


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The Own
Peoples'
Enemies
by
Wilhelms Munfers



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The Own Peoples' Enemies

«ZVAIGZNE»

RIGA, 1965

WILHELM MÜNTERS

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
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The Own Peoples'
Enemies

1941, 1942

1941, 1942



The author of this book Vilhelms Munters was born on July 25th, 1898, in Riga, into a family of merchants. He graduated from the Chemistry Faculty of the Latvian University. Under the bourgeois government in Latvia he worked in the ministry of Foreign Affairs for twenty years, first as secretary of the Press Section, then as head of the Baltic Section, finally as director of the Administrative and Legal Department. In 1933, V. Munters was appointed Secretary General

of the Foreign Ministry. In 1936 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Latvian bourgeois Government, and remained in this post till the re-establishment of Soviet power in Latvia in June 1940. During the thirties V. Munters was widely known in international life. Since 1931 he participated in all League of Nations general meetings, and between 1935 and 1939 he headed the Latvian delegation. From 1936 to 1938 he acted as Latvian representative on the Council of the League of Nations, and in 1938 he was president of the 101st session of the Council. Vilhelms Munters played a decisive rôle in directing the general line of Latvia's foreign policy and endorsing on behalf of Latvia the most important international treaties of the time. As Latvia's Foreign Minister, V. Munters visited numerous European capitals where he met the leading statesmen in foreign policy of the great powers.

During the period of Stalin's personality cult, V. Munters fell victim to that policy, and remained imprisoned for 13 years — from 1941 to 1954. After his liberation he worked as a translator at the famous Vladimir Tractor Works. Since his return to Riga in 1959, V. Munters has been working for the Transactions of the Academy of Sciences of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, and for other scientific publishing establishments. Since 1962, V. Munters has been publishing significant articles in the Latvian press, as well as in the newspaper «Izvestiya» on urgent problems concerning both international affairs and Latvian emigrés. V. Munters' book «Reflections», published in 1963 in Riga, aroused live interest. V. Munters' present publication on the «Assembly of Captive European Nations» is a resumé of years of investigations, reflections, and will undoubtedly meet wide response in Soviet Latvia and outside its borders. Readers are invited to send their opinions on the book to our Publishing House or to the Latvian Committee for Cultural Relations with Latvians abroad.

FROM THE AUTHOR

The international events of the post-war period have been developing against the background of the "cold war," the beginning of which is usually considered to be Churchill's Fulton speech in 1946. Yet the underlying reason for the "cold war" was the resolve of the capitalist world and its politicians—representatives of the monopolistic capitalism—to put up a struggle against the political influence of the Soviet Union which since the victory over Hitler Germany had gained enormous sway. Before long, the scope of the "cold war" concept expanded, involving the people's democracies in Europe, the Chinese People's Republic, the socialist camp as a whole, and every manifestation of progressive political and social economic policy that characterises the development of world politics in the post-war period.

The "cold war" has known periods of increased tension and of relaxation: it developed from Dulles' doctrine of balancing "on the brink of war," to the 1963 agreement on a partial termination of atomic weapon tests and the corresponding agreement between the USSR and the USA; from the abortive hermetic embargo against the Soviet

Union and the Socialist countries, to the conflicts among the capitalists and monopolists themselves over supplying steel pipes to the Soviet Union or buses to Cuba; from restrictions on travel permits to the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries, to wide-scale exchange in the fields of culture and science and the development of individual and mass tourism.

Although broadly speaking it may be stated that the general tendency in the development of international relations during the last two decades has shown a certain relaxation in tension,—a relaxation expressed mainly in a common acknowledgement that a renewed armed conflict on a world scale would be fatal for everybody concerned—it would be premature to assert that the “cold war” clouds have dispersed. On the contrary, time and time again these clouds gather anew, threatening the peaceable aspirations of all nations, reducing to nought the painstaking, persevering efforts of far-sighted responsible statesmen towards securing stable, lasting peace.

This has been happening repeatedly during the recent years; it happened in the current year when after the exceedingly dangerous Caribbean crisis (1962) the situation sharpened in several parts of the world simultaneously. East Africa, South Africa are still in a state of turmoil, military activities continue in the Arabian peninsula, death and destruction are wrought by bombs dropped on Southeastern Asia and Cyprus, and people the world over watch these hot-beds of crisis with quickened breath and trembling hearts. The danger of chain reaction in world politics is clear to all today, even to those who are ignorant

of the primary meaning of this term in atomic physics.

True, it may seem as though the danger of armed conflict had shifted from Europe to other continents; yet there is no doubt that directly or indirectly these conflicts affect not only the USA and some West European countries, but also the United Nations Organization as a whole; that these conflicts are not merely locally confined incidents, but each of them a potential starting-point for a clash on a European scale, and a world scale.

An investigation into the armed clashes of the recent months leads to one inevitable conclusion: the cause has been throughout the imperialists' tendency to impose their will upon other peoples—the oppressed or colonial peoples. Their motives in doing so may vary. But whatever they may be—the uranium deposits in the Congo, or the oil of the Middle East the roads to which belong to the Cyprians or the Arabians; the tin and other natural resources of Malaysia; the American vantage points by the Chinese borders; the racial outrages in South Africa; the colonialist manoeuvres in East Africa—one thing remains invariable: everywhere the imperialists trample underfoot the principles of international rights, use outrageous violence against colonial, semi-colonial and independent nations. And throughout the great powers are directed by their desire to save their political or economic positions gained in the past by dint of superior force, and threatened now by the historic process of national liberation movements.

The camouflage used for all these acts of violence and lawlessness is anticommunism. The

Cyprians and Congolese, the Arabs and the Bantu, the Angolians and the Vietnamese—all are alleged to be communist—"infected," whereby it is frequently maintained that they follow some mysterious directives from Moscow.

While overt armed struggle is in progress in distant continents, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe seem temporarily forgotten. Yet about ten years ago the American reactionaries still hoped their propaganda and subversive activities might break up the socialist camp, undermine the authority of the governments of people's democracies, provoke revolts and deprive the Soviet Union of the support of Eastern and Central Europe.

It was for this reason that they established the so-called "Assembly of Captive European Nations," which comprises Latvians as well. This fact induced me to start a closer investigation into the history and activities of the Assembly. For twenty years I was in a position to observe the policies of Latvia and other Baltic countries, and during the last seven prewar years I was personally actively involved in implementing Latvian foreign policies. This explains my interest in an organization which includes Latvian emigré representatives.

My study of the ten-year-old history of the "Assembly of Captive European Nations" left me with a feeling of disappointment, which soon turned to disgust. Disappointment at the barrenness and futility of its activities, disgust with its antinational and anti-Soviet course.

People who for 20 years now have been severed from their one-time homeland, and who, contrary to their own loud declarations, represent nobody

and nothing, continue to claim a policy that would result in the annihilation of the Latvian people. For it is impossible to imagine a return to the former state of affairs without armed conflict, and a small nation wedged between two contending hostile powers would never survive, never regain its vital powers.

The anti-Soviet direction of this emigré organization's policy stands beyond a shadow of doubt. Every speech of every "Assembly" member since its very inception bears witness to that. Not surprisingly so: the "Assembly" itself is not a voluntary union in the interests of the nations whose self-styled representatives make up its membership; it is a "cold war" weapon forged by the American intelligence service to be turned against the bogey of "world communism," in other words—against the Soviet Union, the countries of people's democracy, and the national liberation movement.

I am not a communist, yet I have to admit that the Communist Parties wherever they are in power, and in the first place in the USSR, are more successfully conducting their people along a path of progress, than is any other political party I can think of in the "free world." And today, when the words "peace" and "prosperity" contain all the hopes and prayers of simple people the world over, it is the Soviet Union that uses the whole weight of its ideological and material authority to sway the world towards the achievement of these aims.

The Soviet Union's struggle for peace is supported by the whole mighty Soviet people, and by all the peoples of the world. The Soviet people's love of peace is obvious now alike to the cool

Scandinavian, the temperamental son of Africa, the exotic nations of India, Indonesia, the Arab world, to the nations of Latin America. Only the reactionaries of all kinds and breeds are grinding their teeth in impotent rage—the colonisers and neo-colonisers, the arms factory bosses and the covert revanchists.

It is these enemies of peace and friendship among nations that have gained the support of the emigré groups who under the pretext of fighting for their people's freedom and independence are rendering them well-paid services—though the people never asked for it, and more often than not know nothing of the existence of their self-appointed "spokesmen."

I had never considered myself authorised to represent the Latvian people as the emigré gang-leaders claim to be, yet I served my people to the best of my conscience, and today, in a world that has changed beyond recognition, I deem it my duty to continue doing so—not, however, in a spirit of sentimental pseudo-patriotism and nationalism, but with a view to the world of the future, a world of international friendship and brotherhood.

These are the feelings which impelled me to submit the present book to my readers.

FIRST STEPS

September 20th, 1954, is considered inauguration day for the "Assembly of Captive European Nations" (ACEN). The event coincided with the opening of the UNO IX Assembly. Thanks to the solicitude of their American friends, the emigrés obtained for their meeting the central rooms of the international Carnegie Hall, situated opposite the UNO building in New York. To attract the attention of the UNO Assembly delegates and other potential spectators, ACEN opened its session in the street, while the banners of the "captive" countries were hoisted over the new assembly building and immediately lowered to half-mast. Thereupon the sitting proceeded in a closed hall. The ACEN statutes were adopted, "modelled in the principles of the UNO statutes," ACEN was stated to comprise the emigré representatives of nine countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania). Each emigré group was allocated 16 places. Poland was represented by two delegations, with eight delegates from each.

For appearance's sake membership without vote was granted to five "international political orga-

nizations," whose composition, membership or activity was not specified. Other "international organizations" were also admitted, including three women's organizations (apparently, unable to agree on a joint representation), and one youth organization. However, all these organizations were of secondary importance, with only advisory rights on three committees (social, legal, and economic). The numerical strength of the delegations is not specified. Presumably, they confine themselves to some one self-appointed delegate. The minutes of the ACEN sittings provide no clue as to the activities of these "shadow" representatives. On the other hand, they indicate, that the additional members—the above-mentioned five "international organizations"—served as a screen to some persons who had not managed to edge themselves into the "national" delegations. Thus, the "Christian Democratic Union" of Central and Eastern Europe is represented by the Czech Prohazka and the Lithuanian Turauskas, the "Liberal Democratic Union" of East Central Europe—by the Pole Olszewski and the Czechs Busek and Ripka, the "International Peasant Union"—by the Pole Mikolajczik (former chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers) and the Lithuanian Blazas, the "International Center of Free Trade Unionists in Exile"—by the Pole Skrodski, etc.

The aim of ACEN as laid down in its statutes is the liberty and independence of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe "enslaved by the Soviets." Commentaries to the statement on its inauguration add that: ACEN is an authoritative source of information (in New York of all places!) on conditions in the "captive" countries of Europe, a forum for these nations (read: emigré leaders)

where they may pronounce their aims and opinions, and warn the "free world" against policies and actions that may be harmful or even fatal to its very existence.

Needless to say, the emigrés consider themselves more competent in these matters than the politicians of West Europe.

We may pass over these details. The ten years that have elapsed since have left a thick layer of dust on the documents in the ACEN archives—if such exist. The lengthy debates, so typical of emigré meetings, have been reduced to a minimum, as have ACEN publications; even its monthly periodical has recently been appearing every second or third month; the number of committees has dwindled from six to three; yet the general committee—ACEN in miniature—has remained practically unchanged in its set-up to this very day. Its members are paid by the Free Europe Committee (to be more precise—by the institution which through the agency of the Free Europe Committee pulls the strings of ACEN) and are in the service of this institution. These nine persons compose memoranda, travel all over the continents, pronounce speeches, write letters to the press and sustain the illusion that ACEN really exists.

INSPIRERS AND SPONSORS

The roots of ACEN reach, however, far deeper into the past. More than five years before its inauguration (to be precise—on June 1st, 1949) an American organization was set up in New

York—the National Committee of Free Europe, subsequently renamed Free Europe Committee, Inc.* Its elected chairman was the former USA ambassador to Japan Joseph K. Grew, and its board included such well-known names as Eisenhower, Allan Dulles (director of the Central Intelligence Administration), Adolf Berle—former assistant secretary of state, Arthur Bliss Lane (former USA envoy to Riga and Warsaw), General Lucius D. Clay and others. If we recall that Allan Dulles soon became chairman of the FEC executive committee, it becomes clear beyond doubt that the American intelligence service was the real boss of the FEC. This finds further confirmation in the fact that the financial resources of ACEN, including the money paid to its employees, were allocated directly by the FEC, which consequently decided not only the assembly's political orientation, but its economic position as well. The situation grew all but ridiculous when the FEC covered the expenses incurred by receptions arranged in its own honour by ACEN.

To return to the establishment of the Free Europe Committee: In his "political declaration," Ambassador Grew proclaimed among other things that the immediate cause of the Committee's organization was "Yalta," i. e., the Declaration signed in Yalta on Feb. 11th, 1945. The peoples whom "we (read the USA) liberated from national (perhaps nazi would be more correct) despotism, were promised by us that they would be enabled to hold free elections and gain the right to ele-

* Note "Inc.", i. e., a private corporation. A favourite CIA method of screening their activities.

mentary freedom. Among these peoples were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yougoslavia and Bulgaria. We have not fulfilled our promise..."

Then follows a formulation of the FEC aim to aid politicians who had fled from "communist terror" in East Europe to the USA. "We" want to enable them to continue unobstructed in their resistance (to communism)." In addition, the FEC takes it upon itself to render these persons "special aid", e. g., to see to it that they are adequately provided for and can remain in useful employment during the whole period of their stay on USA territory; and "we", i. e., the USA, desire "to make use of their services for broadcasting, press statements and other activities aimed at sustaining in their fellow-countrymen in Europe the ideals of personal and national freedom," and "we", i. e., the USA, wish "to promote authoritative institutions, so that these persons may find their way to working together and coordinating their plans with leading statesmen and public figures of the USA (!) and other governments, whose views are close to theirs."

