreed on principle to a political convention with Stalin in the division of the influence spheres in eastern Europe at the expense of Poland and the Baltic States, Molotov began to delay the negotiations already initiated with Great Britain and France by putting forward new Soviet demands. In his answer of June 2 to the British proposal of a three-power assistance pact Molotov connects it with common securities to the Baltic States. Since Zhdanov, who was then omnipotent, had as early as 1936 in a speech demanded the annexation of the Baltic, the Baltic States informed Great Britain that their policy of neutrality forbade them to accept Russia's securities.

According to a news report of TASS, dated June 22, the negotiations had come to a dead stop. On June 29, there appeared a characteristic article by Zhdanov, Chairman of the Foreign Commission, expounding the view that the guaranties may be enforced upon the Baltic States. Finally, prevailed upon by M. Daladier, the French Premier, His Majesty's Government agreed not to make objections to an automatic assistance to the Baltic States by the Soviet Union in case of direct aggression. On July 4, Molotov came forward with a new demand: the Soviet Union should have the right to occupy the Baltic States even in the case of indirect aggression which, according to the Kremlin, would happen when a constitutional change would take place in one of the Baltic States.

When the Moscow negotiations proved fruitless, the Earl of Halifax characterized the British attitude in a speech, held in the House of Lords on December 5, 1939: "Events have shown that the judgment and the instinct of His Majesty's Government in refusing agreement with the Soviet Government on the terms of formulae covering cases of indirect aggression on the Baltic States were right. For it is now plain that these formulae might have been the cloak of ulterior designs . . .".

In order to extort from Hitler the greatest possible concessions by his prolonged double-dealing and induce Berlin without further delay to accept the demands of the Kremlin, Molotov staged a new act in his diplomatic comedy by requesting, on July 20, the French and British Governments immediately to send their delegations to Moscow for discussions of a military nature. When the

negotiations opened on August 12, War Commissar Voroshilov suggested to adjourn the meetings until August 21, because (as it appeared afterwards) the Kremlin was at that time expecting the German Foreign Minister, v. Ribbentrop, who was to arrive with special powers from Hitler.

As soon as he had arrived the negotiations started. At the very beginning Stalin announced that Russia needed the Latvian ports of Liepaja and Ventspils. Ribbentrop telephoned to Hitler who agreed to this demand. As early as August 23, 1939, the German-Russian non-aggression pact was signed. It was eked out by a secret protocol which referred to the division of the influence spheres between Germany and Russia. The latter was given a free hand in Finland, Estonia and Latvia, while Lithuania and Poland were left to Germany. Lord Halifax could but state that "Herr Hitler bartered what was not his property — the liberties of the Baltic people".

The second world war could now begin. Having thus secured the Kremlin's friendship, Hitler ordered the German army, on September 1, to invade Poland where it advanced rapidly. Fearing that Germany might occupy entire Poland and then denounce the pact of August 23, Stalin ordered the Red Army to cross the Russian-Polish frontier, pleading the liberation of the Byelorussians and Ukrainians from the Polish yoke. Having learned that Germany after the defeat of the Polish army planned to create the State of Little Poland, Stalin suggested the exchange of Lithuania for two Polish *voyevodstva* (provinces) with the view of immediately "solving the Baltic problem" with Hitler's consent. Thus, the second secret protocol, which was signed on September 28 in Moscow, came into being.

Now all four Baltic States were practically in the hands of the Russians. Before signing this protocol, Molotov, on September 22, invited Mr. Selter, Estonian Foreign Minister, to come to Moscow, nominally to conclude a new commercial treaty. Instead, Mr. Selter received the prepared text of a mutual assistance pact with Russia. On September 25, Russian planes were repeatedly sighted over Estonian territory. When the Estonian Government met on September 26, it ascertained that Molotov's proposal was in fact an ultimatum of the Kremlin, because during his conversation with Selter he had repeatedly used the phrase "I beg you not to compel the Soviet Government to apply other, more radical, methods for attaining its aims." Under these circumstances Estonia

decided to accept the Russian ultimatum and on September 28 signed the pact of mutual assistance.

Latvia's was the next turn to go to Canossa. As early as October 2 negotiations began in the Kremlin between Latvia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Munters and a Russian delegation consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Foreign Vice-Commissar Potiomkin and Zotov, Soviet Minister in Riga. Stalin pointed out that France and Great Britain were to blame for the annihilation of such States as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, there being yet other countries for which a similar fate might be in store; that the neutral States would become involved in war, therefore Russia had to take measures in order to provide for her security and to get the Baltic ports at her disposal, — a necessity already recognized by Peter the Great; that, frankly speaking, the distribution of the influence spheres in the Baltic had already taken place and that, as far as Germany was concerned, Russia was at liberty to occupy Latvia at any chosen moment. However, Russia did not want to apply the crushing policy of Germany which wished to turn the Czechs into Germans. For Russia, military bases with Russian garrisons would do and she would leave Latvia's Constitution, her institutions, government authorities, her foreign and financial policy and her economic system untouched.

After two days' discussions, on October 5, Mr. Munters signed a mutual assistance pact similar to that of Estonia, according to which Latvia undertook to lend Russia bases at Liepaja, Ventspils and Pitrags until 1949, to build special airfields for Russian requirements and to grant the stationing of Red Army garrisons totalling 30 000 men. Eventually, even Lithuania was compelled to accept Moscow's dictation and sign the assistance pact. This pill was sugared to her by the "restitution" of Vilna.

In form and contents, all three Russo-Baltic mutual assistance pacts were identical. They were unimpeachable from a juridical point of view, despite the fact that the true purpose of these covenants was not to guard the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but, on the contrary, to destroy it. Section 5 of the Pact reads as follows: "The carrying into effect of the present pact must in no way affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their political structure, their economic and social system, and their

military measures. The areas set aside for the bases and airfields remain the territory of the Latvian Republic."

This pact was one of the most hypocritical international deeds known in the history of diplomacy. Soon after the first agreement between Stalin and Hitler (that of August 23, 1939) the General Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) issued operative maps of the Baltic States (scale 5 km in 1 cm) which were dated "first edition, 1939". The headings of these maps showed the designations: Litovskaya SSR, Latviskaya SSR, i.e. Lithuanian and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republics, printed in big lettering. Thus it appears that the sovietization of the Baltic States was decided as early as 1939, although the assistance pacts guaranteed them their previous sovereignty and Russia's non-interference in internal Baltic matters.

Still more perfidious was another document, whose English translation is to be found in the annex. It is a secret and very extensive instruction regarding the procedure for carrying out the deportation of the anti-Soviet elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which was signed on October 11, 1939, under No. 001223, by General Serov, Deputy Commissar of State Security of the USSR. The district branches of the NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security) afterwards always used to refer to this NKVD Instruction No. 001223. A copy of it, meant for application in Latvia, was found among the documents abandoned by the NKVD at Valka when, after the German attack, the Red Army had to retreat from Latvian territory in a hurry in the summer of 1941 (cf. the publication of this document by the Latvian Legation in Washington: Latvian—Russian relations, 1944, p. 227—231, and by K. Pelekis: Genocide, 1949, p. 273—278.)

Before going into a more detailed analysis of this document, which we shall do at a later time, it is important to fix one's attention to the date on which the instruction was issued. No other day was chosen for this purpose than that on which the Kremlin gave a banquet to the Lithuanian delegation in honour of the signing, on October 10, of the mutual assistance pact. At this dinner Stalin, Molotov and other high Soviet functionaries solemnly declared to faithfully and sacredly observe the signed pact and to guard the sovereignty of Lithuania. Listening to these speeches while enjoying Russian caviar and vodka, the Lithuanian ministers, like their Estonian and Latvian colleagues a week

earlier, did not know that they had signed their own and their citizens' death sentence. It was, in fact, the members of the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian Governments who became the first victims of the NKVD deportation order No. 001223. Thus it appeared that the mutual assistance pacts of the Baltic States actually were pacts concluded with Antichrist, in whose mouth the words "faithfully and sacredly" were a sheer blasphemy of that concept which the Christian moral and conception of right associate with them.

It would of course be naive to presume that Stalin and Molotov, while toasting Lithuania at the banqueting table on October 11, were ignorant of the instruction which the NKVD had secretly issued on the same day. The NKVD could not take any action abroad before first receiving instructions from the Politbureau and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs which at that time was directed by Molotov. Moreover, the same V. G. Dekanozov who in his quality of Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs in June 1940 staged, at Kaunas, the performance of the incorporation of Lithuania was then Chief of the Foreign Department of the NKVD.