In other words, under the direct leadership and auspices of the USA intelligence service, an organization was set up with the proclaimed aim of uniting emigré statesmen of East Europe and utilising them for anticommunist propaganda and espionage (see "other activities"). A united emigré organization (the very same ACEN) whose activities must be coordinated with leading USA politicians and spokesmen. It would be more accurate to substitute "execute orders" for "coordinate." It is here that we come upon the cradle of ACEN. To formulate it briefly: ACEN

was established as an organ for subversive activities under the aegis of, and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

This was expressed with unequivocal clarity by one of the FEC stooges Dezső Sulyok, member of the Hungarian national emigré committee till 1954, who a few years later launched the reactionary organization "Hungarian October 23d Movement." He writes of the FEC: "It is simply not possible that an organization whose leader is simultaneously the boss of the state espionage service, should be independent of the state. On the contrary: an organization of this kind furthers the purposes of this service, and its other activities will proceed from this fact." Significantly, these words come from the lips of a Hungarian—in behalf of an emigré group that was considered particularly important among the "lawful representatives" of the captive nations; a Hungarian who left the Hungarian national committee and subjected the Hungarian pillars of ACEN to scathing criticism—directed at men like Bela Varga, Ferenz Nagy and others, whom he called traitors of the Hungarian people's interests. Sulyok was unstinting in his use of biting epithets, noting that the "ensemble" who on the part of the Hungarians had undertaken to serve the amoral (!) mock liberation (!) policy (the policy of the American reactionaries and their intelligence service), who remain suspended in mid-air (!), displayed an almost absolute lack of the qualities essential for the execution of the rôle of the Hungarian people's representatives..." These words may well be referred not only to the Hungarian so-called spokesmen, but also to leaders of other emigré groups who were sub-

sequently incorporated into ACEN. If we consider Sulyok's very truthful observation that the weaker partner always likens himself to the more powerful one (the Russians used to say: "The parish is like its parson," and the Latvians—"The servant is like his master"), the moral and political face of the ACEN activists stands out with sufficient clarity. One more typical detail emanates from Sulyok's own utterings: he noted that the policy of American collaborationism (i. e., the policy whose main trump in Europe is collaboration with West Germany) attributes particular value to the former Hungarian collaborationists, those who used to serve the German fascist occupation authorities. If we examine more closely the political faces of other "captive" country emigré leaders, we discover soon enough that they too are largely former collaborationists.

The establishment of FEC was soon followed by that of a broadcasting station "Radio Free Europe," RFE, that sent out its inauguration broadcast on July 4th 1950 (from Munich). Both date and place are to some extent symbolic. The FEC leaders saw to it that their radio station should be launched on America's Liberty Day. Was there really not one influential and sober-minded American who could have sounded a warning against thus defiling a day deeply revered by generations of Americans? Not one who would have raised his voice in protest, when a radio station intended for subversion and espionage commenced its activities on a day associated with the greatest historic event in the life of the American people? In addition, the place chosen for this radio-subversion, is inextricably linked with the history of hitlerism, with the most shameful event of West European

politics in 1938, when England and France betrayed Czechoslovakia. The "Free Europe" radio-station was indeed born under ill auspices. Today, nobody pays the least attention to the RFE—despite its 14 years of existence, and although it has branched out into five wide-range radio stations, several departments, a filing system, a library etc. After the establishment of ACEN and the "Free Europe" radio station, the FEC itself embarked on widescale propaganda and intelligence work, set up a number of departments and committees, announced a "programme," established contact with the emigré leaders in Europe, appointed its residents in London and Paris, issued numerous publications etc. Apparently the CIA was a generous master.

Since 1961, the chairman of FEC has been John Richardson jnr, a young banker (unlike other big-bugs of the organization, he is only in his early forties). He was advanced to the post in April 1961. Before this advancement Richardson showed great interest in Poland, and visited the country four or five times. It is doubtful that these frequent visits should have been necessitated by matters connected with his bank. The question of Richardson's allegiance is equally obscure: his reports may go directly to the CIA, or else they may be commissioned by the so-called "Crusade for Freedom," a private anticommunist organization, financed chiefly by American bankers, industrialists and the like. The "Crusade" apparently covers part of the expenses for the upkeep of FEC, so as to lighten the burden on the latter's budget. Not that the problem of Richardson's allegiance is of any real consequence: what-

ever it may be, he remains in the service of the American intelligence service.

Soon after his appointment, he called a conference in London with Polish emigrés—"stipendiaries" of FEC. Among the participants were several prominent Poles, including Cziolkosz and Mikolayczik, both members of ACEN. The new FEC chairman reaffirmed the decision that the Committee should increase its financial aid to political emigrés on condition that the latter "compensate" for this by anticommunist activities. He also informed the conference that he had "unlimited" financial means at his disposal, provided they "identified themselves even more completely with the realisation of the USA plans."

Mr. Richardson expounded on his political credo at a dinner in honour of a "Captive Nations Week" in June 1962, at which, in accordance with his post, he did the honours. To start with, he tried to prove the "increased power" of the West, and the superiority of the "Free World" over the communist movement, though the facts of international life go to prove the opposite: viz. increased discord among the great powers of the West, and ever-growing public support of a policy of peace and friendship among peoples—the policy consistently pursued by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

Mr. Richardson went on to warn his listeners that this congenial tendency (from his point of view, of course) may change, and that undue optimism may lead to a passive attitude. This clearly implies that the situation is not so bright after all, and those who intend to conquer communism ought to go about it actively. Hence Richardson requests the government of the USA

and all governments under its influence to pool their energies and funds (you hear the banker's voice) in the interests of freedom, viz., in the struggle against communism. Like his predecessor Berle, Richardson immediately specifies that in the atomic age they (the emigrés) ought not to cherish vain hopes and embark on reckless adventures or provoke futile revolutions. However, close collaboration was important "with our allies on either side of the iron curtain."

We may note that the present FEC mouthpiece is considerably more cautious and diplomatic in his challenges as well as in his choice of words than were the first inspirers of ACEN who openly called for subversive action and offered the emigrés cheap and insubstantial promises. Essentially, however, his policy is the same. The "captured" leaders remain what they were before—a weapon of anticommunism, while FEC remains unconcerned about the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe; what matters is that the "stipendiates" should work for the realisation of the USA plans, and the reference to allies "on either side of the iron curtain" merely implies wishful thinking—that ideological and material subversion may exist within the countries of "captive nations."

The ACEN employees got down to executing the FEC directives, yet while there was ample debating on strategic matters, subversive activities fared ill.

Let us follow up the further developments of ACEN's organization by the FEC. On February 11th, 1951, (NB! The sixth anniversary of the Yalta declaration), on the instigation of FEC, emigré representatives of ten European countries

gathered in Philadelphia Pa. Emigrés of nine countries subsequently joined ACEN, Yugoslavia was the tenth at that time. Why Kerensky, that political corpse, should have participated at the gathering remains obscure; he may possibly have been invited to represent "free" Russia. Needless to say, American guests appeared, headed by FEC president Grew. The emigrés arrived from New York in three saloon-carriages (expenses paid by FEC). They signed the "Declaration on the Aims of the Liberation of Central and Eastern Europe and the main theses," took part in a banquet (also financed by FEC), and left. The declaration, elaborated under the leadership of Gafenku, former Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was described by Sulyok, who participated in all ceremonies, as having "deservedly sunk into oblivion by now." He laments bitterly that the beautiful words only served to mystify people, and reproaches the members of the Hungarian national committee of having tried "to persuade the captive nations that great deeds were being done in their interests, while in reality nobody intended to stir a finger to advance their liberation."

How did the inspirers and sponsors picture the activities of the future "authoritative institution," i.e., the future "Assembly of Captive European Nations"?

The answer is furnished by the chairman of the Hungarian national committee Bela Varga who on May 1st, 1950, came out with a statement which says: "The Committee's task today is to represent the will of free Hungary before the whole world. We do not summon any one to return to his Motherland, but when the iron curtain collapses (!), the Committee will return and see

to it that order is restored and that social life proceed unobstructed until the Hungarian people themselves express their decision by free vote(?)."

It may be appropriate to note that Mgr. Bela Varga still plays a leading role in ACEN, considering himself chairman of the Hungarian National Assembly; that far from resigning (he only fled abroad in 1947) he is executing his duties as Hungarian president in exile. This arbitrary attitude to "authorised power" and "inheritability of sovereign power" is common among leaders of "captive" nations who either escaped or emigrated; we may recall the Latvian emigrés who could not settle their quarrel as to who could rightfully lay claim to the "heritage" of sovereign power—the late minister to London Zarins, or Bishop Rancans, former deputy chairman of the Saeima (all other claimants were dead by then). We may recall the Polish emigrés who even split into two factions—and consider that their "inheritance" should be centred in London, and not New York or Washington.

I do not know about the Rumanian emigrés, but they seem to have an emigré king in reserve who in the past resigned his throne.

To sum up what all these political scum (the definition belongs not to me, but to one of their own colleagues), have in common; the "authoritative institution" as its authors conceived it,—needless to say, with the glad support of everybody concerned—was to become an assembly of "legal" representatives, or even governments in emigration, with a view to returning eventually to their "liberated" countries as American-appointed "lawful" governments á la Chiang-Kai-Shek, Singh Man Rhee, Ngo Dinh Diem and suchlike leaders.

In their respective countries they would secure order and social peace until the time of "free" elections.

Let us not try to conjecture what kind of "order" this handful of aged politicians would secure, and in what way they would settle a social life in which they have not participated for about twenty years; we may leave this to the concern of their sponsors, to follow the notorious examples of many countries of Latin America, Taiwan, Southern Korea, South Vietnam etc. They would also know how to secure "free" elections. But the question arises: who is going to "liberate" the "captive" nations, and when? As to the term, conjectures range between "soon—in a hundred years—in a thousand years." This sounds doubtless beautiful, even pathetic, yet it does not appeal to the emigré leaders. They prefer the first alternative—soon.

The initial plan of FEC was as follows (from an interview of a leading FEC official with a New York Times correspondent on November 24th, 1951): "We intend to create the necessary preconditions for unrest in these countries..." "...the time for us to occupy ourselves with rendering military aid... will come when the people in the satellite countries (i. e., the people's democracies) will succeed in starting a military movement that we shall be able to utilise."

In other words, FEC strategy amounted actually to sabotage and subversive activities in individual "oppressed" countries going to the length of instigating armed risings—whereupon the rebels would be granted military aid. These activities were to be directed by the national committees that consisted of emigrés of the respective nations.

It is common knowledge that after World War II

collaborationists, leaders of bourgeois parties, nationalists who had collaborated with the hitlerite armies in the people's democratic countries and in the Baltic Republics, escaped abroad. The number of people who thus became emigrés, or, to use their own unjustified term, exiles, varied among various nationalities in accordance with the manner in which the respective country threw off the fascist yoke. It was larger in countries which passed through many hands: in the vicissitudes of war, were occupied by the hitlerite army in the early stage of the war, then liberated by the Soviet Army in the 1944—1945 offensive. This refers to Poland and to the Baltic Republics, and to some extent to Czechoslovakia; to a far lesser degree to Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. This, as well as various differences in the national, political and government developments in the respective countries, accounts for the discrepancies evident in the "Assembly of Captive Nations" created by American reactionary circles. This Assembly is based not on the national interests of the emigré leaders who joined it, but on some "general" principles prominent among which are American interests in a cold war policy, anti-communism, all manner of intelligence service, and the personal careerism—quickenened by covetousness—of individual members of the Assembly.

The National "committees" are generous indeed in using the word "freedom." There is, for example, the "Committee for Free Lithuania" set up in 1951, financed by Americans, actively pursuing the aims of American anti-Soviet circles; the "Committee for Free Latvia," established approximately at the same time, and similar to its Lithuanian counterpart in every respect; the "Bulgarian

National Committee," "The Committee for Free Estonia," the "Free Czechoslovakia Council," the "Hungarian National Committee," etc. etc.

The American wire-pullers of these committees are striving to conduct them along common lines, since, on the one hand, the existence of separate committees renders this whole anti-Soviet intrigue less impressive, and, on the other, the thrifty Americans embarked on the whole affair so as not to disperse their material investments designed for anti-Soviet activities and propaganda. The number of Latvian committees alone scattered throughout the world was about ten at that time, though most of them had no backing to speak of. The same refers to other National committees though it is more than doubtful whether the Bulgarian and Albanian emigré organizations had anybody to represent at all.

However it may be, there was enough material to build on: the committees were instructed to obtain plenipotentiary powers from their respective national emigré organizations, so that each committee might speak in the name of its nation. In some instances the emigré leaders went so far as to proclaim themselves the "only" lawful representatives of their people, while in their homeland, where the majority of their people resided, they were considered traitors who had sold themselves to the hitlerite fascists and ought to be put on trial.

The Americans intended these committees to become the basis for a truly influential international organization; what the emigrés themselves thought was not considered, and there was, of course, no question of democratic methods of endowing the "central" representative body with

authoritative power. From the very outset, the committees were not emigré organizations, but tools in the hands of ambitious usurpers, to be used for personal enrichment—and this is what the “committees” amount to even today.

In this respect, the formation of the European reactionary committees is identical to the method which the Americans (after the well-tried example of Latin America) applied in South-East Asia, where they have throughout been supporting “leaders” useful to themselves, regardless of the people’s wishes and aspirations.

The setting up of the “committees” was a lengthy process, but by about 1951 it was completed, and the American leaders could get down to the second stage in the realisation of their plans—the formation of an organization that would unite the committees, the so-called “Assembly of Captive European Nations,” ACEN. The slogan of the emigré national committees was formulated by one of the emigrés in an address to the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe in the following words: “Let there be explosions going at home, so that we may grow powerful here.” This slogan was taken up zealously by all the emigré leaders of the “captive nations,” who did their best to persuade their sponsors that dissatisfaction was growing among the “captive nations,” and that this was due to their—the leaders’—efforts.

TROUBLED TIMES (1949—1954)

However, five more years had to elapse after the formation of the FEC—which, as was mentioned above, happened in 1949—before the cher-

ished dream of the American intelligence service, the "Assembly of Captive European Nations," finally saw the light. As to the reasons for this delay, there is no precise information at hand. The supplement to the Latvian encyclopaedia which appeared in 1962 in Stockholm under an editorial board whose members were all well advanced in years, informs us laconically that in the early fifties central political emigré committees of various countries were set up in the U.S.A. As the period of exile dragged on, the Latvian encyclopaedia informs us, the idea of forming a joint organization directed towards a joint purpose grew increasingly urgent among exiles from Eastern Europe. However, it took several years for an emigré organization of this kind to be established, an organization comprising all "captive" nations of Eastern Europe. It was not before the autumn of 1954 that preparatory work had advanced sufficiently for the organization to be actually planned and launched.

It is not at all surprising that by 1950 national emigré committees were already established—the American FEC bosses had clearly stated in their "political declaration" that it was essential to set up "authoritative institutions" that would coordinate the work of the emigré leaders; to remove any doubt, the declaration added that FEC "wished to instil courage(!), into the leaders and give them support, so that they should maintain their national councils in our country (i.e., the USA)..." Thus the bosses desired the existence of national committees, and advised courage, in other words, guaranteed the emigré organizations unhampered activities while simultaneously planning the setting up of a joint "authoritative" organization.

The "exiles" in the USA were naturally only too glad to fulfil the "wishes" of Mr. Grew and Allan Dulles, the more so since they were promised "special" assistance; whether we call it subsidy, or grant, or charity—makes no essential difference. The question is why it took the "national committees" four years to unite in an "Assembly of Captive European Nations!"

On the one hand, this delay was apparently connected with the hopes FEC pinned to the "Free Europe" radio station. Evidently the bosses of the committee held that a few broadcasts from Munich would rouse all peoples of Eastern and Central Europe against their "communist enslavers," whereupon, by dint of military aid, i. e., by providing arms, a proper conflagration could be started, as a result of which the emigrés would in the final issue succeed in imposing their "lawful governments" on the respective nations. However, as may be deduced from the above-mentioned reference in the Latvian encyclopaedia, "the period of exile dragged on," necessitating more energetic efforts to organize an "authoritative" institution of propaganda and sabotage activities.

On the other hand, differences of opinion both inside the individual national emigré groups, and among leaders of various national emigré groups, constituted an important obstacle in the execution of the FEC plans.

For example, the so-called Little Entente,—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (the latter was also considered a "captive" nation at that time) was renewed in emigration. As we know, the Little Entente was established after the peace treaties of Versailles and Trianon as a guarantee of mutual security among the countries

that came into existence through the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Each of the above countries, each member of the Little Entente, was allocated either a piece of Hungarian territory, or else a territory with a considerable Hungarian minority. Therefore these countries united to prevent possible irredentist claims on the part of Hungary, especially since Hungary continued challenging the territorial decisions of the Trianon treaty during the whole period between World War I and World War II.

The Hungarian emigré politicians renewed their claims against the Little Entente—indeed, sharing out the bearskin before the bear was killed—so that the latter even submitted a complaint to the “conference” of Central and Eastern Europe, to the effect that Hungary was planning to “destroy her neighbours.” And although neither the Little Entente, nor the Hungarian emigrés had either the right or even the possibility to decide European territorial problems—now or ever—they argued till they foamed at the mouth, refusing to sit side by side even in the “authoritative institution”—the future ACEN.

Similar difficulties were raised by individual emigré groups. There was enmity among parties, groupings, individuals. We may presume that there were not a few who would be glad to make use of American sponsorship and American money bags, but some of the emigré leaders lived outside the USA, in different countries of Europe, or Australia, or Canada. They, too, were eager to make use of the new opportunity to come into money by occupying positions of “lawful” representatives or “real members” of counter-governments in “exile.” Disagreements arose over the

question where political emigrés should establish their "centre"; over conditions for representative rights, over candidates to leading positions etc, etc.

The Polish emigrés elected to remain "centred" in London, simultaneously joining ACEN where, as distinct from all other states, they were allocated two seats, the two main Polish emigré organizations being unable to agree on various points. The other emigré organizations were transferred to the USA, while retaining considerable duplicate organizations in Europe or in other continents, which, in their turn, claimed "their place and their share." The Latvian emigrés may well serve as an example. They possess four "centres": in Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia. In 1955 a joint organization was established—the Union of Latvians of the Free World. To satisfy all sides, it was decided that the centre of this Union would not be entered into the statutes—to which the "Europeans" seemed to have raised objections. However in the distribution of posts within the Board, preference was given to the "Americans" who obtained five of them, including the chairmanship and one out of two vice-chairmanships. The "Europeans" received three posts, including one deputy chairmanship (which is slightly "higher" than vice-chairman); the Australians were allocated one vice-chairmanship and one Board membership. The Canadians, however, had to be satisfied with one Board membership post only. I am reporting these details to show what subterfuge the emigrés resorted to in order to create the impression of unity, if not full agreement, piously continuing the traditions of "proportion" and political "haggling"—so habitual in former times. On closer

examination, this emigré, hocus-pocus reveals many interesting details. To quote one instance, the regulations of the Union of Latvians of the Free World state that it is not essential to specify that members of the management must be Latvian citizens. This provision is made against a time when Latvian citizens in the "Free World" will become museum pieces—which will happen soon enough. As another example, we may take the Latvian emigré centre in Europe, established in 1951 in London and still existant. According to its statutes two thirds of its members must come from Latvian organizations in Europe, and one third must belong to political parties which in the last Parliament of bourgeois Latvia (i. e., thirty years ago) had at least five deputy seats. What anachronism, what political infantility! Quabbles of this kind are not unusual among Lithuanian and Estonian leading emigrés either.

Neither could Czechoslovak emigré circles avoid them. In fact, the Czechoslovak emigrés have had no joint representation in ACEN since 1960. The right-wing grouping led by the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" chairman Lettrich (former chairman of the former Slovak democratic party), severed from this council and formed a new organization called "Committee for Czechoslovakia's Freedom." As a result of this split, the Czech and Slovak emigrés were not represented in ACEN for two years, until, to conceal the division, it was decided that the two Czechoslovak groups must agree on advancing a joint delegation. Even separatist tendencies appear in Czechoslovak emigré circles. The Slovak separatists have been trying for a long time to attain the recognition of leading USA circles. But since the USA govern-

ment recognises the integrity of Czechoslovakia, it does not officially support the Slovak separatists, so that the Slovaks had no hope of entering the "captive" nations organization as an independent group. Unwilling to reconcile themselves to such "discrimination," they avail themselves of every opportunity to attract the attention of American and emigré circles. They did not hesitate to slander and denounce other "captive" political spokesmen to members of the USA congress, FEC leaders and other institutions. This may well be called "principle of self-determination in its practical manifestation."

We have quoted here but a few examples to illustrate the political confusion, absurdity, and petty quabbling among the emigrés who were about to mount the dais of the "captive nations" and constitute the "authoritative organ" called ACEN.

All this explains the statement of an emigré historian regarding the pre-history of ACEN. He says, that "the need for a united joint organization was growing more and more urgent" (the FEC had given orders to this effect already in 1949), "yet several years passed before this idea was put into practice." Not only the internal and external disagreements in the various groups must be borne in mind, but also the changes in the composition of the would-be "authoritative" institution. When FEC was initiated six "captive nations" were envisaged as its members—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (or rather, the emigré representatives of these countries). The Yougoslav emigrés refused to participate in realising the FEC plans, and were superseded by a handful of Albanian

emigrés, and three new members turned up—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—or, rather, the emigré representatives of these countries.

THE COORDINATOR

Thus, as was noted above, a considerable period of time elapsed between the establishment of FEC and the organization of ACEN. The process of setting up national emigré committees was completed by 1951, by which time nine of them existed, which, according to FEC instructions, were to constitute the "authoritative institution," subsequently renamed "Assembly of Captive European Nations." However, if the organization of separate national committees was fraught with considerable difficulties and all manner of fractional and personal complications, the joining of these National Committees into an Assembly proved an even harder task. Not surprisingly so: the individual emigré groups varied greatly in size, and the respective numbers of emigrés also varied. True enough, nobody cared for their views and opinions, yet they played a certain rôle when it came to evaluation of "statistical backing" which, in its turn, decided the significance of respective leaders. A leader backed—or rather, alleged to be backed—by hundreds of thousands of emigrés, as, for example in the case of the Polish emigrés, obviously carried far more weight in the eyes of the inspirers and sponsors, than one heading an emigré group of several hundred or even less—as in the case of Albania.

In evaluating the importance of an emigré leader, the number of naturalised citizens of the respective nationality had also to be considered, for although formally they could not be added to the number of emigrés, yet they could act as resonators, as it were, in the activities of the would-be organization, the ACEN. Such was, for example, the situation of the Lithuanians. The number of naturalised Lithuanians is considerable indeed in the USA—500,000 to 1,000,000 according to unauthorised Lithuanian emigré statistics. We are not in a position here to go into the question of how closely these naturalised Lithuanians are still linked with their former motherland, or to what extent they still know their native tongue, etc. (in the majority of cases, it is the third generation of Lithuanians on American soil). Nevertheless, the Lithuanian emigré leaders who fled to the USA after the war claimed strong backing of Lithuanian born American citizens, and this claim raised their importance in the eyes of FEC. Neither the post-war emigrés, nor their naturalised fellow countrymen were ever asked whether they supported the anti-Soviet line of their phoney leaders.

Thus, smart politicians set out to establish such organizations as "Americans for Congressional Action to Free the Baltic States," or "Conference of American Citizens of Central and Eastern European Descent." These organizations are in the hands of careerists who speculate on the votes of the respective immigrants, be it in the case of local elections, or in general USA elections. They are supported by only a very narrow circle of leading men; it is not unlikely that the majority of naturalised citizens even take a negative view

of all kinds of Valiukas, Lipskombs, Caunes etc. and their political manoeuvres. But it does not disconcert these gentlemen; they still talk freely of the millions allegedly behind them and in whose name they take it upon themselves to participate in various kinds of anti-Soviet provocations.

In view of the numerous organizational difficulties that kept arising in the process of materialising the plans of the FEC and the forces behind it, obstructing the establishment of the "authoritative institution," it was decided to create a coordination committee. It fell to the lot of a Latvian, Vilis Masens, to be (I find it difficult to formulate this correctly) elected, or selected, or appointed chairman of the coordination committee. Masens presided not only over the coordination committee but also over the first ACEN session in the autumn of 1954, a post he filled for four successive years, until the implementation of a statute regulation decreeing that the chairmen be chosen in rotation from all national delegations.

What particular qualities justified Masens' very special position, making him eligible for heading the coordination committee and subsequently presiding over ACEN over a period of several years, is a question of some interest.

The documents referring to the initial stage of ACEN specify that all (assembly) delegates used to fill socially or politically important and responsible posts in their respective countries, enjoying their people's confidence.

This does not apply to Vilis Masens in any way. His last post in Latvia was that of chief of the Latvian Foreign Ministry Baltic Section, and

previous to that he was mainly working abroad as minor official (attaché or secretary) at various legations. To assert that Masens enjoyed the confidence of the Latvian people would be stretching the truth by a long way: the Latvian people did not even know who he was. His social contacts were confined to colleagues of the Foreign Ministry and fellows of the students' corporation to which he belonged. His rôle in political life was nil, neither did he participate in Latvia's social or cultural life.

If we furthermore bear in mind that the Latvian emigrés included former ministers, members of parliament, social and cultural workers, high-standing army officers, we see that in comparison with them Masens was indeed a political nonentity. And yet it was he who was promoted!

A comparison between the Latvian emigré leaders and the leading groups of other "captive nations" emigrés renders the above even more interesting. The latter comprised many names known in the past not only on a national but on a European scale—former prime ministers, members of parliament, workers of culture, representatives of the clergy etc. Yet the choice had fallen on an obscure ex-official of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, known perhaps to a handful of Latvian emigrés.

The Latvian emigré leadership, represented by Masens, did not even belong to the basic group of six Central European nations, which FEC considered members of the prospective "authoritative institution": the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian emigrés were coopted or admitted to the community of "captive nations" at a later stage. Yet it was Masens who became leader of the coor-

dination committee and for four years chairman of ACEN!

If his prominent place in the preparatory stage of ACEN and during its first years of existence was justified neither by previous political activities, nor by a numerical superiority of the Latvian emigrés,—there must have been other substantial motives in favour of his candidature. The initiative, and the decisive voice belonged doubtless to the CIA, especially since the latter provided the means, distributing them via FEC, and thus securing the existence of ACEN.

To find the clue to the problem, we may turn to Masens' biography where a little detail strikes the eye: Masens graduated from Heidelberg university shortly after the war.

Insignificant in itself, this fact may still cause surprise in the reader who may wonder why a man in his middle age, head of a family, who had fled from Latvia to Western Germany, should suddenly decide to enrol at a provincial German university. He did not even know German well enough to follow lectures and write examination papers. Besides, as a refugee he could not have been particularly well off. It all appears rather incongruous.

Let us remember, however, that Heidelberg was at that time the residence of the American occupation army headquarters, and that this headquarters not only discharged itself of military and administrative duties, but was also engaged in intensive and varied political and intelligence work; let us remember that Masens had perfect command of the English language, and that he may well have encountered some old friends from the days he had spent abroad. If we

remember all this we may well ask ourselves whether Masens' studies at Heidelberg university were not just a camouflage for studies at a different "educational institution." Information to hand points to contacts with Hitler Germany's intelligence service established by Masens early in 1945, and to the fact that after Germany's capitulation members of the German intelligence service facilitated his transfer to the American zone. There he contacted general Clay and acquainted him with plans he himself had helped to elaborate, on the formation and dispatch of groups of saboteurs to fight against communism.

If we further recall that General Lucius Clay belonged to the founders of FEC, the picture becomes perfectly clear.

ACEN IN ACTION

Reports of the ACEN general committee on its first year of existence show that the emigré leaders tried at first to launch widescale activities. They issued all manner of proclamations, appeals, declarations, resolutions, petitions, addressed both to UNO and to individual governments. They established "personal contacts," participated in various meetings, furnished the press—especially the American press, and the "Free Europe" and "Voice of America" radio stations—with propaganda material.

The practical results of all this work, though it comprises hundreds of thousands of printed pages, were rather negligible. This is evident from the reaction to all this multitude of material on the part of the foreign governments.

The only head of government to support ACEN's activities was the late ill-famed dictator of South Korea, Singh Man Rhee. It is noted by ACEN with special pride that Ruslan Avdulgani, secretary general of the Bandoeng conference, deigned to reply to an ACEN telegram. ACEN ascribes to itself "in no small measure" the merit of having the paragraph on refugees struck off the Austrian State treaty. This is about all. The rest of the documents issued by ACEN during the first years of its existence soon turned into archive material or literary garbage.

The general committee praised its own accomplishments most unstintingly, yet it took the opportunity to stress the need for ACEN to widen its scope of activities, and that this required money, money and more money. Where the finances come from was not specified, just as it remains anybody's guess to whom the demand for assignments was addressed.

On two occasions ACEN attempted to interfere in large-scale international problems.

The first was in October 1955, when the question of Albania's, Bulgaria's, Hungary's and Rumania's UNO membership was on the agenda of the United Nations' Assembly.

Poland and Czechoslovakia had automatically become members of UNO as allies in the War against hitlerite Germany, while the question of the above mentioned four countries that had been occupied by the Germans and forced to fight on Germany's side, had remained open.

On October 7th, 1955 ACEN addressed a demand to the chairman of the corresponding UNO committee, that Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania be refused admittance to UNO, as

countries "of a colonial type," dependent on the Soviet Union, "weapons of Soviet colonialism." Some time later the "captive" leaders submitted similar demands individually to ministers of foreign affairs and representatives of "free" UNO members.

As is common knowledge, the above-mentioned four countries were admitted as members of UNO on December 14th 1955.

It would have been incumbent on ACEN to acknowledge silently that it had mixed into matters outside its competence. However, this would have gone counter to the spirit of the "captive" leaders. They resolved to launch out against the Soviet Union, and to express their dissatisfaction with UNO. On December 16th they published furious statement to the effect that their "warning had been ignored" in consequence of which the "Soviet Union had once again succeeded in black-mailing the 'free nations' who had agreed to a deal on conditions advanced by the Soviet Union." The statement speaks of the "mortal danger," allegedly pending over Western civilisation. In a word, it contains bits of everything that may further the aims of the institution working in the interests of the cold war.