Knowing that the mutual assistance pacts concluded between the Baltic States and Russia would soon lead to a complete sovietization of the former and to deportations connected with it, Hitler immediately issued respective orders to his ministers at Tallinn, Riga and Kaunas. As early as October 6, that is to say, on the day after the pact was signed by Mr. Munters, Herr Kotze, German Minister in Latvia, called on the Latvian Foreign Minister in a rather excited frame of mind and asked the Latvian Government not to put obstacles in the way for the "repatriation" to Germany of the Latvian citizens of Baltic-German origin. The Latvian-German repatriation agreement was signed as early as October 30, and according to this convention towards the end of 1939 and at the beginning of 1940 49 885 German-Baltic Latvians renounced their Latvian citizenship and were repatriated to Germany.

It was the merit of Finland that the annexation of the Baltic States did not take place at the end of 1939 already, as it had been calculated and planned by the Politbureau. On October 5, also the Finns were invited to send their Government delegates to Moscow to "discuss mutual problems". However, they refused to accept the dictation of the Kremlin regarding the cession of military bases according to the pattern of the rest of the Baltic States. It was then, on

November 30, that the Red Army attacked Finland and the Russo-Finnish war began, and it was for this act of aggression that Soviet Russia was expelled from the League of Nations on December 14, 1939. Eventually, Finland was forced to capitulate before the military predominance of the Red Army and to cede military bases and grant other territorial concessions to Russia.

The general tone and contents of Molotov's official declarations now underwent a marked change. If prior to the Russo-Finnish war the Russian Foreign Commissar still hoped for a compliant attitude of Finland and, on October 31, 1939, at a meeting of the USSR Supreme Council declared that "all nonsense about sovietizing the Baltic countries is only in the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs", he, after Finland's capitulation, did not hesitate to allude, in his speech of March 25, 1940, to the Kremlin's intention of annexing the Baltic States. Among other things he stated that "... the execution of the pacts progressed satisfactorily and created conditions favourable for a further improvement of the relations between Soviet Russia and these States."

Molotov was right. In the few months, during which the land, air and naval forces of the Red Army had installed themselves in their new bases in Latvia, circumstances took a favourable turn for the realization of the further plans of the Kremlin. The ports of Liepaja and Ventspils were in the hands of the Russians. The outlet of the Gulf of Riga was within the compass of their long-range guns at Pitragas. Each Russian military unit in Latvia had a NKVD section attached to it which was taking up contact with the illegal communist party in the country and beginning to put into effect the Serov Instruction No. 001223. With a view to extending her net of agents, Russia requested and received permission for the admission to Latvia of 300 "technicians", allegedly for the construction work of the Soviet bases. No doubts ever existed about the real nature of these men.

Immediately after Molotov's above-mentioned speech, the Soviet press started attacks, in March and April, on the Latvian Government and there appeared floods of proclamations inviting to overthrow the Government. The next phase was marked by a series of strikes in Riga and Liepaja, inspired by the NKVD, which however failed to develop into a general strike. Thereupon the Soviet Russian Legation officially rebuked the "irresponsible element which spoils the good neighbourly relations".

However, seeing the successful advance of the German army in Belgium and France where it moved from victory to victory, Stalin decided to wait no longer and to show his hand. On May 28, 1940, the Lithuanian Minister in Moscow received a note from Molotov which dealt with the alleged kidnapping of two Russian soldiers in Vilna. Referring to its pacts, the Lithuanian Government suggested to clear up this matter by a mixed Russo-Lithuanian commission. Moscow rejected this proposal and, on the day after the fall of Paris, on June 14, delivered an ultimatum to Lithuania, in which the Baltic States were accused of conspiracy against the USSR. As early as June 15, the Red Army occupied Lithuania, and shot, on the same day, some Latvian frontier guards in order to provoke an incident.

On June 16, similar ultimata, demanding the establishment of Russian-approved governments and the right of passage for troops of USSR, were received by Latvia and Estonia. The answer had to be given within six hours. These ultimata were an act of brutal violation, being an infringement of the stipulations of the mutual assistance pacts and non-aggression treaties. However, being aware of their complete isolation and inability to fight against the predominance of the Red Army, both Latvia and Estonia accepted the dictation of the Kremlin.

What followed was a political farce staged by Moscow. On June 17, motorized units of the Red Army invaded Latvian territory, coming from the east and south (Lithuania), occupied bridges, and post, telegraph and broadcasting offices. Not provided for in the ultimatum was the arrival, in Riga, of Deputy Commissar Vishinski who introduced himself to State President Ulmanis as a special envoy of the Soviet Government. On June 19, he once more called on the President, handing over an enumeration of the members of the new Cabinet which, he assured, had been approved by Moscow and which was unalterable. Actually, this list had been drawn up by Vetrov, second secretary at the Soviet Legation in Riga, who was Vishinski's political advisor.

To conceal yet for a while the true designs, there was, at the beginning, only one communist, member of the underground party, in the new "People's Government" and that was V. Lacis, a writer of novels. The rest were politically naive and insignificant pressmen, with A. Kirchensteins, an ambitious veterinary surgeon and professor of microbiology, who had for several years been in Vetrov's "influence sphere", as Premier.

When the new pro-Soviet Government took over office on June 20, processions of thanksgiving were organized in honour of Stalin, the "liberator", and the "victims of the plutocrats' terror" — members of the illegal communist party, arrested for subversive activity — were released from prison. They totalled in Latvia to some 300. On July 5 was issued a decree, announcing new parliament elections according to the Latvian Constitution of 1922 which provided that every 100 voters could put up a list of their candidates. In order to participate in the elections with a list of their own, the Latvian democratic parties joined into the block of the National Committee, worked out their programme and duly informed Vishinski about it. But already on July 9, by order of V. Lācis, Minister of Internal Affairs, the electoral boards of the National Committee were closed by the police while its most conspicuous candidates were arrested and deported to Russia.

Moscow had decided that the election of the puppet parliament, in all three Baltic States should take place simultaneously, on July 14—15, 1940, and with only one, the "Working People's Union's" list, approved by Moscow. There were only bolsheviks and their left fellow-travellers on that list. Although a considerable number of Baltic citizens boycotted the elections by abstaining from voting or dropping invalidated voting cards at the polls, the TASS news agency announced that in each of the three republics 95—97% of the electorates had voted.

According to documents and the material of the electoral commissions, found after the Red Army was repulsed, the outcome of the voting proved to be a simple falsification by the Moscow emissaries. Also Paletski, President of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, made the statement at a secret meeting that only 16 to 18 percent of valid voting cards were submitted at the polls.

One proof of the staging by the Kremlin of the Baltic parliamentary elections and "legislative" activity is the complete synchronization of these procedures. Another is provided by the fact that the first parliamentary sessions were arranged in theatres and initiated by slogans and resolutions which were passed in chorus. Every single part, performed by the "people's representatives", was prearranged and elaborated on the programme which was worked out by the Soviet Legations and no delegate was given permission to speak outside the order laid down in advance. The votes were not scrutinized and not only did the

official deputies vote, but the whole assembly, among which were a great many specially invited Soviet citizens, took part in the voting by a raising of hands. The deputies had been warned that any member withholding his vote or counter-voting would be taken charge of by the NKVD.

The three single-list Diets had to meet on July 21 and to vote on a whole bunch of sovietization and nationalization decrees, worked out by the Kremlin. Not the least modifications or amendments were allowed to be made by the three puppet parliaments. Although the new Premier Kirchensteins, the legalized central organ of the Latvian Bolshevik party "Cina" and the rest of the communist-controlled press had been unanimous in assuring during the election period that all rumours about the incorporation of Latvia were nothing but provocations and that the "People's Parliament" would strictly observe the stipulations of the pact of October 5, 1939, one of the first items of the "Saeima's" agenda, much to the surprise of the voters, was the proclamation of the Latvian Soviet Republic and the "unanimous" resolution of the assembly to beg Stalin to include Latvia as a federal republic in the Soviet Union. In his raptures with these successful performances Vishinski quite forgot that according to the Latvian Constitution this question could only be decided by a referendum. Nor did the other two emissaries of the Kremlin, Zhdanov at Tallinn and Dekanozov at Kaunas, keep this fact in their minds either.