All these pretentious declarations are so many empty words today, devoid of any historical significance, since even at the time the responsible Western statesmen took no notice of them whatever.

The other incident took place approximately at the same time, with ACEN suffering a similar fiasco as it did on the above mentioned occasion. In connection with the Geneva conference of the Four Great Powers (the USSR, the USA, Britain

and France), ACEN was permitted by its American leaders to submit a memorandum to the foreign ministers of these powers on October 27th, 1955, containing an elaborately worded demand to reestablish "the independence of the nine captive nations." A few days later, when it had become clear that this attempt had also failed, ACEN published a special booklet entitled "Soviet aims at the Geneva conference." This document says that the extending of Soviet "power" to the "captive nations" (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania) is as important a cause of tension as the "division" of Germany; and further, the Great Powers are reprimanded for not even having this problem included in the agenda of the Geneva conference.

The emigrés insinuate brazenly that the Great Powers demanded from the Soviet Union agreement to one deal: the unification of Germany (meaning that the GFR should incorporate the GDR); the Soviet Union would be "compensated" by a security pact which would "de facto sanction Soviet control of the nine Central and Eastern European countries."

As is well known, the Soviet Union refused to hand over the GDR to the Bonn leaders. This must have evoked a dual reaction in the ACEN ringleaders: on the one hand, vicious attacks against the Great Powers for discriminating between the problem of Germany's re-unification, and that of reviving bourgeois régimes in the people's democracies and in the Baltic Soviet Republics; on the other hand—they must have experienced certain satisfaction, probably mixed with malicious joy, because the two above-

mentioned problems have since become closely interwoven (at least, in their imagination), so that their own interests coincide with Bonn policy.

The interference on the part of the ACEN ring-leaders in international politics on two important questions (the inclusion of the people's democracies into UNO, and the problem of Germany at the Geneva conference) manifested not only the insignificance of the emigré cliques in international politics; it also revealed several significant factors that were but in their initial stage at the time but would soon become characteristic of all ACEN activities over the future years. We see here the beginnings of the campaign directed against so-called "Soviet colonialism" and of the "principle of self-determination", that would subsequently gain such importance in the "diplomatic activities" of the ACEN leaders; we see already symptoms of their inimical attitude to a policy of peaceful coexistence and security in Europe; to put it briefly, from its very first steps ACEN elected a path of unconcealed, furious anti-communism, disregarding completely the vital interests of their own countries and nations, and this while they never cease proclaiming their rights to represent their nations, and always allege to be their spokesmen.

To what lengths of absurdity they could go on occasion is indicated in a phrase out of their telegram addressed to the President of Cuba (the dictator Batista) in connection with the Poznan events: "The fact that Cuba is the actual conscience of mankind (mighty words!) in the debates on the summary deal (the acceptance of 18 countries, including the people's democracies), and has always been the advocate of the freedom

of nations and of human rights in the UNO (listen to that!), induces ACEN to look forward with expectancy to action on the part of Your Excellency's government."

At the Bandoeng conference the ACEN leaders took the opportunity of challenging the countries of Africa and Asia to recognise the universality of the principle of self-determination of peoples.

Another announcement deserves attention. In September 1955, ACEN issued a warning to the "captive nations" against the communist "repatriation bluff." When the consequences of Stalin's personality cult were being liquidated, the Soviet government proclaimed a far-reaching amnesty applying to those who had suffered during the Stalin-Berya period and had been sentenced for political reasons. This amnesty extended not only to those who had been sentenced and exiled within the confines of the Soviet Union, but also to those who for various reasons had fled abroad. Far from welcoming this humane action directed towards mitigating as far as possible the harm committed in the Stalin-Berya period, ACEN adopted a hostile attitude to what they called "the repatriation campaign organized by puppet governments." Guided by purely personal interests and considerations, the emigrés who had severed all ties with their mother-countries ascribed to the Soviet government the intention to "liquidate" the political exiles (by permitting them to return home), and thus to "destroy the idea of liberation." To lend a lofty, highly moral purpose to their anti-Soviet propaganda, the emigré ringleaders declared, that they on their part would only return (to their homeland) when the independence of the "captive

nations" was restored... and that they, the ring-leaders, had no personal ambitions whatever, that they were fully resolved "to build up truly democratic countries, free from any form of dictatorship and foreign pressure."

These fraudulent arguments were reiterated later too, and are formulated in the ACEN resolutions adopted on April 14th, 1956, in Strasburg in connection with the refugee problem.

This document contains a derisive reference to the failure of the "Geneva spirit" and of "smiling coexistence," and repeats the old provocative reproaches to the Western states, leading up to the self-laudatory crowning words: "The whole of modern Western civilisation developed behind the live bastion of Central and Eastern European nations, whose historic mission today and in the past seems always to have been directed towards staying aggression and invasion."

How would the late French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pinaud have reacted to the news that his formula on a "cordon sanitaire" around revolutionary Russia was to be revived almost half a century later in the minds of the "captive" emigré leaders of Central and Eastern Europe? Let us recall that after the first World War, the western politicians motivated the resurrection of Poland, the strengthening of Rumania, the formation of the Baltic countries mainly by the argument that these countries would form the necessary barrier against the spreading of bolshevism into Europe. The elder generation of Baltic politicians ought to remember, that the recognition of their countries' independence had come only after the allied military missions had reported that, according to their observations, the Estonians,

Latvians, and Lithuanians were putting up an armed struggle against the "red menace" from the East; and even so de jure recognition had been delayed until there had been no hope whatever for a revival of a "united and undivided" tsarist or bourgeois Russia.

And in the final issue? In the final issue, the countries intended as a "barrier," a "buffer" or a "cordon sanitaire" between East and West became a foothold for hitlerite aggression against the Soviet Union*, and we know now that Western politicians welcomed this aggression hoping quietly (or openly, as the case may be) that the Soviet Union and Germany would mutually destroy each other.

How can anybody get the words across his lips (or on to paper) to claim, in 1950, that Central and Eastern Europe carried out the historic mission of saviours of Western civilisation?

Yet it is just this idea, disproved though it may be by fifty years and more of recent European history, that underlies the tactics which the American bosses prompt—or, rather, used to prompt—to the emigré leaders in launching ACEN—a tactics of subversion and provocations directed against their native countries. Today nobody except perhaps the hopelessly insane, speaks of blowing up bridges or storehouses in the people's democracies. Even the theory of the Central and Eastern European nations being a "deterrent" factor along the Soviet Union's frontier line,

* Even Berle, the first chairman of FEC, was forced to admit that this region (i. e., the countries of Eastern and Central Europe) had been used by the Germans twice as a foothold for invasion of the Soviet Union.

seems to have lost a good deal in popularity, though we hear it voiced at times by some fossil ACEN ringleaders. The question of "establishing contacts" with the "captive nations" is still on the agenda of the Western leaders. But why on earth should the American, British and other institutions that have been instructed to establish contacts with countries "behind the iron curtain," utilise for their purpose a handful of compromised emigré ringleaders? They have no need for it; the western institutions for propaganda and information have every reason to consider the fact, that persons notorious for their anti-Soviet activities cannot be used for contacts with their native countries, without harming the cause. Realising this, the emigré ringleaders took up from the very start a hostile attitude regarding development of contacts between East and West.

In the early period of its existence, ACEN expected a great deal from contact with the Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly, which, as is generally known, holds its meetings in Strasburg. True, the emigrés never succeeded in participating actively either in the one or in the other, however,—and this fact was proudly noted—"on July 8th 1955, for the first time in the history of the Council of Europe," an ACEN delegation was admitted to the "non-represented nations" committee session. On July 4th, the chairman of the committee Vistrand (Sweden) had visited an ACEN meeting. In his address to the meeting he announced that "we all (i. e., the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly) are looking forward to the day when our friends behind the iron curtain will regain their freedom." He went on to admonish the emigrés to cherish their

"cultural traditions," and expressed the wish that the emigrés may find a way of speaking not only in behalf of their people, but directly to them. This rather touched them on the raw, for whereas it is an easy matter for the emigré ringleaders to call themselves "lawful" representatives of the "captive" nations, and to proclaim themselves their spokesmen—there being nobody to call their bluff—it is quite impossible for them to prove that they are in contact with their homelands and their people. On the contrary: the more foreign visitors, including visitors from among rank-and-file emigrés, travel to the "oppressed" countries "behind the iron curtain," the thinner does the ACEN-fabricated legend wear on horrifying poverty, tyranny, dissatisfaction, passive resistance and other "glaring violations of human liberty and rights." These legends were spread by emigré cliques who named themselves authoritative sources of information and "fountain-heads of constructive ideas."

As to the "historic" meeting of July 8th, 1955, the only reference to it is a reported discussion on the best methods of collaboration between the committee of non-represented nations and ACEN. These methods will be dwelt upon later.

The actual conditions of refugees occupy a rather negligible place in ACEN reports. One might have expected the emigré leaders to show special concern here, since the problem involves hundreds of thousands of people the majority of whom had fled to the West without serious reasons, or else had been swept along against their will by the retreating German army. The emigré leaders might have admitted that many refugees had chosen this thorny path because of anti-Soviet

propaganda coming from the very circles to which these leaders themselves belong. It is they who are doubtless responsible for the unenviable fate of the refugees deceitfully lured into difficult conditions in strange countries where they are regarded with either pity or contempt.

However, the only concern of the ACEN officials who felt safe under the wing of their New York American bosses, was to see to it that they should be considered as backed by masses of refugees, which would strengthen their own position as "lawful representatives" of their nations. That this was of little avail to the refugees in their sufferings and hardships, worried them not at all.

In their resolution of April 14th, 1956, adopted at another meeting in Strasburg which had become a place of annual pilgrimage, ACEN was forced to admit that the position of the refugees continued to be hard (11 years after the war!). It may be appropriate to recall here that during the same period the economic position in the socialist camp had been rapidly improving, and the wounds inflicted by the war on the countries of this camp were healing fast. Yet there, in the "Free World," hundreds of thousands of people were eking out a prospectless existence either in camps or by unaccustomed heavy labour—which was insecure at that.

What, then, did their leaders offer them? Briefly speaking, they put forth two propositions: an international refugee organization, and an international refugee fund. It goes without saying that ACEN members were to be attached to both organizations as "active members." The precarious state of the refugees in the "Free World"

is indicated in the demand included in the above-mentioned resolution of April 14th, 1956, that immigration laws in individual countries should be mitigated, that refugees should be provided with homes within two years, and that the right of residence be granted to those who refuse to return to their homelands (as distinct from refugees) provided they are recognised "bona fide refugees" in the course of a year. Interestingly, the term "recognised refugees" is recommended with regard to people who have been resident in the respective country for no less than three years.

Equally interesting is the proposal to incorporate the so-called frozen assets of the Central and Eastern European countries into the planned international refugee fund. The proposal envisaged payment out of this fund of pensions for former service in the respective home countries, loans without interest to refugees desiring to resume their former commercial or professional occupation, and assistance to emigré peasants to set up independent farms (sparsely inhabited countryside is stipulated here).

The emigré ringleaders had a hearty appetite indeed! It must be borne in mind that the above referred only to European countries which is indicated by its inclusion into the agenda of the ACEN Strasburg session.

However, the emigré "spokesmen" did not limit their claims to this. To present themselves in the rôle of defenders of the refugees and emigrés, they demanded that the "responsible governments" should pay out compensation money to former political exiles, that refugees should be assigned money grants, stipends, assistance money and loans to continue their education, pre-

miums, donations for literary publications, subsidies for all manner of national academies, schools, institutes, boarding schools, libraries etc. etc.

In addition, various measures were suggested for the struggle against "communist propaganda," for reorganizing camps in Germany, Austria, Greece, and Italy into "reception centres," for assistance to "counterpropaganda" against "communist propaganda," for organizing "sponsorship" over "recalcitrant" refugees... Maybe we could stop at that.

As to results—they did not differ from those obtained in political matters, i. e., they were to all intents and purposes equal to nought. In the autumn of 1955, the ACEN leadership swallowed two bitter pills—when their protest was ignored as to the admission of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania into UNO, and when their suggestion was ignored to have the problem of restoring bourgeois regimes in the captive countries included in the agenda of the Four Great Powers Conference in Geneva, how, in the spring of 1956 they were made to realise during their second session in Strasburg that the European cultural fund for "exiles" had not been set up yet, because "too few of the memberstates were prepared to participate in it."

They took comfort in the prophesy of the late Dulles regarding what he himself called the "European idea" that matters were developing in the direction of "United States of Europe"; apparently, they hoped to be incorporated in this fantastic organization. For the present division of the (European) continent, they alleged, was

generally admitted to be one of the gravest forms of tension and insecurity.

They were also partly reassured by the verbal juggle of the European Consultative Assembly, the long and the short of which was that the problems of European and world security were closely tied up not only with the re-unification of Germany (what kind of unification the western politicians aspire to is common knowledge), but also with "the restoration of national independence and political freedom" in Central and Eastern Europe.

And lastly, the captive leaders descried a certain measure of success in the invitation by the European Consultative Assembly of four ACEN representatives in the capacity of experts to the Committee for non-represented nations.

True, when ACEN expressed the desire to see all nine "captive nations" in the same status, it remained ignored. It rather seemed as though in the subsequent years the European Consultative Assembly observed scrupulous caution regarding official contacts with ACEN. As was stated elsewhere, already in 1963 "contact" was confined to a few dyed-in-the-wool anti-communists attending a "special" ACEN session in Strasburg. For the rest, contact was upheld only through the secretariat, while sessions of the Consultative Assembly itself and of its committees remained barred to members of ACEN.

1957—1959.

All through the subsequent years, ACEN continued their ballyhoo. It seems, however, that its

sponsors eventually concluded that the substance of the literary production they could offer did not warrant the enormous expenditure the secretariat incurred on printing it all. This can be seen, for example, from the fact that the four sessions held between 1957—1961 were reported in one joint publication, while in the first years of its existence ACEN published reports annually, and its very first year's work was even reflected in two publications. Apart from reasons of economy, there was an additional reason for this, namely, that it was becoming increasingly difficult to find new themes for anti-Soviet propaganda—all resources were soon exhausted.

Year upon year, the agenda of ACEN sessions contains the same hackneyed points, in the first place, attacks on the Soviet Union's "aggressiveness," protests against the admittance to UNO sessions of "pseudorepresentatives" of the people's democracies, the demand that the question of Soviet "colonialism" be put on the agenda of UNO sessions, the demand that the "Hungarian question" remain on the agenda, complaints regarding the violation of human rights in "captive countries," etc.

As vain as all other efforts were the attempts of ACEN to obtain recognition of their basic premise, namely that the question of "captive" European nations was allegedly one of the main reasons of international tension. In the early years of the period under consideration, ACEN ostentatiously challenged the West to solve the problem of Eastern and Central Europe while, in the opinion of ACEN, the West still possessed unquestionable military and other superiority over the Soviet "Empire." This is an unequivocal expression

of "power politics": you threaten the Soviet Union with war, and it will cede its positions and submit to your demands. Apart from their erroneous evaluation of the balance of forces, and apart from the fact that they, the instigators themselves, possessed no power whatsoever, the ACEN spokesmen had wrongly appraised even the mood of the Western powers, who were not in the least inclined to increase the already dangerous tension by advancing obviously unrealistic claims, especially since such claims would never win public support either in the USA, or in Britain, or in France.

Thus ACEN was forced to admit, wistfully, its failure to induce the West to take up this task, declaring, for the sake of self-esteem, that it had at least helped to sustain the idea of Eastern and Central Europe's freedom and to uphold hope and faith in the hearts and minds of "captive" peoples. Neither the one nor the other is true to fact. The freedom of Eastern and Central Europe is secure, while the emigré pseudo-leaders have themselves closed for themselves all approaches to the hearts and minds of their fellow-countrymen by their fallacious premise that they represent their peoples and are authorised to speak in their behalf—instead of listening to the thoughts and aspirations of their peoples. Indignation is the only possible reaction to the numberless, repetitive, boring appeals coming from people who have no homeland, people who have sold their own nations, and who address themselves to every kind of international institution and statesman under the impudent pretext that their peoples are allegedly forced into silence, so that they, who have in actual fact resigned from their nations, are the spokesmen of one hundred million.

Impudent criticism of Western politics is not infrequently expressed by ACEN spokesmen. A collection of all their charges against Western politics as a whole, and against actions of Western statemen individually, would make up an enormous list, so that one might wonder not so much, perhaps, at the patience of these Western statesmen—it is doubtful whether they read these wrathful outbursts—as at the shortsightedness of the actual ACEN bosses, those who direct its activities and presumably expect some results from such irresponsible ballyhoo.

The Western Powers are accused of a “purely defensive policy,” they are warned against concluding security pacts, if the participants include “communist satellite governments,” they are requested to stop making the “artificial distinction” between the problem of the reunification of Germany and that of restoring freedom and independence in the “captive” countries. Ironical comment is made with regard to the alleged Western view that the reunification of Germany is a matter of “practical” politics, while the problem of the “captive” nations belongs to “declarative” politics. The Western Powers are advised not to trust “the liberalisation of Kremlin politics” (meaning the liquidation of the consequences of the Stalin personality cult)...

In December 1957, ACEN sent a telegram of protest to President Eisenhower, because the NATO Paris session Communique contained not a word on the Soviet Union’s “enslavement” of nine European countries. The telegram suggests that NATO must “unceasingly” expose the Soviet Union’s “aggression” and “never stop” declaring the right of the nine nations to freedom. As in

many other instances, here, too, the wording implies both threat, and apprehension lest silence on the part of the West should "discourage" the nations of the above-mentioned countries. However, as before—and in the future!—President Eisenhower and NATO remained deaf to the captive leaders' pathetic pleas. ACEN did not confine itself to the appeal to the USA President. Only the other governments of NATO had to be satisfied with letters instead of telegrams—for reasons of economy. The letters instruct the prime ministers and foreign ministers that the "seizure" of the nine European countries and the "division" of Germany remain the chief cause of international tension. Needless to say, the destination of all these letters was the same—the archive or the waste-paper basket.

Some time earlier, ACEN had demanded that President Eisenhower should raise the question of "captive nations" before UNO. For results—see above. They were the same when ACEN repeated its attempt at the 13th session of UNO in 1958. For unknown reasons, however, the address to the heads of governments of the "Free World" mentions only five "captive" nations—Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania; Hungary and the Baltic Republics are not listed.

As is known, in 1957 the Soviet government submitted to discussion at UNO a Declaration on peaceful coexistence of states with various social orders. ACEN immediately hastened to discredit this initiative, declaring the Soviet proposal a weapon of political struggle, and urging UNO to consider the Soviet document as a "mobilising ruse" for propaganda purposes, and not "an earnest expression of legal principles." Yet once

again ACEN remained snubbed, waiting vainly for a response to their move.

This sort of variation on the same theme comprises all of ACEN's activities during 1957 and 1958. Every single meeting of the heads of the Western Powers was accompanied by the appearance of some ACEN document, although a response was never forthcoming. The ACEN accounts for the given period state that encouraging steps had been taken towards "acquiring official status," though what these steps are is passed over in silence, and the "official status" was never reached. Meetings were held endlessly: in the course of four years, the General Committee met 300 times, and the other committees about as often. It means that on an average the General Committee met once every three days, and yet quantity never changed into quality, and the results still remained nil.

Nor did it improve matters when ACEN started publishing their monthly organ not only in English, but in Arabic, Spanish, and Swedish as well. I doubt whether this costly affair is still on; whether or not, the results are the same, or rather, they are nonexistent.

A change of ACEN chairman did not help matters either: in 1958 Korbonski, a Pole,—a figure of greater stature—was elected instead of Masens.

Former member of the Polish Diet, Head of the underground government during the war, Stefan Korbonski possessed, among other qualities, enough courage and political perspicacity to refuse to identify ACEN with the German revisionists. Surprising enough, though, for all his past activity in the resistance movement, he could bring himself to work side by side with former members of

the SS, and of punitive detachments—such as the Latvians Janums, Hazners, Maikovskis, Kripens.

However, although as a politician Korbonski was beyond Masens' scope, he still could not alter the fallaciousness and instability of the very foundations of ACEN. He could not change the fact that ACEN was a tool for implementing the cold war policy, and utterly unconcerned with the true interests of the nations of whom the group of emigrès claimed to be the legal representatives. Nor could he change the fact that in the eyes of the ACEN bosses, the growing strength of the Bonn Republic in Europe, and of reactionary regimes in South East Asia, were more important by far than a guarantee for peaceful existence to some small European nations. In a word, even a statesmen from the most important of the East European countries, that had suffered bitterly in the war, proved unable to disentangle himself from anti-communism, from a fruitless, purely negative ideology.

During the late 1950ies—a period of supremely significant international events, a period of intensive diplomatic activities, ACEN proved too insipid an institution to be a mouthpiece of its bosses' policy.

This is why a new move was made in the game of anti-communist politics, conceived on a broad scale, yet fraught with dangerous consequences, jeopardising the CIA plan to play out the reactionaries of any country of the world against the progressive or revolutionary tendencies in the strata of society distasteful to CIA.

The matter in point is the July 17th, 1959 Resolution of the USA congress that it should fall

to the USA President's duty to proclaim every third week of July "Captive Nations Week."

Every possible means was put into play to speed the adoption of this resolution so that it might anticipate the Soviet delegation's arrival for the 14th UNO session. This is evident from a telegram from ACEN leaders to President Eisenhower, Sept. 4th, 1959, belauding the President's declaration, published on the basis of the Congress resolution. The telegram makes you marvel indeed, how quickly ACEN changed their wrath for delight, how quickly forgotten were all reproaches flung at the President at the time when the question of "captive" nations was not raised either within UNO or at other international conferences. Now ACEN is full of "profound gratitude" for the President's "constant support" of their determination to regain independence. Truly, one may say— a lovers' quarrel.

The emigré leaders follow up their expression of gratitude with a request that at his meeting with the Soviet Premier, the President should make the restoration of freedom and independence in the nine Eastern and Central European countries an obligatory condition of a European settlement and "the political liquidation of World War II." What exactly the political liquidation of "World War II" implies, is not clear. What is clear, and what everybody ought to bear in mind, is—who had unleashed World War II, and who had treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Today, many responsible Western statesmen tend to forget this, or try to do so. But one cannot forget as long as there are millions of people still alive who lost fathers, brothers, close and dear ones on the fields of battle; whose mothers, sisters and

children went under in the cataclysm produced by fascist aggression against the whole civilised world, or under the yoke of the invaders. The instigators of that war will not be forgotten, and there can be no question of "political liquidation of World War II."

If not for the hitlerite crime on a world scale, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe might have possibly been living now under bourgeois or fascist regimes. But these nations have matured now, they have taken the power into their own hands and will not forfeit it for telegrams or resolutions.

At any rate, even this new effort on the part of ACEN, inspired though it was by the resolution of Congress and the declaration of the US President, failed as ingloriously as the previous ones had done in the preceding five-year period.

A few more words on the Congress resolution. It will be analysed more closely further on, yet I should like to note here that it was not dictated by a desire to render active assistance to the nations mentioned in it. Its aim was different. Magnanimous concern for the freedom of peoples was but a screen, a pretext for propaganda for interfering in the internal affairs of any country whose political system is not to the liking of the reactionaries. Under a slogan of freedom, the resolution whitewashes the policy of the reactionary elements in the American leadership, aimed at restoring militarist Germany in Europe, at supporting the corrupt anti-nationalists in South Eastern Asia, at quenching the national liberation movement in Latin America. The main adherents of this policy belong to leading USA military

circles, and to the financial oligarchy, while the masses of the American people have no aggressive aspirations, but, like all peoples of the world, want peace and better living conditions. Thus, in addition to the aim of justifying themselves in matters like the setting up of "multinational atomic forces," for example, or armed interference in Vietnam, or reconnaissance flights over Cuba—the authors of the resolution pursued one more aim: at least once a year they would put into play the full force of their propaganda machinery, to persuade the American people, whom they consider indifferent to their political speculations, that communism or, to be more concrete, the policy of the Soviet Union is to blame in all international difficulties.

Such is the actual background of the Congress Resolution of July 17th, 1959. ACEN plays a second, if not third-rate role in the matter.

THE CONGRESS RESOLUTION

On July 17th, 1959, 5 years after the establishment of ACEN, the USA Congress adopted Resolution 111, to the effect that henceforward each year the third week of July would be designated "Captive Nations Week." The resolution was part of a provocative campaign against the countries of the socialist camp. It is adorned with samples of the Senate style, e. g., "submerged nations," the USA as a "citadel" of human liberty, the restoration of "Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Buddhist and other freedoms of faith," etc., etc.

When I asked an American journalist of the

U. S. News and World Report during his stay in Riga in 1963 what this masterful stylistic concoction signified, he answered: "I must say, our Congress adopts such lots of such nonsense." He even promised me to make inquiries as to the nature of the country "Idel-Ural" mentioned as one of the "captive" nations in the Congress Resolution. The results of his inquiry have not reached me yet.

The USA Congress Resolution mentions 22 submerged or captive nations and "others," yet only nine banners are hoisted above the "small building" opposite UNO headquarters. Why such "discrimination"? The composition of the "captive nations" apparently suffers from some defect or imprecision.

I should like to dwell on the Congress Resolution from the political angle, since it presents a directive to the "Assembly of Captive European Nations."

The underlying idea of the Resolution is doubtless that of anti-communism, if this kind of idea may at all be put on paper in a serious political document—and a Congress resolution ought to be considered as such. At the same time, the anti-communist purport of the Resolution is not just an ideological doctrine, but is linked with the alleged threat to USA security. It stresses the question of USA security twice: in the first place, it states, already "since 1918 the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Russian communism have resulted in the creation of a vast empire which constitutes a dire threat to USA security"; secondly, it says, that upholding the aspirations for freedom among the emigrés is allegedly "of vital importance for the national security of the USA."

In other words, the very existence of the Soviet Union is in itself considered a threat to the USA, and the "liberation of all those 22 nations and others" is essential for the national security of the USA.

The Soviet Union is contrasted with the widely proclaimed "democratic" process in the USA thanks to which a "harmonious unity" of peoples has been brought about.

The unbiased reader is struck as much by the absurdity of the first two assertions as by the lie and hypocrisy of the declaration on the democratic process and harmonious unity of nations in the USA.

If the Soviet Union, i. e., the embodiment of what the senators call "Russian Communism" presented a dire threat to the security of the United States already since 1918—why, then, did the USA recognise it, true, with a delay of 16 years? Why did they join with it as allies in the period of World War II? Why have they during the recent years displayed a reasonable tendency to establish economic and cultural relations with the Soviet Union, and, through their President, expressed the wish that the cold war might be put an end to once and for all?

And in what way would the "liberation" or "restoration of national independence" of 22 and "other" countries enhance the national security of the USA? Or do the senators propose to liquidate the Soviet Union, or better still—Communism?

Such directions, such tendencies can only be qualified as absurd. And is it not preposterous to call American capitalism, the most revolting form

of the cash-nexus, the true kingdom of the dollar—a “democratic process»?

This shows as much lack of political consciousness as does their formulation “harmonious unity” of nations in qualifying the attitude of the ruling circles to their fellow-countrymen of other races. The very concept of “a hundred percent American” implies arrogance and unwritten restrictions of political and social rights towards those American citizens whose skins are black, or brown, or yellow, or whose family-tree is not up to the mark.

The words “Communism” and “communist” recur frequently enough in the Resolution to leave no doubt as to the fact that all the wrathful eloquence of the senators is aimed at Communism and nothing else.

We may add that the Resolution questions the right of existence of all Union Republics of the USSR except Kirghisia and Uzbekistan; all others fall under the category of “captive,” “enslaved,” or “submerged” nations.

We shall not be far off the mark in presuming that the basic purpose of this politically ignorant resolution, as conceived by its authors, was linked with home policy. It is only natural that the reactionary circles should fear the powerful example of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. It is for this reason that they attempt to instil into the working people of capitalist countries the idea that the masses did not choose the path of socialism of their own free will, but were forced into it by external pressure. This was confirmed by no other than Senator Goldwater, former Republican candidate for USA presidency. In a telegram to ACEN towards the end of 1963,

the Arizona senator declares: "ACEN augment its activities" so that "the plight of the peoples now enslaved behind the iron and bamboo curtains be kept constantly before the American people." In simpler language, this means that by its very existence, and by spreading slander about the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy ACEN must help to disseminate among the Americans hostility towards socialism, thus implying approval of the capitalist regime in the USA. In this consists the rôle of ACEN.

Thus, by instituting "Captive Nations Week" its authors were pursuing the following aims:

- 1) struggle against Communism, by means of dismembering the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp;

- 2) upkeep of potential saboteurs in the rear of the Soviet Union, as a "deterrent" in the interests of USA security.

This is why the chairman of the "Assembly of Captive Nations" went so far as to call "Captive Nations Week" a symbol of America's moral and political obligations. The Soviet public is of different opinion, considering "Captive Nations Week" a preposterous annual comedy.