The last act of this performance took place in Moscow where at the 7th session of the USSR Supreme Council, on August 3, 5 and 6, 1940, the delegations of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian "People's Parliaments" "requested" the incorporation of their respective republics. As a matter of course, the Latvian Premier was at a loss how to write down a speech, sufficiently servile and false, to please the gentlemen of the Politbureau. Therefore, in the end Vishinski himself was compelled to compose the address in Mr. Kirchensteins' place. Afterwards, at its 2nd session in Riga, on August 30, the Latvian Parliament adopted the common standardized Constitution of the Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic, the 13th section of which reads: "the LSSR voluntarily has united into a federated State — the USSR." Naturally, also in this document, fabricated by the Kremlin, like in all other Stalin's Constitutions, is to be found the famous paragraph (§ 97) which caused embarrassment to the minds of so many foreign intellectuals and workers, and which announces that "the citizens

of the LSSR are by law guaranteed freedom of speech, press, assembly and demonstration, in conformity with the interests of the working people." This clause is decisive, because in Russia it is not the working people and their organizations which decide what is in their interests, but solely the Bolshevik party and the Politbureau.

As early as July 23, in reaction to these events, Mr. Sumner Welles, Undersecretary of State, on behalf of the U.S. Government, stated to the press that this was a "devious process" and that "the people of the United States are opposed to predatory activities, no matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by the threat of force." Also, Professor A. de Lapradelle, the well-known authority on international law, has given his opinion of the incorporation, requested by the Baltic Diets in the staging of the Russian occupation powers: "The mode of action pursued by the Soviet Union bears the distinct mark of an infamous double-dealing. A silent annexation would have been a worthier undertaking." (*La Jeune Suisse*, 19 Febr. 1944)

It was Lenin who already defined annexation as an act of incorporation of small or weak nations to some large or powerful State, adding that in such a case "a free vote implies the complete withdrawal of the troops of the incorporating nation." Lacking this prerequisite, it would according to Lenin be an "arbitrary appropriation of a foreign country, an act of violence." However, he who had vowed to fill Lenin's bequest, was thinking and acting in a different way, as it is apparent from Molotov's conversation, on June 30, 1940, with Professor V. Kreve-Mickevicius, Foreign Minister of the Lithuanian "People's Government". Thus, yet before the Baltic parliamentary elections, Molotov had said to him in Moscow: "If the Russian Tsars, beginning with Ivan the Terrible, tried to establish themselves on the Baltic Sea, they were doing this not out of their personal ambitions, but in the interest of the Russian State. It would be unpardonable if the Soviet Union were not to seize this opportunity which might never recur again. The leaders of the Soviet Union decided to incorporate the Baltic States into the family of the Soviet Republics".

Thus, western communism had turned into eastern bolshevism and, at the same time, into the most powerful weapon of Russian imperialism for conquering the world, and "the teacher of all nations", Stalin, the Georgian, had become a pupil of Ivan the Terrible.

Tsar Ivan IV of Muscovy (1547—1584), who suffered from persecutorial delusions and megalomania, about 1564 founded the secret political police, the so-called "Oprichnina", which helped him to fight the aristocracy. When riding horseback on duty, each oprichnik had a dog's head and a broom attached to the saddle. These emblems were meant to emphasize their doglike faithfulness to the Tsar, as well as their readiness to sweep the treason out of the country. This horrifying instrument of Ivan the Terrible was reintroduced by Lenin on December 20, 1917, when the Cheka i.e. the Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counter-Revolution, was founded.

The Cheka is the bolshevik Oprichnina. Its original task was not so much to fight individual enemies of the bolshevik regime as to organize a permanent civil war against the bourgeoisie. As early as December 25, 1918, i.e. a year after the Cheka was instituted, its leading authorities had the following order published in the newspaper "Pravda": "We are not waging war against separate individuals; we are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class . . . Do not ask for incriminating evidence to prove that the prisoner opposed the Soviet Government either by arms or word. Your first duty is to ask him what class he belongs to, what were his origin, education and occupation. These questions should decide the fate of the prisoner. This is the meaning and essence of Red Terror." On September 1, 1918, the newspaper "Red Terror" defined in a more precise way the programme of the Cheka: "We want to murder not by the hundred, but by the thousand. Our enemies shall drown in their own blood."

In 1923 the Cheka was renamed GPU (State Political Administration) and "Izvestya", the officious newspaper of the Soviet Government, on December 19, 1927, wrote that the Cheka would not be abolished before the last capitalist in the world was exterminated. In a lengthy interview which he granted to the foreign workers' delegations on November 5, 1927, Stalin himself fixed the tasks of the Cheka with the following words: "The GPU or Cheka is a punitive organ of the Soviet Government . . . It punishes primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, speculators and forgers. It is something in the nature of a military political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests of the revolution from attacks on the part of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents . . . It has been, ever since, the terror of the bourgeoisie, the indefatigable guard of the revolution, the unsheathed sword of the proletariat . . . We are a

country surrounded by capitalist States. The internal enemies of our revolution are the agents of the capitalists of all countries In fighting against the enemies at home we fight the counter-revolutionary elements of all countries. Judge for yourself whether under such conditions we can do without punitive organs as the GPU."

In 1934 the Cheka was merged in the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and when a special Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) was created the GPU was transferred to that department and only those functions left to the NKVD which were connected with the forced labour camps. For the latter purpose, in 1930 a new huge administration, the GULAG (Main Administration of Correction Labour Camps, Prisons and Special Settlements) was called into life which, since 1934, has been under the direction of the NKVD (now MVD). The chief of the GULAG has the rank of General of Security and is directly subordinate to the Minister of Internal Affairs. A GULAG camp is called "lagpunkt" and the whole of them in one region — "lag" (abbreviation of the Russian "lager" -camp). This last designation is always used jointly with some geographical name, thus, for instance, Kraslag meaning the Krasnoyarsk Camp. The "lag" superintendent is directly subordinate to the chief of the GULAG. On an average, in every "lag" there are about 100 000 convicts, while the number of inmates of a "lagpunkt" is about 1 000. The sentences are pronounced in contumacy by a special tribunal of the NKVD (now MGB), the so-called OSO (Special Council). The politically unreliable are condemned to 10 to 25 years' imprisonment in forced labour camps which generally are situated beyond the polar circle and, in the long run, mean sure death to the prisoners. The rest are deported to special labour settlements either for a certain number of years or for life. The GULAG camps serve a twofold purpose. One is to pursue and "liquidate" the bourgeois and other citizens, unreliable towards the Soviet regime. The other is to ensure yearly contingents of cheap man-power to the Soviet Government, according to the five-year plan, provided in the NKVD budget and needed for the more extensive and important State enterprises, particularly in the northern regions where the mortality rate is specially high. According to the incomplete information of UNO, the total number of individuals toiling every year in the Soviet slave camps is from 8 to

14 million people, while during the Tsarist regime, in 1916, only 29 352 people were condemned to forced labour.

Although the revolution of March 1917 did away with administrative deportation and forced labour by court sentence, provided for in the Penal Code valid since 1885, the Soviet Government re-introduced these two institutions of the Tsarist regime as early as 1922, authorizing the Cheka to transfer all "socially dangerous elements" to forced labour camps for a duration up to 3 years. This practice was legalized by all Soviet criminal codes. In addition, the programme of the Bolshevik party provides for a "transfer of inhabitants according to plan, for the purpose of balancing the distribution of man-power" which began in 1925 when several millions of Soviet citizens from European Russia were deported to Siberia, Central Asia and the Far East. Now again millions and millions of people are being exiled to these climatically severe latitudes to erect, in those snow- and icebound regions, new cities on the graves of the deported, and to build new harbours, railways and mines in order to increase the war potential of the Soviet State. Thus, deportation and forced labour have developed into a system of extermination of whole social groups ("bourgeois", "kulaks") and of genocide in that sense and understanding which made the UNO Plenary Meeting in Paris, on December 9, 1948, pass the convention on the punishability of genocide.

Since Red Terror, genocide and the slave economy, provided for in the economic structure of the Soviet State, are the foundation of the bolshevik regime, it is easy to understand that all these methods were automatically put into effect immediately after the occupation of the Baltic States in June 1940. The incorporation of these countries had not yet taken place when the GPU started its work, in all three Baltic countries, not only by deporting the State presidents of Latvia and Estonia (the Lithuanian President was the only one to succeed in emigrating), but also the governments and the most prominent of the social workers and politicians of the three countries. After the incorporation, the Order No. 001223 which referred to the registration of "anti-Soviet elements" with the view of subsequently punishing them, and issued by the NKVD as early as October 11, 1939, was revived to its full extent. No sooner was the Soviet Latvian Constitution decreed on August 30, 1940, according to which the Latvian People's Commissariat of State Security was "federal-republican", i.e.

common with that of the USSR, than the specialists in the matters of the GPU, sent from Russia, could under the direction of the NKVD commissar A. Novik (in autumn of 1940) and the NKGB commissar S. Shustin (early in 1941) "legally" start their activity.

The premises of the former Ministries of Home and Social Affairs, a conspicuous building in the central part of Riga, were turned into the GPU main headquarters. In November 1940 the ground-floor and cellars of this building were remodelled into a special prison for interrogation, and provided with cells measuring 80×80 cm on plan and called "dog-kennels" (in Russian "sobachniki"), where the prisoners could neither stand nor lie. After all kinds of devilishly subtle methods of torture the prisoners were put into these cells to "recover" until they were again summoned for interrogation which usually began late in the evening and lasted the night through with the purpose of extorting a confession from the prisoner. The GPU had at its command an extensive net of agents whose reports were worked out by specialists. All prisons were under the control of the GPU which had at its disposal special military units composed mainly of Asiatics. Even the militia, Workers' Guard, the members and candidates of the Bolshevik party, members of the Communist Youth and the rest of the ancillary party organizations had to obey GPU orders and instructions.

Who, then, were the unfortunate people who sooner or later had to succumb to the NKVD? The secret order, signed on November 28, 1940, at Kaunas by the Lithuanian NKVD commissar A. Guzevicius, which was found in the summer of 1941 among the documents left by the GPU (cf. K. Pelekis, *Genocide*, p. 265—267, published by Venta, Germany 1949), gave the answer to this question. Taking into account that the NKVD in the three Baltic countries only executed the orders which they received from Moscow, there is every reason to assume that confidential orders of a similar content were issued to their subordinate authorities also by the Latvian and Estonian NKVD commissars.

This circular order of November 28, 1940, contains the following passage: "For the task of operative work it is of profound importance to know how many former policemen, white-guardists, ex-army officers, members of anti-Soviet political parties and organizations are in the territory of Lithuania and where this element is concentrated. This is necessary in order to define the counter-

revolutionary force and to *direct our apparatus of active agencies for their annihilation and liquidation* Executing the Order of the People's Commissar of NKVD of USSR No. 001223 referring to a report on the anti-Soviet element, and the demand to be most careful in the exact execution of that task, I issue the following order:

§ 5. Into the alphabetic files must be entered all those persons who, because of their social and political past, their nationalistic-chauvinistic inclinations, religious beliefs, moral and political instability, are hostile to the socialistic form of state, and consequently might be exploited by foreign intelligence services and counter-revolutionary centres for their anti-Soviet purposes. Among such elements are to be counted:

a) all former members of anti-Soviet political parties, organizations and groups: Trotskyists, right-wingers, Essers, Mensheviks, Social Democrats, anarchists, etc.

b) all former members of nationalistic, chauvinistic anti-Soviet parties, Nationalists, Christian Democrats, the active members of student corporations, of the National Guard etc.

c) former policemen, officers of the criminal and political police and of prisons.

d) former army officers and members of military courts.

e) persons who are dismissed from the Communist Party and Communist Youth Organization for various offences against the party.

f) all refugees, political emigrants, immigrants, repatriants and contrabandists.

g) all citizens of foreign states, representatives of foreign firms, employees of foreign state institutions, former citizens of foreign states, former employees of foreign legations, firms, concessions, and stock companies.

h) persons who maintain personal contact or are in correspondence with foreign countries, legations and consulates, with philatelists and esperantists.

i) former officials of Ministerial Departments.

j) former Red Cross officials.

k) clergy of religious communities, Orthodox priests, Roman Catholic priests, sectarians and active members of religious congregations.

l) former noblemen, estate owners, merchants, bankers, businessmen, owners of factories and shops, owners of hotels and restaurants.

§ 6. For the completion of the alphabetic files for all anti-Soviet elements there must be made the most careful use of all sources, among them: reports of agencies, material of special investigations, material of Party and Soviet Organizations, declarations of citizens, testimonies and other official material must be proved at first in the agential way.

§ 9. The chief of the 1st Special Branch of the NKVD is under obligation to report to me daily about the progress of this Order."

This enumeration is not complete, as is proved by other documents. Thus, in the above Order are only mentioned members of military courts, but after the NKGB was established on February 3, 1941, the latter had lists prepared which included even public prosecutors, inquestors of the specially important trials, members of Courts of Appeal and Supreme Tribunals, district prefects, military commandants of districts, officers of the Intelligence Section of the General Staff, officers of the Frontier Guard Corps, all officers of the former white Armies, prison guards of the ranks, former employees of the Baltic legations abroad, members of families of the participants of counter-revolutionary nationalist organizations, whose family heads had been sentenced to death or were in hiding from government organs; families of traitors of the homeland who had fled abroad.

Let us recall Stalin's declaration made to the foreign workers' delegations to Moscow in 1927: "The internal enemies are the agents of the capitalists of all countries." This assumption explains why the Soviet penal codes qualify as spies and agents all those who without the knowledge of the GPU manage in some way or other to get abroad or who are in contact with foreigners. Everyone who sends or receives private or service letters to or from his relatives, colleagues (scientists, for instance), international organizations abroad, unless his correspondence has been copied or registered beforehand by the political police, is regarded as a traitor of the homeland. Everyone who dares to apply for a foreign travel passport without a special order by the GPU automatically falls under the category of and is filed as politically suspect. No scientific institution of the USSR may order or receive any foreign special journal or publication, let alone fiction and newspapers, unless it has been approved by the GPU. No Soviet citizen must know what is going on beyond the iron curtain and what the people there write, speak and think, except that coloured and

screened information which the Soviet people are hourly served with a specific propaganda dressing by the Soviet radio and party newspapers. That accounts also for the fact that after the occupation of the Baltic States the former newspaper editors, employees of the broadcasting stations, ministers abroad, consuls, officials and even servants of legations were included in the class of enemies of the people; further, members of the Red Cross, the PEN Club, the Rotary Club, boy-scouts, girl-guides and — oh wonder — even philatelists and esperantists.

In the official correspondence of the GPU all these citizens of the Baltic countries were designated with the technical term "byvshiy lyudyi" (i.e. people who were something in the past) that is to say people whose fates were determined by the political police only. What were the crimes of these people? Why were they arrested, interrogated, tortured, killed or sentenced to forced labour? Their only crime consisted in their not being communists and their being either ex-soldiers of the Latvian National Army who had fought in 1918—1920 against the Russian Red Army, or, later, officials and civil servants who had honestly filled their official duties, trying to combat the banditism instigated by underground communists and criminals. After the Russian occupation also criminal convicts were released from prison. This element joined the new regime by enrolling in the Red Militia, the Workers' Guard and by taking service with the NKVD. Therefore also the officials of the criminal police who knew too much of the past of that element had to be liquidated.

Let us remember the Order of the Cheka, published on December 25, 1918: "Your first duty is to ask the prisoner what class he belongs to, what were his origin, education and occupation. These questions should decide the fate of the prisoner." The citizens of the Baltic States at that time naively believed — as it is still now believed in many western democracies — that in the course of the 30 years after the bolshevik subversion in Russia the primary terror and methods of civil warfare had been entirely abolished or, at least, adjusted to the principles of right, declared in Stalin's Constitution. Thus, sections 84 and 85 of the Constitution of the LSSR declares that: "In all courts of the LSSR, to the extent that the law does not provide exceptions, cases are tried publicly, ensuring the defendant the right of counsel. Judges are independent and subject only to the law."

This, however, was only the façade of the Soviet State, painted in bright

colours to catch the eyes of the onlookers from the western world. In fact, the Cheka, or NKGB, became the actual ruler of the occupied countries, superior to all other branches of Government, Party and the Red Army. This institution had laws of its own and methods, elaborated during a 30 years' practice which no Constitution of Stalin's ever mentions anywhere. Thus, for example, in its Order dated April 25, 1941, under No. 0023, the Lithuanian NKGB advises all its district branches: "The existence of a large contingent of persons, subject to operative accounting under Order No. 001223 of the NKVD of the USSR, dated October 11, 1939, *regardless* of concrete data concerning their anti-Soviet activities, obligates the NKGB at the present time to *specify separately* in its accounting work and screening of the counter-revolutionary and hostile elements, the categories of particularly dangerous persons, whose accounting must be organized in first priority order and within the shortest time possible."