The "Assembly of Captive Nations" as well as "Captive Nations Week" are creations of reactionary forces, of advocates of the cold war. When the late President Kennedy, who was a shrewd statesman, signed, in 1963, the last proclamation in his lifetime, implementing the Congress Resolution of July 17th 1959, he was doubtless aware that the ill-famed resolution was not exactly flattering evidence of its authors' political maturity. Aware of the awkwardness of his position he deliberately

worded the motivation for the proclamation very vaguely. This was at once noted by the American reactionaries: thus, The Dallas Morning News—(issued in the very town where a few months later President Kennedy was murdered)—wrote in connection with “Captive Nations Week” that “Mr. Kennedy’s proclamations have been conscious, studied efforts to avoid offending the Soviets and their cohorts...” “It is difficult to understand these actions,” continues the rabid journalist, “if the President and this nation are truly dedicated to the preservation and extension of freedom. How continued efforts to placate and avoid condemning the enemy can promote that goal is hard to understand. The President, or someone else, should explain.”

Although President Lyndon B. Johnson declared in his speech at the plenary session of the General Assembly of UNO on December 17th, 1963, that “the USA want the cold war to end once and for all,” he was evidently obliged to carry out the Resolution of Congress and proclaim “Captive Nations Week” in 1964. Whether he did it particularly gleefully or not is difficult to tell, but his proclamation was as severely criticised in the reactionary press as had been that of the late President Kennedy. However, the whole atmosphere of the election struggle, and the memory of what happened to President Kennedy in November 1963 in Dallas, seem to stand in the way, at present, of any measures that might be taken to revoke the Resolution. Even in its pre-election programme the Democratic Party was compelled to follow the Republican Party’s example and in enter the point “... liberation of the nations of the Socialist countries.”

PLAGIARIES

A number of senators and congressmen turned the Congress Resolution of July 17th, 1959 to their own account. They cribbed part of the text, word for word, to submit their own draft resolutions (about 50 of them all told), suggesting that the USA President be requested to raise the question of freeing the "captive nations," and to demand through UNO that the Soviet Union recall all Soviet troops, all "agents," "colonists," etc. from the countries concerned, that the Soviet Union return all exiles and prisoners from Siberia, from prisons, and from "slave labour camps," and that "free elections" be held in these countries under UNO supervision, and that UNO should list all Soviet communists guilty of crimes against these nations.

It may be asked whether these plagiarisms by political ignoramuses are worth mentioning. I think they are. They show that in political thought—or, rather, thoughtlessness many American senators and congressmen have remained at the level of the July 17th Resolution five years ago: the same absurd statements regarding "the aggressive policy of Russian communism," the "threat to the security of the United States," "submerged nations," the USA role as "citadel of human freedom," "freedom of creed," "liberation of captive nations," etc.

Many of the authors envisage depriving a number of European states and Cuba of their sovereign rights and threaten the Soviet Union's territorial integrity. If a sovereign state, a member of UNO, should agree to "free elections" on its territory under the auspices of UNO, it would first

have to resign from its sovereignty, and no one in his right mind could expect UNO to advance a proposal to this effect. As to withdrawing Soviet troops from the territories of other countries, this is exactly what the Soviet Union proposed more than once, only on a reciprocal and universal basis, i. e., if all troops are withdrawn from foreign territories.

The proposal that all exiles and prisoners be allowed to return from Siberia, prisons, and "slave labour camps," goes to show the stark ignorance of the authors of the resolutions, as well as their extraordinary impudence. If they referred to persons sentenced on political grounds—these have long since been liberated; if they had in mind all and sundry serving a term—then, with all due allowances for the mental abilities of the authors, even they must admit that a "total amnesty" of this kind is wholly and completely the internal affair of the Soviet Union. As to identifying Siberia with exile—this rings like an echo of the distant tsarist times, while the term "slave labour camp" must have been borrowed from reminiscences of Hitler's Reich, or else from the times of slave labour in the Southern States of the USA. Or maybe the term is derived from the present slave system in the South African Republic and other localities where the American congressmen have admittance.

Even the USA State Department is tired of all this pen-wagging by senators and congressmen in draft resolutions, and it was repeatedly forced to declare that they merely reiterated the USA policy (laid down in the Resolution of July 17th, 1959), and that the operative parts of these drafts add nothing new to the policy pursued by the USA.

DISILLUSIONMENT.

The first impression of the Congress Resolution upon the ACEN leaders was undoubtedly more than favourable, and they rejoiced in finding themselves among the objects of American policy. However, on sober reflection they must have experienced a certain degree of doubt as to whether they had really gained anything from their new status. On the one hand, it was obvious that the militarists and reactionaries would not retreat from their designs against the German Democratic Republic, or from their support of reactionary regimes in the Far East (Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam). Hence, it was agreeable to be in their company counting on American aid. On the other hand, however, the idea of dismembering the Soviet Union as expressed in the Congress Resolution, must have appeared completely unrealistic even to the emigré leaders, for all their blind hatred of communism. To be listed together with Soviet Socialist Republics, as with Idel-Ural "and others" must have appeared a dubious political advantage, to some extent a demotion from the sphere of "real" politics to that of "declarative" politics. Besides, if anybody had previously cherished any doubts on this score, now it had become perfectly clear that ACEN had no independent political line, that it was but a tool—and not a very precious one at that—of American policy.

The ACEN leaders chose to put a cheerful face on it, happy to be granted subsidies at least for the duration of the Resolution.

Before long they came to realise, however, that an addition of new epithets—"enslaved," "sub-

merged," "humbled"—to their previous one—"captive"—changed nothing in their de facto position as stooges of the American intelligence service.

In connection with the summit conference appointed for May 1960, ACEN addressed themselves to Bundeskanzler Adenauer, their new ally, acquired on the strength of the Congress Resolution. The letter opens with a statement, clad in diplomatic terms, to the effect that in the past the mutual relations between some of the nine Eastern and Central European countries, and Germany had not always been "harmonious."

"However," it continues hopefully, "times have changed." ACEN is therefore convinced that the past should be buried, and that "we must join our efforts, unequal and disproportionate (the authors are aware of the difference between themselves and the head of the Bonn Government)", so as to "struggle against the communist evil," which threatens to submerge "our" old continent and destroy "our" Western civilisation.

There is nothing to add to this; anti-communism cannot be expressed more unequivocally.

ACEN goes on to repeat its old favourite argument, that the re-unification of Germany is not enough, that the European problem must be solved as a whole, and a suitable program can only be based on the principle of self-determination. All this is substantiated by stale arguments—the "deterrent," strengthening of the "spirit of resistance," the importance of Eastern and Central Europe for West Europe's security. The letter ends with a humble bow to Adenauer, and adds that the Bundeskanzler is sure to avail himself of Ger-

many's influential position in Europe in behalf of all Europe, including its "captive East."

Thus, "fortified" by the USA Congress Resolution, ACEN openly links its fate with the revisionist and revanchist policy of Bonn. No answer from Adenauer is reported. More likely than not, there was none, since that "Cunning Fox of Bonn" was not inclined at that time to link the demand for Germany's "unification" with the dubious venture of "selfdetermination" in the Eastern and Central European countries.

ACEN had suffered a disappointment already previously, in connection with its protest against the participation of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania in the Committee of "10" on disarmament, which was agreed upon despite ACEN's expressed opinion that the participation of these European countries, considerable both in territory and population, in the Committee of "10," would cause "painful disillusionment" among the people of their "motherlands"—from which the ACEN representative had severed themselves long since.

In March 1960, they vainly entreated the French President General de Gaulle to raise in his negotiations with the USSR the issue of urgent elections in the "captive" countries after a withdrawal of Soviet troops and "agents." Anticipating their failure in this matter, the ACEN leaders declare that irrespective of the results the fact remains that if the issue is raised the menace to Western Europe's security would be eliminated, because it would fortify the "spirit of resistance" among "captive" nations.

If the population in the countries of people's democracy knew of all the feverish activities con-

ducted behind their backs, but at their expense, by their former compatriots in New York, they would have long since told these renegades to stop their game, because the people stand on different positions, they want peace and friendship, and it is time for the renegades to clear the stage.

In connection with the XV session of the General Assembly, ACEN started another hullabaloo. Leading representatives of the USSR and of the People's Democracies were expected in New York, so ACEN impudently suggested to President Eisenhower to use the opportunity for "a shattering exposure of Soviet colonialism" and for voicing a demand for free elections under international supervision in all "captive" countries.

In addition—ACEN demanded that the President receive an ACEN delegation during the stay of the representatives of the Socialist camp in New York—apparently, in order to air their anti-Soviet views.

Needless to say, ACEN achieved nothing; not even an acknowledgement of their provocative document. A fortnight later, ACEN sent a telegram to the President expressing "disappointment" with his speech at the UNO plenary Assembly. The telegram starts on a subdued note, declaring that ACEN was grieved and disappointed at the absence of some kind of reference in the President's speech at UNO to the tragic fate of the captive nations. This was a terrible blow to the people of 'their motherlands.' Passing the "captives" over in silence in a speech dedicated mainly to freedom in other parts of the world, will be interpreted as meaning to say that the West acknowledges the status quo.

In conclusion, the ACEN spokesmen express

their traditional apprehension, lest this time "the communists succeed in demoralising our people and destroy their trust in the West." All this we have heard many a time, and are going to hear many more times in the future.

"WE WANT TO BE COLONIAL NATIONS"

The political part of the Senate Resolution proved as little inspiring as its geographical exposition was obsolete and contradictory. However, the "Assembly" was already set up and had been functioning for five years with all the necessary paraphernalia: premises, nine banners at half-mast, a general committee, working committees, a secretariat. This machinery was in need of finance, and the assignments, officially from the "Free Europe Committee," de facto determined by the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA, had to be proved justifiable. This was of vital interest not only to the initiators of the "Assembly," the charitable friends of the "captive nations," and to those who pulled the wires from behind the scenes; it was of most vital interest also to the self-styled emigré leaders who had climbed to leading positions in the "Assembly" and had secured for themselves quite handsome earnings, interesting missions, the nimbus of exiles—and all this with a minimum of exertion and effort. Because the thousands of emigrés whom the members of the Assembly claimed to represent, knew little if anything about ACEN, saw in it no practical use for themselves, and did not even really know what these mysterious po-

liticians were occupying themselves with. In consequence of all this, the emigré leaders found themselves faced with the task of justifying the "Assembly's" existence in some way or other, so as to satisfy their American clients, earn their benevolence, and at the same time appease the envious and critical within their own camp.

Luncheons and receptions, annual flag-hoisting timed to coincide with UNO General Assembly meetings, special church services and similar ceremonies were insufficient. Something more effective had to be thought up. This is how the problem of "Soviet colonialism" was taken up by the "Assembly of Captive Nations." The "captive" activists declared nine European countries Soviet colonies, mentioning also the other 13 countries "and others" from the geographical reference list provided by the Senate.

It is probably the first case in history that sons of a nation want their mother country to be declared a colony. It can only be explained by utter confusion in the minds of people who have severed all ties with their native countries and put themselves at the service of alien interests. It is because these emigré big-bugs divorced from their countries and their peoples, deem themselves representative of something, while in reality they represent nobody except themselves. Even this is questionable; more likely than not, they are merely tools in the hands of forces and institutions acting counter to the interests of peace-loving nations.

The "captive" emigrés exerted themselves to the utmost to make the UNO Assembly include in a document their peculiar and unnatural assertion: they issued a special pamphlet on colonial-

ism "of a new kind," and approached the delegations of the African countries newly accepted by UNO, appealing to them to insist that it should be clearly specified, that the principles on which the declaration on colonialism is based, refers "to all parts of the world, including Eastern and Central Europe." They paid personal visits to more than half the UNO delegations, made representations at the foreign ministries and delegations of Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Denmark, Japan, the Lebanon, the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay at UNO, dispatched telegrams in all directions, pronounced speeches over the radio—and all this for the sake of empty verbal manoeuvre advantageous to the USA State Department. After all—the American officials of the CIA and similar institutions did not at that time squander their dollars to start a loud campaign so that, for example, the Latin American countries be defined as colonies, or that this definition should apply to Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Alsace, Lorraine.

As was pointed out earlier, the very concept of "captive" nations was very loosely interpreted by the American politicians. Sometimes there are 22 of them, then 14, and each time "and others" is added, a category into which any country of the world may be included—or from which it may be excluded—as the case may be. Therefore, alongside the "lawful and recognised" assembly of captive nations, comprising, as we know, emigré representatives of nine European countries and hence named "Assembly of Captive European Nations," we also come upon the expression "captive nations" of Europe, Asia and the Western hemisphere. Interestingly, Africa is not yet

mentioned as a continent containing "captive nations." And this despite the fact that Africa used to be a typical continent of colonialism, and that a rather considerable number of colonial possessions are still extant there. True, France, Spain, and Portugal try to maintain the unconvincing version that their possessions in Africa are not colonies but overseas territories of the metropolis, but this metamorphosis has not received international recognition. In a similar way, the British Government is trying to manoeuvre the problem of Malta* and Gibraltar which quite obviously do not belong to the territory of the British Metropolis and are considered by world public opinion as territories captured by force and governed as colonies.

The USA maintains diplomatic silence with regard to all this, reluctant to hurt the feelings of a partner who frequently voices his support of USA policy on questions concerning struggle against countries of the Socialist camp.

The ideological arsenal of the "Assembly of Captive Nations" is but a component part of the political purposes pursued by anti-Soviet circles in the USA. It is they that created ACEN as a weapon for the cold war, coopting the help of some of the more active and servile emigrés to implement their plans of political sabotage against the countries of the Socialist camp.

Nobody could give serious consideration to the bouncing attempts on the part of a handful of emigré leaders to launch an ideological struggle

* As we know, Malta's independence was proclaimed in September 1964.

against Communism. Or to their assurances that the people of the countries they have abandoned, with which they have no contact, which they do not represent, will act as a hostile force in the rear of the Socialist camp.

As to "Soviet colonialism," a negative view with regard to this problem being put before the UNO forum was unequivocally expressed by the majority of UNO members, including the US government. In view of this, ACEN dropped their assaults on "Soviet colonialism," which could only compromise these new-fangled fighters for a recognition of the colonial status of nine European nations; it would show up their lack of erudition in history, economics, and sociology. Instead, they started a campaign for the principle of self-determination.

However, there is just as much contradictoriness, and as little ideological clarity in the circles that utilise ACEN for their political anti-Soviet ends with regard to the concept "colonialism," as there is with regard to propaganda for self-determination—as there is in all their activities, for that matter. The gentlemen of the State Department and of CIA would be well advised to consult more frequently various reference books that could provide them with precise and elaborate formulations of the word "colony." They would find, in various reference books, definitions qualifying colonies as: a remote territory dependent on the dominating power; a group of people re-settled from their native country to another country yet remaining subject to the government of their native country; a settlement in a new country comprising a community fully or partly subjected to their native country; an overseas ter-

ritory acquired by forcible enslavement and forcibly exploited, etc.