This group of particularly dangerous individuals comprised the leaders of the former political parties of the Baltic States, the chairmen of the parliaments, heads of police, commanding officers of the army and the Home Guard and other leading persons who had held administrative key positions during the period of independence and who still enjoyed the loyalty of their adherents and former subordinates. According to the Order No. 001223, issued by Commissar Serov, these persons should be eliminated without noise and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other excesses by a certain part of the surrounding population inimically inclined toward the Soviet administration. All arrests took place by night or late in the evening. The arrested were removed to the GPU where they were made to fill in questionnaires, containing innumerable questions, with the view of recording their social origin, education and activity before the occupation.

Then followed the interrogation which was combined with psychical and physical torture.

When, in June 1941, the Red Army retreated from the Baltic area, on the premises of the NKGB were found a variety of instruments which were used for extorting confessions from the prisoners. Without enumerating all the devilish devices of torturing, let us mention the ordinary equipment of the working cabinet for interrogation of the NKVD, or NKGB: instruments to break the bones of shins and arms, to squeeze testicles, to pierce the soles of feet and to

pull off the nails and skin from hands, to squeeze the main nose ligament until the victim bleeds profusely, electrical appliances, etc. The corpses which were left in the courtyards of the GPU prisons and exhumed from mass-graves show that before being shot the "enemies of the people" were mutilated to an extent which in many cases made it quite impossible for relatives to identify the GPU victims. As a matter of course, the interrogation and sentencing were not carried out publicly, but in great secrecy by special NKGB tribunals.

Among the papers of the NKGB, there have survived several lists, bearing the signature of Shustin, Commissar of State Security of the LSSR, on death sentences passed in Riga. These lists usually end with a resolution which reads as follows: "Considering the social danger they represent, all must be shot." On some of these lists, in special columns, the crimes of the condemned have been formulated in a few words, as, for instance: "Did not join in singing the Internationale on the 1st of May; has fought in the Latvian Army against the bolsheviks; member of a student corporation; former policeman; descendant of a kulak; awarded the Order of Lācplešis (Bear-killer); formerly adjutant of the State President; exploited man-power other than his own, etc."

The registration, carried out by the Latvian Red Cross in the summer of 1942, evinced that during the first Russian occupation of Latvia no less than 7 161 political criminals were in prison, amongst them 404 women and 17 children and 179 old people over 60 years of age. Actually, the number of prisoners was by far larger, because many prisoners were reported as missing. Of these prisoners 979 were killed, the rest being sentenced and deported to forced labour camps in Russia. The deportation of smaller groups began as early as towards the end of 1940, while the first larger transport of prisoners left for the autonomous republic of Komi on April 25, 1941. Other followed until June 24, with different polar regions as destination. During the whole period of Latvia's independence the total number of political prisoners did not exceed 300 to 400 and of these, as a matter of course, no one was ever sentenced to death, capital punishment being abolished in Latvia.

The large deportation scheme, carried out in all three Baltic countries on the night from June 13 to June 14, 1941, had a purely administrative character and had been carefully prepared during the whole previous year according to Serov's Order No. 001223 already mentioned before. This measure was

conceived not for the liquidation of individual leading persons, but with the view of exterminating a whole class, the so-called "bourgeoisie". Several days before it was implemented, all available lorries were mustered and ordered to wait at the police, NKVD and party offices. Before this scheme was put into effect the drivers, among themselves, had already been hinting that a "hunt for the bourgeois" was under preparation. These lorries, manned with armed chekists, militia-men and members of the Communist party who were provided with special lists approved in Moscow, raided, in the dead of night, town flats and country farms, carrying out domiciliary searches, reading their warrants of deportation and telling the people to be ready for departure in an hour's time or even less. According to the instructions, the deportees from the towns were allowed to take with them their belongings not exceeding 100 kg in weight (all personal cash, a whole family's food ration for a month, cooking appliances, footwear, clothes and linen). In the country, people could also take some working tools (axes, saws) with them. If, during the search, arms, foreign currency or counter-revolutionary literature were found, a report was drawn up. If the person to be arrested offered armed resistance, it was separated from the rest and handed over to the NKVD. After these formalities were settled the arrested families were taken to railway stations where trains, composed of goods-vans with grated window-openings and — as the only convenience — a hole sawn in the floor of the van, were already waiting.

While preparing for departure, the families of the deportees were made to believe that they would be all sent together to one place. However, this was a cunning Asiatic trick, because Order No. 001223 provided that "in view of the fact that a large number of deportees must be arrested and distributed in special camps and that their families must proceed to special settlements in distant regions, it is essential that the operation of removal of both the members of the deportee's family and its head shall be carried out simultaneously, without notifying them of the separation confronting them The convoy of the entire family to the station shall be effected in one vehicle and only at the station of departure shall the head of the family be placed separately from his family in a car specially intended for heads of families." These trains were escorted by a NKVD officer, specially

appointed for this task, and by a military convoy. The deportation taking place in the hottest season the deportees in the crammed wagons suffered horribly from thirst and diseases, caused by the anti-sanitary conditions on the trains.

A few of the deportees who afterwards succeeded in escaping from the settlements have attested under oath the truth of the statements they have given of the procedure of deportation. A Lithuanian deportee gave the following account: "After a month's journey, we, the male deportees, were detained in the Krasnoyarsk region, at Kraslag, lagpunkt 7. On getting out from the train, the NKVD functionaries expressed their gladness at the arrival of a new transport of bourgeois and fascist sons-of-bitches who in their own interest would be glad to meet their end here. Besides all objects of value, money and clothes, even such things as pocket knives, shaving-apparatuses and small religious crosses were taken away. Clad in rags, we were divided up in brigades and sent into the tayga (virgin forest) to cut trees for railway-sleepers for a line under construction. Our day's food-ration consisted of 400 g of bread and a thin soup of frozen and rotten potatoes without any fat. We had to sleep in unheated huts, without blankets, on bare boards or on the floor. When winter came and the temperature fell to -50° C, mortality increased in a terrific manner. It was impossible to bury the dead, because the ground was frozen to a great depth, so they were heaped up in a corner of the camp. As early as Christmas 1941 nearly all the deportees of our transport had died."

From the bills of lading it may be seen that between June 15 and June 27, 1941, a total of 901 goods-vans with deportees left Latvia. Of these, 427 had carried prisoners. It seems that among them were also the heads of the families of the deportees. A telephone message, received in Moscow on June 13 at 2.30 by Commissar Serov, revealed that it was planned to deport 16 200 people from Latvia. The total number of people actually deported may be reckoned to have been 15 600. Thus, a few hundred who happened to be absent from their homes at the fateful hour or who had changed residence succeeded in escaping deportation. The registration of deportees, which was afterwards carried out, yielded detailed information about 15081 deportees. Among them were 6447 men, 5 302 women and 3 332 children under the age of 16, this latter figure including also 291 infants under the age of 1, and 315 aged people over 70 years old. When the Red Army, in June, 1941, retreated from Latvia, it engulfed in its

wake also motor-drivers, railway-men, sailors, children from summer rest-homes and nurseries and soldiers of the Baltic Territorial Corps, especially officers, a total of about 13 000 persons.

After the occupation of Latvia by the Russians the units of the Latvian National Army were reduced to one corps consisting of two divisions and the military order and regulations of the Russian Red Army with its political instructors (politruks) were introduced in it. As early as September 10, 1940, several hundreds of Latvian officers and several thousands of Latvian privates were dismissed and replaced by soldiers of the Red Army. In spring 1941 the two Latvian divisions were sent to camp at Litene. It was here that 120 Latvian officers, mostly of the higher ranks, were told off by roll-call, put into lorries and, surrounded by chekists and Red Army soldiers, disarmed, arrested and deported. Also this scheme had already been planned early in spring 1941. Brigadier Blauberg of the Territorial Baltic Corps, on April 12, issued a secret order No. 02833 to all army prosecutors of the divisions, reminding them to shadow all soldiers of the former national army who were left in the national units of the Baltic Corps. "... In these national units there are individuals who originated from a socially alien element, reactionary and hostile to the Soviet rule and the Red Army. These elements, by abusing the backwardness of individual fighters, their religious superstitions, national ideas, insufficient understanding of the new socialistic order, are attempting in all ways to wage an anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary activity."