This series of definitions is far from complete, but we know from political history that there have been no colonies in Europe, and some politicians and political officials would do well to get clear on the point that there are no colonies in Europe today either. If they want to verify this fact, they may visit Europe, including the Soviet Union, to realise how deficient their knowledge has been so far in political, historical and geographical sciences. They would also understand that the Socialist countries develop their interrelations, their political and economic ties, on a basis of equality of rights, of mutual aid, and adherence to common aims.

It may as well be noted that the attempt on the part of the nine "captive nations" to be qualified as colonies, fell through with a bang, just as their proposal that the question of Soviet colonialism be moved before UNO. It was then that ACEN received new directives—to move heaven and earth so that the term colonialism should be superseded by the principle of selfdetermination.

In February 1961, President Eisenhower was succeeded by President Kennedy, and on February 14th of the same year ACEN was already at his doorsteps with a letter. A new man, the President was to be "taken in" at once, and so they overwhelmed him with the statement that "100 million captive people" in Central and Eastern Europe were looking towards him with new hope. Mark the word "new"—significant if compared with the "disappointment" expressed to his predecessor only some months before. Then follow variations on the same old tune—the significance of the Eastern

and Central European nations as "deterrents" against Soviet "aggression"; juggling with the concept of "atomic deterrent," and "graded deterrent" (to be deciphered at discretion), and finally, the wish is expressed that the President may, at his convenience, reaffirm the USA determination never to enter on an agreement that might imply reconciliation with the present "enslavement of captive nations," to which this time they surreptitiously add "Eastern Germany"—presumably hoping that such garnish would make their nine-country hotch-potch more palatable.

The letter offers a five-point programme, and expresses the wish that the President may receive an ACEN delegation that could convey to him the best wishes of the Eastern and Central European nations, and present to him their views.

President Kennedy did not, however, wish to receive the ACEN delegation, nor even to answer their message.

It is commonly known, that the heads of the USSR and USA Governments met in Vienna in June 1961. Again ACEN thought it incumbent on them to advise the President as to his conduct in negotiating with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The emigrés admonish the President not to recognise the status quo in Eastern Europe. They declare that in spite of all their disappointments, the nations of Eastern Europe still cherish their trust in the West, and they, the emigrés, voicing their people's views (whoever authorised them in this?) express their confidence in President Kennedy as the "acknowledged leader of the Free World." They demand that on no account should the President agree to the Soviet "colonial power in Eastern and Central

Europe"; they were confident that the President realises that only a united Europe can counter the "Soviet challenge."

If we recall that in the summer of the same year of 1961, i. e., a little over a month after the above incident, ACEN severely criticised President Kennedy for his "tepid" proclamation regarding the "week of captive nations," we see that apparently his attitude at the Vienna meeting was a bitter disappointment to the ACEN "world politicians."

To make up to themselves for their failures in "high" politics, ACEN turned their attention to Latin America, for which purpose they wheedled out for themselves several missions there and conveyed their greetings to the Cuban reactionary emigrés who had found shelter and a strategic base for subversive activities on USA territory.

A perusal of the ACEN accounts of their activities during 1961/62 shows it would be superfluous to enumerate all failures suffered by ACEN; a general appraisal of the period is adequately presented by the ACEN leaders themselves in the conclusions to their annual account.

We quote: "Judging by the events in the Communist Empire (meaning the Socialist camp) during the period under consideration, certain progress towards ACEN's final goal—restoration of freedom and independence in the nine Eastern and Central European countries—might have been expected." What were the events referred to? The emigré pseudo-politicians are referring to the "growing disagreements among communist leaders" without quoting a single fact in support of their statement. They speak of a "crisis in agriculture," allegedly caused by the passive resistance

of "forcibly collectivised peasants." Proofs? None. Further they make obscure references to "confusion in the Communist camp in view of the rapidly developing political and economic unity of Europe." Today, three years after these statements, we are more remote from political and economic unity in Europe than at that time, and the tendency of development points not to possible improvement in interrelations within the Western camp, but on the contrary, to inevitable further disintegration.

The emigré leaders cannot keep silent about the pitiable devaluation of their shares on the international emigré stock-exchange. They had to admit that "since September 1961, Eastern and Central European affairs have been developing for the worse, and not for the better." They find that the spirit in "captive countries" has never yet been so unfavourable to their intrigues, and that never has disappointment with the West been so profoundly felt. The only proper thing to do after such an admission would be to throw up the game and retire. But how could they be expected to bring themselves to abandon cushy jobs and free trips to all the countries in the world! Let us give the West another chance: "if the spirit of resistance in Eastern and Central Europe dwindles even more, these parts will no longer serve as a deterrent against Soviet expansion." This is how ACEN plays saviour of Europe! The above was said in the autumn of 1962. The "spirit of resistance" has not been showing any signs of revival since then, simply because it had never existed and was just a soap-bubble blown out by a bunch of emigrés. Nor have there been any symptoms of "Soviet expansion"—on the contrary, the international climate has become far more clement since. The

fallacy of the ideology and argumentation put forth by ACEN has revealed itself with convincing clarity, and it has become more than perplexing that the American tax-payer should still be contributing towards its existence.

After the complete failure of its anti-communist campaigns three years after the Congress Resolution—envisaged to “pep up” the deflated ideology of international reaction, ACEN discretely withdrew from its vanguard positions and took up other occupations, such as a study of the criminal code of the USSR (this was apparently most important to the leaders of CIA), and an investigation into the position of the Church in Eastern and Central Europe.

It is noteworthy that in 1962, when ACEN suffered a fiasco in all its activities, and its anti-communist machinations had failed completely, it suddenly felt a consuming interest in economic problems and came out with three successive publications by the Estonian representative in the ACEN General Committee, Alexander Kütt, a former Cooperative functionary in bourgeois Estonia. The publications deal with the question of trade between the Soviet Union and the “captive” countries, and with “methods of communist economic colonialism in Eastern and Central Europe,” and they pursue a double purpose: on the one hand, the author strives to show that the Soviet Union is allegedly exploiting the socialist countries both by its trade policy and by its price policy, so as to improve its own payments’ balance; on the other hand, evidently in view of increasing interest among capitalist countries in trade with the Soviet Union, the inference is made that the Soviet Union’s trade policy is inspired by

aims of direct or indirect "communist expansion," or by the purpose of undermining the economy of capitalist countries.

A detailed analysis of Kütt's publications is neither possible nor relevant here; international trade offers practical and convincing enough proof to the Soviet Union's businesslike and scrupulous attitude to its trading partners and to its dealings on the international market, while the unremitting economic development of the socialist camp vindicates the advantage of commonly planned economic interrelations.

I should only like to note here that attempts to discredit the Soviet Union's economic relations with other countries of the Socialist camp, and insinuations against the Soviet Union as a trading partner calls to mind the obsolete and bankrupt spirit of trade bans and embargos which constitutes one of America's most unsuccessful contributions to cold war strategy. Kütt's publications re-echo to some extent the economic efforts of CIA which were recently publicly disgraced as thoroughly incongruous with the demands of practical life.

Yet—Kütt cashed in his fee, a press-conference was called for him, and in 1963 he was "elected" ACEN chairman with the pleasant possibilities of "good will missions" to the Argentine and to Taiwan.

STRASBURG COLLOQUY

Alongside their annual ceremonies—hoisting banners over the "small building" on the opening day of UNO sessions (evidently in order to

persuade the UNO delegates of the actual and active existence of ACEN), celebrating Captive Nations Week, trips to distant lands such as Japan, South Vietnam, Taiwan etc. to Latin America and to other exotic lands; compiling stereotyped anticommunist, but also (probably with CIA permission) anti-West memoranda read (or not, as the case may be) by the Western bosses with sympathetic smiles and a helpless shrug of the shoulders—alongside all this, the ACEN leaders arrange from time to time friendly anticommunist talks, so as to advertise their existence, expound their aims, or draw fresh inspiration from their friends.

Two such talks took place in 1962—one dedicated to "The Significance of East-Central Europe in World Affairs," the second to "The Strategic Significance of East-Central Europe in the Era of Nuclear Stalemate." I mentioned both of them in my article "Fiasco of an Anticommunist Venture" (Dzimitenes Balss, 1963, No. 46—48). Among the speakers were men of renown, professors, former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State Berle, the "father of the H-bomb" Teller, former Chief Planner of the Central Intelligence Agency Prof. Kintner, and others.

They discussed everything under the sun except the situation in the "captive" countries. All kinds of suggestions were advanced on how to utilise the nine European countries in the interests of . . . American politics. Some advised that "Moscow be denied any further success" during the next five years (though how this was to be accomplished remained unstated), while in the meantime the conventional forces in West Europe (read West Germany) should be developed. Others suggested

developing cultural contacts with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, whereby the utmost care should be taken not to emphasise the strategic role of these countries. Comforting pronouncements were made to the effect that West Germany was today "a relatively small nation in the world picture" (?), and her armed forces, being part of NATO, not under national German control (?). Hopes were voiced in connection with the Soviet—Chinese differences. In a word—they "galloped not only over all Europes," as the saying goes, but over the whole world. And the result of all this? The American visitors of the "captive" spokesmen declined all proposals advanced by their representative Ferenz Nagy, former Hungarian Prime Minister. And in conclusion Berle, former Assistant Secretary of State, declared that "it would be unnecessary and unwise to commit ourselves to specific (i.e., concrete) measures."

Thus the talk came to an end, in a minor key, and with no results.

For this reason the captive activists decided in 1963 to transfer the centre of gravity of their whole propaganda work to Europe, and arranged a "colloquy" in Strasburg between May 5th and 7th. Annual meetings in Strasburg were not new in themselves. But this time it was called colloquy, with ACEN representatives in the rôle of professors, and "Europeans" as listeners. The aim of this arrangement was to restore "close contact" with members of the "Council of Europe" (which, as is known, resides in Strasburg), to acquaint them with world problems (!) and discuss these problems with them, insofar as they concern the 100 million "captive" nations in whose name they (i. e., a score or so of emigré leaders) were speak-

ing. Most fortunately gatherings of this kind have no mandate commissions, otherwise the "delegates" would be hard put to it to prove who had authorised them to speak on behalf of 100 million people. The ACEN chairman Dimitrov, a Bulgarian, went one better: he took it upon himself to divine the "fervent hopes" of the peoples whom neither he nor his colleagues represent, and asserted that these people wished to "join their efforts and their moral and material resources" so as to build "an entirely free and prosperous Europe." Thus Dimitrov supports the idea of unity—only not within the socialist camp, but within the "European Union."

The first speaker was a Lithuanian, Sidzikauskas, on the theme "The Road to Freedom in East-Central Europe: Accommodation with the Regimes, or Support to the Peoples?" He complained of tangible changes in Western politics towards compromise with the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe; he claimed, that these changes were most markedly felt on government level, whereas in the parliaments of Western countries the demand for freedom of captive nations enjoyed certain support. In the course of his speech it transpired that this must be understood in the following way: the presence of reactionary parties or individuals who disapprove of the beginning relaxation of international tension, makes it possible to push through anti-Soviet propaganda even against the wishes of the respective governments.

In addition to his bias for oratory and travel, Mr. Sidzikauskas is distinguished by fearlessness in levelling criticism at Western statesmen who defend normal relations between East and West.

In the given instance, he again issued a grave warning: "If Western policies towards Eastern Europe are not quickly reversed this state of affairs is bound to deteriorate even further." "Deteriorate" is to be understood in the sense that the international atmosphere will further improve, which is not at all to the liking of Mr. Sidzikauskas. He returns to the thread-bare argument of the Dulles period and the peak period of the cold war—that the "trouble-making capacity of the captive European peoples" was an important risk factor for the "Soviet rulers" in Europe, that a different spirit was rampant now among the "captive nations" compared to 12 years ago, as a result of which the "risk factor" for the Soviet Union had decreased in Europe. In a word, this advocate of the "rigid course" of cold war, and of anything anti-Soviet, feels that his services as a war-monger have become redundant. So he launches a new challenge, in his typical peremptory manner, demanding that instead of trying to attain "illusory accomodation" with the Communist regimes, the West now make the principle of self-determination of Eastern and Central Europe the main issue in its foreign policy. Then follows an equally categorical order to the USA and its main allies as to their exact course of action. The order comprises 7 points, 5 of which mention self-determination. Sidzikauskas concludes with the assertion that "a free East-Central Europe without war is not an illusion but a distinct possibility in our time." With this we fully agree. We also agree with the suggestion that the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe have put all their strength into furthering this aim, and will continue doing so in the future.

On the other hand, it is equally doubtless that neither Mr. Sidzikauskas himself, nor all those who hold the same views, ever did, or ever will further this aim. In this lies the whole difference between the people, to whom peace and creative work stands beyond anything else, and the self-styled "representatives" abroad who qualify even their worthless verbal promises of assistance to the West with various provisos, such as: that military power and political unity be created (as if Sidzikauskas and his like could have any part in this), that any concessions be denied to the Soviets and even that "the myth of the historical inevitability of the victory of Communism be shattered," etc.

INCIDENT

The debates that followed Sidzikauskas' speech, are most revealing. The Czechoslovak emigré delegate Lettrich recited one of the songs from the ACEN repertoire — namely, that what communism feared above all was a decisive showdown (to use American terminology—"putting the cards on the table"). "Our goal is the defeat of communism, and not its perpetuation," he added. To achieve this, a joint program has to be worked out "for anti-communist forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain." A clear enough challenge for subversion. However, the emigrés are well versed in these matters, it is not the first time they come out with calls of this kind, in obedience to their three-lettered "leading" institution.

The oppressed people's potential "trouble-making

capacity" was mentioned by the former Danish foreign minister Kraft—now chairman of the Cultural Committee of the Council of Europe. This may sound a joke, but it is not. It is one of the instances mentioned by Sidzikauskas, which go to show that some individual Western legislators go one better on their respective governments in pressing the anti-Soviet line. The present Danish prime minister Kraag has visited the Soviet Union and commented favourably on what he saw there, yet while the former minister of foreign affairs supports reaction and subversion—for this is what "creating trouble" amounts to. Is it a peculiar kind of division of labour—or is it a case of "the right hand not knowing what the left hand does"? But there was something else Mr. Kraft said—something truly in tune with his position as Chairman of the Cultural Committee of the Council of Europe: "If the West does not understand the vital necessity to preserve this deterrent (read sabotage), the future of the whole Western is in danger." Excellent, Mr. Kraft!

Some delegates complained that UNO stood in support of decolonising nations that have never yet enjoyed freedom (what other nations could be subject to decolonisation, one may ask?).