By adding those, the total of deported Latvians in the years 1940 and 1941 amounts to 35 000 or 1.8 % of the population of Latvia. This means that in the case of a Russian occupation and in proportion to the population: 2 400 000 people would be deported from the U.S.A., 865 000 — from Great Britain and 205 000 — from Canada. All trades and social groups, independent of nationality, sex and age, were affected by this deportation. Of all the professions and occupations, decimated by the deportation, the army lost 20 %, the police forces — 19 %, the judges and lawyers — 13 %, and the number of professors of higher educational institutions was reduced by 8 %. Moreover, 372 school rectors and teachers, 1953 pupils, many authors, artists and scientists were banished.

⊖ This violent measure of June 13 and 14 was to be the introduction to a still

more extensive deportation which according to the plans of the NKVD was to embrace several hundred thousands of Baltic citizens and which was to take place on June 27 and 28, 1941. However, the beginning of the Russo-German war prevented the implementation of this second mass deportation. Documents found in the University of Latvia after the Russian occupation authorities had left, revealed that the whole professional staff had been entered on three nominal lists, bearing the following headings: nationalists and fascists, neutrals, and sympathizers of the Soviet Government. The first-mentioned group was marked out for deportation on June 27 and 28.

Among the deportees in the years 1940 and 1941 were the following members of the last Latvian Saeima (Parliament): J. Visna, R. Dukurs, A. Veckalns, P. Lejins — Social Democrats; State President K. Ulmanis, H. Celmins, General J. Balodis, H. Dzelzitis — Peasant Party; M. Skujenieks — Progressive; G. Milbergs, P. Apinis — New-settlers; Berta Pipina — Democr. Centre; Arv. Bergs — Nationalist; P. Leikerts — Indep. Peasants; O. Rancans — Letgall. Catholics; J. Trasuns — Letgall. Progressive; the rabbis M. Nuroks and M. Dubins — of the Jewish Group; deputies M. Kalistratov, Russian starover, and T. I. Muiznieks, Soc. Dem., were shot. Thus, the loss amounted to 20% of the total number of Saeima members. The number of deported parliament deputies increases, if we add the members of the Constitutional Assembly and of the first three Saeimas. The nominal list of Latvians deported to Soviet Russia in 1940/41 has been published by the Latvian National Fund in the Scandinavian Countries (These Names Accuse, Stockholm 1951).

The second Russian occupation, which is continuing since autumn 1944, shows that the true purpose of these administrative deportations is completely to exterminate the entire middle classes. In an agricultural country this means the liquidation of the peasant class (the so-called kulaks) also, in order to completely carry out the programme of agricultural collectivization which provides only for the existence of "poor peasants". According to the data of the 15th Conference of the Russian Bolshevik party in 1926, only those peasants were regarded as poor whose yearly income did not exceed 39 dollars, while a well-off peasant's income was fixed at 46 dollars. The rest (kulaks) were considered to be enemies of the people. Yet before the annexation of the Baltic States, all three Baltic "people's parliaments", under the protection of the occupation army, on

July 22, 1940, passed resolutions on land nationalization. Seven days later, a special Bill of Land Reform was passed which provided the maximum of 30 ha of land to be used by a family. At the same time, lots up to 10 ha each were apportioned to new-settlers from the fund of nationalized land. This new agrarian law created two different classes of peasants: working peasants with lots ranging from 1 to 10 ha and "kulaks" whose farms were larger. After the second Russian occupation, it was decreed, on September 7, 1944, for reasons of propaganda, to increase the land norm of the working peasant to 15 ha, while the maximum area tilled by kulaks was reduced from 30 ha to 15—20 ha. In 1935, 44.5 % of the Latvian farmers had a landed property from 1 to 10 ha each, or 59 % of them 1 to 15 ha each. This meant that at least 41 % of farming peasants and their families were now by law included in the category of enemies of the people and thus predestined for deportation.

The first 4 kolkhozes were set up in Latvia 1946, officially quite "voluntarily". By September 1, 1947, the number of kolkhozes (i.e. collective farms) had grown to 16 and by January 1, 1948, to 49. As the collectivization continued to make slow progress, the Bolshevik press stated: "We must destroy elements belonging to the kulak class." And the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, J. Kalnberzins, said on July 22, 1948: "The policy of imposing taxes according to class and the introduction of kolkhozes will destroy this capitalist element which will disappear the same as it did in Russia."

If a farmer is regarded as a kulak, the taxes he is required to pay are ten times higher than they would be otherwise, and they have to be paid retroactively as far back as 1945. If a kulak is unable to pay, he is taken to court as a saboteur. The usual sentence is deportation to the slave camps in Siberia.

The result of this "new policy" was a wholesale deportation of Latvian kulaks in March 1949. Driven to despair, many farmers burned their farms, took to the woods and joined the guerillas. People of a more passive character, intimidated by the incessant deportations, clenched their teeth and "voluntarily" joined the kolkhozes. After these means of compulsion and Red terror the number of Latvian kolkhozes had increased from 49 to 4200, including 97 percent of all farmers.

This scheme is continuing to work in all three Baltic countries without interruption. According to unofficial reports, 3,000 to 5,000 Balts are being deported every month from each of the Baltic countries, the vacuums being filled up by infiltrating Russians and Mongolians.

APPENDIX IV

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.

ORDER No 001223

regarding the Procedure for carrying out the Deportation of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

STRICTLY SECRET.

(Translated from the Original Russian Text in London).

1. General Situation

The deportation of anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic Republics is a task of great political importance. Its successful execution depends upon the extent to which the district operative "troikas" and operative headquarters are capable of carefully working out a plan for executing the operations and for anticipating everything indispensable.

Moreover, care must be taken that the operations are carried out without disturbances and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other troubles not only on the part of those to be deported, but also on the part of a certain section of the surrounding population hostile to the Soviet administration.

Instructions as to the procedure for conducting the operations are given below. They should be adhered to, but in individual cases the collaborators engaged in carrying out the operations shall take into account the special character of the concrete conditions of such operations and, in order correctly to appraise the situation, may and must adopt other decision directed to the same end, viz., to fulfil the task entrusted to them without noise and panic.

2. Procedure of Instructing

The instructing of operative groups by the district "troika" shall be done as speedily as possible on the day before the beginning of the operations, taking into consideration the time necessary for travelling to the scene of operations.

The district "troika" shall previously prepare the necessary transport for conveyance of the operative groups in the village to the scene of operations.

On the question of allocating the necessary number of motor-cars and waggons

for transport, the district "troika" shall consult the leaders of the Soviet party organized on the spot.

Premises for the issue of instructions must be carefully prepared in advance, and their capacity, exits and entrances and the possibility of intrusion by strangers must be considered.

Whilst instructions are being issued the building must be carefully guarded by operative workers.

Should anybody from amongst those participating in the operation fail to appear for instructions, the district "troika" shall at once take steps to replace the absentee from a reserve which shall be provided in advance.

Through police officers the "troika" shall notify to those assembled a division of the government for the deportation of a prescribed number contingent of anti-Soviet elements from the territory of the said republic or region. Moreover, they shall briefly explain what the deportees represent.

The special attention of the (local) Soviet party workers gathered for instructions shall be drawn to the fact that the deportees are enemies of the Soviet people and that the possibility of an armed attack on the part of the deportees cannot be excluded.

3. Procedure for Acquisition of Documents

After the general instructions of the operative groups, documents regarding the deportees should be issued to such groups. The deportees' personal files must be previously collected and distributed among the operative groups, by communes and villages, so that when they are being given out there shall be no delays.

After receipt of personal files, the senior member of the operative group shall acquaint himself with the personal affairs of the families which he will have to deport. He shall, moreover, ascertain the composition of the family, the supply of essential forms for completion regarding the deportee, the supply of transport for conveyance of the deportee, and he shall receive exhaustive answers to questions not clear to him.

Simultaneously with the issuing of documents, the district "troika" shall explain to each senior member of the operative group where the families to be exported are situated and shall describe the route to be followed to the place of

deportation. The roads to be taken by the operative personnel with the deported families to the railway station for entrainment shall be indicated. It is also essential to indicate where reserve military groups are stationed, should it be necessary to call them out during trouble of any kind.

The possession and state of arms and ammunition of the entire operative personnel shall be checked. Weapons must be in complete battle readiness and magazines loaded, but the cartridge shall not be slipped into the rifle breech. Weapons shall be used only as a last resort, when the operative group is attacked or threatened with attack or when resistance is offered.

4. Procedure for Carrying out Deportations

If the deportation of several families is being carried out in a settled locality, one of the operative workers shall be appointed senior as regards deportation in that village, and under his direction the operative personnel shall proceed to the villages in question. On arrival in the villages, the operative group shall get in touch (observing the necessary secrecy) with the local authorities: the chairman, secretary or members of the village soviets, and shall ascertain from them the exact dwelling-place of the families to be deported.

After this the operative groups, together with the representatives of the local authorities, who shall be appointed to make an inventory of property, shall proceed to the dwellings of the families to be deported. Operations shall be begun at daybreak. Upon entering the home of the person to be deported, the senior member of the operative group shall assemble the entire family of the deportee into one room, taking all necessary precautionary measures against any possible trouble.

After the members of the family have been checked in conformity with the list, the location of those absent and the number of sick persons shall be ascertained, after which they shall be called upon to give up their weapons. Irrespective of whether or not any weapons are delivered, the deportee shall be personally searched and then the entire premises shall be searched in order to discover hidden weapons.

During the search of the premises one of the members of the operative group shall be appointed to keep watch over the deportees.

Should the search disclose hidden weapons in small quantities, these shall be collected by the operative groups and distributed among them. If many weapons are discovered, they shall be piled into the wagon or motor-car which has brought the operative group, after any ammunition in them has been removed. Ammunition shall be packed together with rifles.

If necessary, a convoy for transporting the weapons shall be mobilized with an adequate guard.

In the event of the discovery of weapons, counter-revolutionary pamphlets, literature, foreign currency, large quantities of valuables etc., a brief report of search shall be drawn up on the spot, wherein the hidden weapons or counter-revolutionary literature shall be indicated. If there is any armed resistance, the question of the necessity of arresting the parties, showing such armed resistance, and of sending them to the district branch of the People's Commissariat of Public Security shall be decided by the district "troika".

A report shall be drawn up regarding the deportees in hiding or sick ones, and this report shall be signed by the representative of the Soviet party organization.

After completion of the search of the deportees they shall be notified that by a Government decision they will be deported to other regions of the Union.

The deportees shall be permitted to take with them household necessities not exceeding 100 kilograms in weight.

1. Suit. 2. Shoes. 3. Underwear. 4. Bedding. 5. Dishes. 6. Glassware. 7. Kitchen-utensils. 8. Foods, an estimated month's supply for a family. 9. Money in their possession. 10. Trunk or box in which to pack articles. It is not recommended that large articles be taken.

If the contingent is deported from rural districts, they shall be allowed to take with them small agricultural stocks—axes, saws, and other articles, so that when boarding the deportation train they may be loaded into special goods wagons.

In order not to mix them with articles belonging to others, the Christian name, patronymic and surname of the deportee and name of the village shall be written on the packed property.

When loading these articles into the carts, measures shall be taken so that the deportee cannot make use of them for purposes of resistance while the column is moving along the highway.

Simultaneously with the task of loading by the operative groups, the representatives of the Soviet party organizations present at the time prepare an inventory of the property and of the manner of its protection in conformity with the instructions received by them.

If the deportee possesses his own means of transport, his property shall be loaded into the vehicle and together with his family shall be sent to the designated place of entrainment.

If the deportees are without means of transport, carts shall be mobilized in the village by the local authorities, as instructed by the senior member of the operative group.

All persons entering the home of the deportee during the execution of the operations or found there at the moment of these operations must be detained until the conclusion of the operations, and their relationship to the deportee shall be ascertained. This is done in order to disclose persons hiding from the police, gendarmes and other persons. After verification of the identity of the detained persons and establishment of the fact that they are persons in whom the contingent is not interested they shall be liberated.

If the inhabitants of the village begin to gather around the deportees' home while operations are in progress, they shall be called upon to disperse to their own homes, and crowds shall not be permitted to form. If the deportee refuses to open the door of his home, notwithstanding that he is aware that the members of the People's Commissariat for Public Security have arrived, the door must be broken down. In individual cases neighbouring operative groups carrying out operations in that locality shall be called upon to help.

The delivery of the deportees from the village to the meeting place at the railway station must be effected during daylight; care, moreover, should be taken that the assembling of every family shall not last more than two hours.

In all cases throughout the operations firm and decisive action shall be taken, without the slightest excitement, noise and panic.

It is categorically forbidden to take any articles away from the deportees except weapons, counter-revolutionary literature and foreign currency, as also to make use of the food of the deportees.

All participants in the operations must be warned that they will be held legally

accountable for attempts to appropriate individual articles belonging to the deportees.

5. Procedure for Separating a Deportee's Family from the Head of the Family.

In view of the fact that a large number of deportees must be arrested and distributed in special camps and that their families must proceed to special settlements in distant regions, it is essential that the operations of removal of both the members of the deportee's family and its head shall be carried out simultaneously, without notifying them of the separation confronting them. After the domiciliary search has been carried out and the appropriate identification documents have been drawn up in the deportee's home, the operative worker shall complete the documents for the head of the family and deposit them in the latter's personal file, but the documents drawn up for members of his family shall be deposited in the personal file of the deportee's family. The convoy of the entire family to the station shall, however, be effected in one vehicle and only at the station of departure shall the head of the family be placed separately from his family in a car specially intended for heads of families.

During the assembling (of the family) in the home of the deportee the head of the family shall be warned that personal male effects must be packed in a separate suitcase, as a sanitary inspection of the deported men will be made separately from the women and children.

At the stations of entrainment heads of families subject to arrest shall be loaded into cars specially allotted to them, which shall be indicated by operative workers appointed for that purpose.

6. Procedure for conveying the Deportees

The assistants conveying the column of deportees in horse-carts are strictly forbidden to sit in the said carts. The assistants must follow alongside and behind the column of deportees. The senior assistant of the convoy shall from time to time go the rounds of the entire column to check the correctness of the movement.

When the column of the deportees is passing through inhabited places or when

encountering passers-by, the convoy must be controlled with particular care; those in charge must see that no attempts are made to escape, and no conversation of any kind shall be permitted between the deportees and passers-by.

7. Procedure for Entrainment.

At each point of entrainment a member of the operative "troika" and a person specially appointed for that purpose shall be responsible for entrainment.

On the day of entrainment the chief of the entrainment point, together with the chief of the deportation train and of the conveying military forces of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, shall examine the railway cars provided in order to see that they are supplied with everything necessary, and the chief of the entrainment point shall agree with the chief of the deportation train on the procedure to be observed by the latter in accepting delivery of the deportees.

Red Army men of the conveying forces of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs shall surround the entrainment station.

The senior members of the operative group shall deliver to the chief of the deportation train one copy of the nominal roll of the deportees in each railway-car. The chief of the deportation train shall, in conformity with this list, call out the name of each deportee, shall carefully check every name and assign the deportee's place in the railway-car.

The deportee's effects shall be loaded into the car, together with the deportee, with the exception of the small agricultural inventory, which shall be loaded in a separate car.

The deportees shall be loaded into railway-cars by families; it is permitted to break up a family (with the exception of heads of families subject to arrest). An estimate of twenty-five persons to a car should be observed.

After the railway-car has been filled with the necessary number of families, it shall be locked.

After the people have been taken over and placed in the deportation train, the chief of the train shall bear responsibility for all persons handed over to him and for their delivery to their destination. After handing over the deportees the senior member of the operative group shall draw up a report on the operation

carried out by him and briefly indicate the name of the deportee, whether any weapon and counter-revolutionary literature have been discovered, and also how the operation was carried out.

After having placed the deportees on the deportation train and having submitted reports of the results of the operations to be thus discharged, the members of the operative group shall be considered free and shall act in accordance with the instructions of the chief of the district branch of the People's Commissariat of Public Security.

Deputy People's Commissar of Public Security of the USSR.
Commissar of Public Security of the third Rank (signed):

S E R O V.

APPENDIX 2.

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО

Пятидневная сводка № _____

По учету в/с и к/р элементов, согласно приказа НКГБ Лит. ССР № 0023 от 25 апреля

1941 года по _____ Уездному Отделу НКГБ Лит. ССР

за время с _____ по _____ 1941 г.

О К Р А С К И	Выявлено и взято на справочный учет	Установле- но на обслуж территории	Заведено дел форм	Заведено учет. дел	Заведено розыскных дел
1	2	3	4	5	6
I. По линии СПО:					
РАЗДЕЛ ПЕРВЫЙ.					
а) Бывшие руководящие чиновники государ- ственного аппарата					
1) Основные референты					
2) Директора департаментов и выше					
3) Уездные начальники					
4) Военные коменданты уездов					
5) Полицейские					
6) Жандармы					
7) Тюремщики (работавшие на админи- стративной работе)					
8) Прокуроры					
9) Члены военно-полевых судов					
10) " военных судов"					
11) " Верховного Трибунала					
12) " апелляционных палат					
13) " окружных судов (принимавшие участие в разборе полет. дел)					
14) Следователи по особо важным делам					
15) Чиновники Жалыгибы (Саугумас)					
16) " Криминальной полиции					
17) Офицеры 2-го (разведывательного) отдела Генштаба литовской армии					
18) Активные участники банд ПЛЕХАВИ- ЧУСА, БЕРМОНТ-АВАЛОВА, ФОН- ДЕРГОЛЬЦА, выступавшие против Советов в Битве					
19) Троцкисты					
20) Эсеры					
21) Руководящие социалдемократы					
22) Provokatory охраны					
23) Семьи репрессированных					
24) Помещики					
25) Крупные фабриканты					
26) Крупные купцы и крупные домо- владельцы					

Secret registration form, showing number and classification of deportees according to their social status, their occupation, political conviction, etc. Such forms were issued for all three Baltic countries. The above example shows a form prepared by an order dated April 25, 1941, for the requirements of Lithuania.

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PROGRESS OF THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

FOR THE YEAR 1921

No.	Name	Country	Profession
1	Mr. J. H.
2	Mr.
3	Mr.
4	Mr.
5	Mr.
6	Mr.
7	Mr.
8	Mr.
9	Mr.
10	Mr.
11	Mr.
12	Mr.
13	Mr.
14	Mr.
15	Mr.
16	Mr.
17	Mr.
18	Mr.
19	Mr.
20	Mr.
21	Mr.
22	Mr.
23	Mr.
24	Mr.
25	Mr.
26	Mr.
27	Mr.
28	Mr.
29	Mr.
30	Mr.
31	Mr.
32	Mr.
33	Mr.
34	Mr.
35	Mr.
36	Mr.
37	Mr.
38	Mr.
39	Mr.
40	Mr.
41	Mr.
42	Mr.
43	Mr.
44	Mr.
45	Mr.
46	Mr.
47	Mr.
48	Mr.
49	Mr.
50	Mr.

The names of the members of the Committee on the Progress of the Work of the Commission for the year 1921 are given in the following table.

Сов. секретно.

Бривибасий

№ III	Семейн. № и отчество.	Отрасль в % де-за.	Количество в семействе до 16 лет. 16 л.	Адрес места жительства.	Срок, в течение которого в отс-роще.	Примечание.
	Нендуре Мухомов / соебмбан	5124	- 5	Бривибасий ул. 46-55		
	Толм Арбус	5124 / соебмбан	-	Бривибасий ул. 108	1 го.	
	Варваркин Карлис / сына / импробан	6128	- 1	Бривибасий ул. 13-10		
	Района Янис Петрович / дерхокемис	5124	2	Бривибасий ул. 15-19		
	Мандулис Янис / сына / айскапс / соебм	7100-5403	1	Бривибасий ул. 14-15		2 го
	Темпринис Петрис / айскапс	5804	-	Бривибасий ул. 14-7		

Sample of list used by the operative groups of the NKVD when carrying out the deportation of Latvian citizens on June 13 and 14, 1941. The list shown above was used during the arrests in Brivibas Street, Riga. It contains the names of the deportees or of the head of the family to be deported, the category of deportees he belongs to and the number of family members intended for deportation, with a separate enumeration of the children under the age of 16.

APPENDIX 4.

Information Regarding Movement of Certain Trains, In Which the Arrested


No. of freight letter:	Date of departure	Railroad Stations		Railroad Line
		Departure	Destination	
423990	16.6.41.	Jelgava	Jenisej	Krasnojarsk
424009	16.6.41.	Jelgava	Jenisej	Krasnojarsk
424010	17.6.41.	Jelgava	Babinino	Moscow-Kiev
174192	24.6.41.	Riga pass.	Leningr. pass.	Oktjabr
174088	21.6.41.	Riga pass.	Moscow pass.	Kalinin
173890	16.6.41.	Riga pass.	Moscow pass.	Kalinin
177789	24.6.41.	Riga freight	Leningrad	?
177790	24.6.41.	Riga freight	Pskov	Leningrad
360911	27.6.41.	Riga freight	Pskov	Leningrad
177791	24.6.41.	Riga freight	Moscow	Leningrad
360912	27.6.41.	Riga freight	Pskov	Leningrad
263773	15.6.41.	Skirotava	Babinino	Moscow-Kiev
263674	16.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Novosibirsk	Toms
263682	16.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Akmolinsk	Karagandinsk
263683	16.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Babinino	Moscow-Kiev
263685	16.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Kuks	Omsk
263731	22.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Kotla	Gorkovsk
263732	22.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Potmja	Penza
263733	22.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Kuks	Omsk
263734	22.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Vladivostok	Plejuras (Sea-side)
263735	22.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Novosibirsk	Toms
263736	22.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Babinino	Moscow-Kiev
263747	24.6.41.	(Shunting st.) Skirotava	Kuibishev	Kuibishev
337962	15.6.41.	Tornkalns	Jenisej	Krasnojarsk
127211	24.6.41.	Krustpils	Kuibishev	Kuibishev
8187	?	Daugavpils II pr. (Freight II)	Babinino	Moscow-Kiev
8189	?	Daugavpils II pr. (Freight II)	Acinsk	Krasnojarsk
8144	?	Daugavpils II pr. (Freight II)	Kansk-Jeniseisk	Krasnojarsk
8145	?	Daugavpils II pr. (Freight II)	Babinino	Moscow-Kiev
6075	?	Indra	Gladan	Krasnojarsk
6074	?	Indra	Karaganda	Karagandinsk

Signed: f. f. Chief of the Income control.

Latvian Citizens Have Been Deported to Soviet Russia In June, 1941

Direction	Transferred to Russian Railroad	Number of cars	Sender-Receiver's Designation	Notes (Sender's signature)
Indra	17.6.41.	64	236. army NKVD	
Indra	17.6.41.	73	236. army NKVD	
Indra	18.6.41.	59	236. army NKVD	
Valka	?	Prison Car 1	155th spec. batt.	
Zilupe	?	Prison Car 1	155th spec. batt.	
Zilupe	17.6.41.	Prison Car 1	155th spec. batt.	
Valka	?	Prison Car 1	NKVD	
Valka	?	5	NKVD	
Valka	?	12	NKVD	
Indra	?	3	NKVD	
Valka	?	4	NKVD	
Indra	16.6.41.	56	155th spec. batt.	
Indra	16.6.41.	81	155th spec. batt.	A. Lenski
Zilupe	17.6.41.	6	155th spec. batt.	A. Lenski
Indra	?	23	155th spec. batt.	
Zilupe	?	11	155th spec. batt.	Lenski
Indra	23.6.41.	Prison Car 1	155th spec. batt.	
Indra	23.6.41.	Prison Car 1	155th spec. batt.	Karcagin
Indra	23.6.41.	Prison Car 5	155th spec. batt.	Jeremejev
Indra	23.6.41.	Prison Car 5	155th spec. batt.	Jeremejev
Indra	23.6.41.	Prison Car 4	155th spec. batt.	Jeremejev
Indra	23.6.41.	Prison Car 8	155th spec. batt.	Radzanovsk
Indra	?	Prison Car 15	155th spec. batt.	
Zilupe	16.6.41.	Prison Car 54	155th spec. batt.	Brivibas Street 93
Indra	?	Prison Car 57	155th spec. batt.	Varségov
Indra	18.6.41.	Prison Car 48		
Indra	18.6.41.	Prison Car 55		} Train arrived from D station without documents issued at Indra
Indra	16.6.41.	Prison Car 75		
Indra	16.6.41.	Prison Car 46		
Indra	18.6.41.	Prison Car 45		
Indra	18.6.41.	Prison Car 4		
		Total	824 cars	

APPENDIX 5.



Many Latvian citizens who had been condemned or had simply been missing, were afterwards exhumed from secret NKVD mass graves. The shooting of the victims was executed without a previous court sentence, on the ground of a simple order. Appendix 5 shows the last page of a list containing the names of 78 executed Latvians and, at the end, a remark written in Russian and signed by S. Shustin, Commissar of NKGB: "Considering the social danger they represent, all must be shot."

S. Shustin.

June 26, 1941.

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