Yet it was the speech of Ciolkosz, president of the Polish national group, that put the lid on everything. It opened with the statement that whereas he agreed with the main conclusions of the preceding speaker, he did not agree with its substantiating arguments. The emigrés must not put too much store by the belief that if the West is ever threatened with danger, the East European nations will automatically "come to its rescue," he declared. They must first be deeply convinced of

full support the West, which at present they are not. Only if the West recognises the Oder-Neisse frontier,—then and only then will the foundation be laid for an active policy regarding Eastern Europe. Unless this is recognised, the Polish people will need the protection of the Soviet Union. "The Polish people," he goes on to say, "would certainly oppose a Germany equipped with nuclear weapons and sharing in all responsibility (with other nations) in this field." Veiling his purpose with patriotic phrases, Ciolkosz continues, in the name of the Polish emigré centre in London: "The Polish view is that the right to self-determination of the German nation cannot be considered separately from the same right to security of Poland and the East Central European nations. The former (rights) must not have priority over the latter."

This speech should have produced the effect of a bomb-shell. However, the meeting was drawing to a close, and but a few speakers reacted to it with brief remarks. Among them was the Rumanian delegate (Visoianu), who expressed disagreement with the Polish delegation's views adding that he could not accept this negative appraisal of West Germany's rôle in the Western Union.

On the next day, the ACEN Secretary General Coste (Rumania) took the floor, with a speech on "East-Central Europe—Factor of Western Security." Being merely a rehash of the usual statements on Europe's strategic position, on the "deterrent", on the need to curb the Soviet Union's success and so on, it naturally raised no argument. Thereupon the second Polish delegate, Korbonski, reiterated Ciolkosz's speech of the previous

day—to the effect that Poland could not uphold the “spirit of resistance” unless her western frontier was unanabigously recognised.

The storm broke at the evening session. The report read by the above-mentioned Visoianu was: “Whither Europe? Continental Integration, Atlantic Union, or a Combination of Both?” The theme might have seemed to promise no more than some futile debating over questions in which the emigré so-called politicians have as little say as a bunch of smug Western bourgeois tackling world problems over a cup of coffee or a pint of beer. However, it turned out otherwise. The speaker opened his report expressing his gratification at the rapprochement between two great powers—France and Germany. Further, he repeatedly claimed to read and voice the thoughts and aspirations of the “captive nations”—not only his own, the Rumanian nation, but all those whose phoney representatives comprise ACEN. He expounded on “our nations’” firm belief, that Western “civilisation was either to expand, or else perish(?)”; he dwelt on the importance of evolving a Western ideology; he expressed the infinite joy with which “captive nations” observed yesterday’s hate turn into friendship—thus alluding again to the Franco-German rapprochement. Without proferring any concrete motion he gave the floor to some visitors from the “Committee on Non-represented Nations” (this, too, appears to exist within the system of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe). When the guests had spoken (we shall return to these speeches later on), Ciolkosz rose to utter a “sharp reservation” on the main speaker’s assertion that the fact that hatred had been superseded by friendship (the hint at reconciliation

between the Germans and the French) was a favourable development for the "captive nations."

The session ended on this jarring note of discord, and on the following, and last, day of the colloquy, after several speeches by guests to the meeting, and only after these guests had left the hall (so that they should not witness the subsequent squabble), the floor was taken by ACEN Deputy Chairman the Hungarian Nagy. He severely criticised the Polish delegation's conduct and manner of expression during the previous meetings, especially with regard to West Germany's rôle in the framework of NATO. Ciolkosz immediately went into counterattack, pointing out that on entering NATO West Germany had agreed not to produce or possess nuclear weapons. He on his part had not demanded that the German Federal Republic leave NATO, and had merely expressed the Polish view, viz., that the German Federal Republic should remain a NATO member on the original conditions. He took issue with the reproach levelled against the right of ACEN meetings to criticize NATO members. And adorning his statement with another patriotic phrase, he declared that he considered it his duty to defend Poland's interests, and would therefore speak up for his country's benefit at any time place. The Polish delegation, he said, had never begged ACEN to defend its rights against the German Federal Republic, but neither could ACEN deny the Polish delegation the right to defend its national interests against a country that was advancing territorial claims against Poland.

As soon as he had finished his speech Ciolkosz

demonstratively left the hall, together with Korbonski.

What a scandal! Moreover—the Polish attitude was completely overruled in the ACEN final resolution, as three of its four points restate the principle of self-determination, while the fourth advises the Western countries to refrain from any kind of action that might lend the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe a “respectable appearance,” or that might create the impression that the Western states had reconciled themselves to a status quo in Eastern Europe. The conclusions, however, express satisfaction with the strengthening of Franco-German friendship—the very point the Poles had criticised.

Thus, ACEN declined to recognise the priority of the Polish frontier question, which implies that “self-determination of the German people” which in their interpretation means that the German Democratic Republic be incorporated into the German Federal Republic, is more important to the emigré leaders than the security of Eastern Europe. The Rumanian delegate even permitted himself to admonish the Poles, saying that it was a mistake on the part of the proprietor (i.e., Poland) to demand unremittingly the recognition of his frontiers(!). A Germany of medium power as part of the Western system would be the best guarantee to the Poles, Visoianu continued. In other words, let us achieve Germany’s “reunification” under the banner of “self-determination,” and the rest will settle itself: the Western powers would surely see to it that Germany should remain “a power of medium strength,” and that Poland should not suffer with regard to her frontiers.

Whether the other “captive” representatives,

including the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians, endorsed this opinion or not, we do not know. What we do know is that they approved of the proffered conclusions, which leads to the assumption that they, too, consider Germany's "self-determination"—viz., the German Democratic Republic's destruction—more important than either the question of the Western frontiers of Poland, or that of Eastern Europe's security.

GUESTS

Guests from various countries were among the orators, 10 of them all told: three from Western Germany, two from France, two from England, one Austrian, one Dane, one from Luxemburg. The speeches of the German delegation deserve special attention—one by a Bundestag deputy of the Christian Democratic Union, and two by representatives of the Socialist Party. All three were at one in their praise of ACEN and its activities. "We are in the same boat," said the CDU delegate in her address, stressing that Berlin, Eastern Germany (meaning the GDR), and all other Eastern and Central European countries were denied the right of self-determination which was their basic problem. The German Social-Democrats voiced similar opinions. One of them maintained that both ACEN and the Germans must carry on with their work, since the success of the one was that of the other. The other declared that having come from a "divided country with an imprisoned capital" it was not difficult for her to understand the captive nations. "We demand that the Committee of Non-independent Nations be

transformed into a Committee of Self-determination, for it is both painful and absurd that while the last tribe in Africa is given the benefit of the right of self-determination, so many nations of East Central Europe of old standing and historic importance are denied this right," she said.

Obviously, the German representatives want to make use of ACEN to gain support for their demand that the German Democratic Republic be granted the right of self-determination, or rather—to achieve the annexation of the GDR by the GFR. It is for this reason that they keep lamenting the "division of Germany"—despite the recognition of two German states by international law, which expresses the legal concepts of the majority of countries the world over. What exactly the advocates of this right of self-determination are hoping for remains obscure; do they really expect the GDR to pass over its sovereign rights to some international organization, and agree to stand back while the fates of 20 million Germans is being decided? Or do they hope for the majority of GDR citizens to opt for being joined to the Federal Republic—this hot-bed of revisionism and revanchism in Europe? In other words, to accept voluntarily the danger of being dragged into new perilous adventures after years of peace and fruitful cooperation with the countries of the Socialist camp, years of economic and cultural developments, of freedom from the domination of Prussian junkers and bureaucrats?

Such hopes are only too obviously vain.

Besides—note the argument of "the last tribes" in Africa allegedly granted the right of self-determination. A similar thought was frequently voiced by the ACEN "experts" on questions concerning

UNO, such as the question of so-called "Soviet colonialism."

It is general knowledge that a large number of colonies in Africa have not yet attained the right to self-determination, and still suffer the cruelties of colonial oppression. At the same time the movement for unity is growing among African peoples and countries liberated from colonial oppression. Thus, this reference to the "last" African tribe is inaccurate to say the least of it.

And secondly: how can one compare the process of liberation and emancipation of the colonial peoples with the attempts of reactionary politicians to reduce the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to their pre-war status—which had been the very cause of the horrible experience the peoples of these countries had undergone.

The French visitors to the Colloquy spoke on a very different note. One of them ventured an explanation for the fact that a number of members of the European Consultative Assembly refrained from participation in this emigré gathering. It transpires that this was due to their condemnation of the criticism levelled against the West so frequent among ACEN members who reproach the West of "a weak and vacillating policy" towards the Soviet Union. What this actually means is, that the Western statesmen resent as futile and unrealistic the stubborn anti-Communism of the emigré leaders which found expression in furious attacks against all and sundry who express the desirability of relaxing international tension, censure a "power policy" as unreasonable, stress the senselessness of continuing the "cold war," and maintain that peaceful coexist-

ence of countries with different social systems is possible.

True, they may sympathise with ACEN's anti-communism, yet when it comes to interminable outbursts on the part of political nonentities against the "impeccable" policy of West-European powers, the emigrés are given to understand that "a judgment of their own" does not befit their position. I wish to stress once more, the dissatisfaction of the French Parliament members who see beyond the narrow horizons of ACEN, by no means implies a departure from their anti-Soviet line. On the contrary, their tactics, their talks on closer "contact with the East," on the possibility of peaceful coexistence—all this is doubtless temporary, as was clearly stated by a deputy of de Gaulle's party who said: "... once we have achieved a united free Europe, we shall be able to pose the problem of Europe's Eastern half." He goes on to explain that Europe is not a Europe of six (i. e., Common Market countries), nor a Europe of sixteen (i. e., members of the Strasbourg organization). Europe "extends to the Urals." This kind of Europe was once mapped out by Hitlerite geopoliticians, yet it was never brought off. And if a unified Western Europe—very remote indeed at present, if at all feasible—is intended as an anti-Soviet body designed to revive (after a lapse of time), the "power politics" position, then we can safely foretell that such a "unified," "free" Europe will never come into being.

Another French representative (from the independent republicans) confined himself to a few general phrases, among them the gleeful observation that the emigrés remain united, while the

West presents a picture of discord. The latter is undoubtedly true, but as to the former, the French delegate might have chosen his words more cautiously had he been present at the final stage of the colloquy when the Poles left the hall. However—the guests had left by then, and if this action sounded a note of discord into the Frenchman's eulogy on the exemplary concord among the emigrés, this note rang out in his absence.

The British representatives spoke most instructively. They were former and present chairmen of the "Committee of Non-represented Nations" at the European Council.

The first was Mr. P. Kirk*, Conservative member of the House of Commons, who wished ACEN speedy termination of their work, so that its members may be reinstated as citizens of their respective free countries. The first part of this wish may be wholeheartedly endorsed, the second—strongly doubted. However, Mr. Kirk next turned to the point on the agenda—"Whither Europe?", explaining diplomatically that no answer could as yet be forthcoming. There were still differences of opinion both regarding the nature of the European Union, and the best means of defence. Nothing serious, of course, only "differences among friends." He did not specify whether these differences would be eliminated, or whether they could remain "differences among friends" without detriment to the cause. But we may well ask—how are the friends to unite if there is no common view on the nature of the European Union?

* Deputy Secretary of State for Army affairs at the Defence Ministry in the former Douglas-Home Cabinet.

Mr. Kirk declared that there was no simple solution to the problem of "captive nations." We might suggest one to him: to close down the "Assembly of Captive Nations." If this clique of bragging, unrepresentative emigrés put their shutters up, there would be no problem any longer. However, this depends not on Mr. Kirk, but on his friends across the ocean, who do not deem it timely yet.

Unable to propose anything more tangible, Mr. Kirk expressed the view that the claim for the restoration of self-determination in Eastern and Central Europe should be maintained by all means, whereupon he abruptly changed the record. He asked point-blank: why should the Committee of 24 at UNO not take up the problem of Soviet colonialism? There is no difference, in Mr. Kirk's opinion, between the colonies still extant, and the possessions Russia annexed or dominates. Such assumed artlessness hardly becomes a British MP., as Mr. Kirk himself seems to realise. Therefore he specifies, that while such an action would be no solution to the problems, it would still "establish a principle," and show the nations most closely concerned that the question remains open. Not at all, Mr. Kirk! Such an action will establish nothing and show nothing—nothing but your ignorance in international law and in history. You may rest assured that had such an action been able to establish or show anything useful to British policy it would have long since been taken up by wiser men. But all it can bring about is confusion for the British Colonial Minister and the British Foreign Secretary.

The newly elected Chairman of the Committee of Non-represented Nations, Mr. Russel, Conser-

vative member of the House of Commons, spoke at the last meeting of the Colloquy. Like his predecessor, he too expressed the wish to see Europe united, instead of split into two—a veiled reiteration of Hitler's principle: Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. In addition to this unrealistic desire he uttered the even less realistic assertion that Europe would profit enormously if (through the agency of Britain, apparently) she joined the British Commonwealth of nations inhabited by peoples of European race. The "honest middle-man"—viz., Britain—would turn this to good account for himself. In conclusion Mr. Russel repeated his colleague's Mr. Kirk's expressed admiration for the "persistence" of the "captive" representatives, who upheld their banners continuing to keep the world aware of the Soviet Union's "total aggression" against their countries. It is, indeed, hard to say which is more amazing—the British MP's irresponsibility, or his total ignorance? The latter quality seems to predominate, or rather, to be the cause of the former—of the irresponsible way in which Mr. Russel juggles with facts. To demonstrate this, we must go back to the autumn session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe which took place in September 1963, also in Strasburg.

Here the hosts were the "Europeans," and the guests—the ACEN representatives. There were two of them—the chairman of the ACEN delegation in Bonn, and the director of the ACEN bureau in Paris; this meant considerable economy on travel expenses: Bonn and Paris are far closer to Strasburg than New York. At this session of the European Parliament at the "Committee of

Nonrepresented Nations," M-me von Lowzow (Danish) presented a rather empty and uninspiring report on the present situation in the Baltic Republics. The Danish lady admitted woefully that "concretely there is little that we can do to help these people," but by preparing annual reports and discussing the situation, we "can remind public opinion of their plight and express our moral and psychological support for them." With all due respect, M-me von Lowzow, this is little indeed. Your words will remain in the minutes of your committee, unresponded, and I can assure you, that your noble promises of moral and psychological support will hardly evoke enthusiasm in the Baltic countries. In the summer of 1964, the Head of the Soviet Government paid an official visit to the Scandinavian countries. It may be no secret to you, what genuine moral and psychological support the policy of peace and friendship received from the peoples of these countries, including the Danish people.

But to return to Mr. Russel, who presided over the committee when M-me von Lowzow delivered her insipid speech. He took it upon himself to complement the speech by quoting some data to prove the allegedly unremitting and even accelerating process of "Russification and integration (viz., inclusion into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) of these three Baltic States." Thus, he proclaimed with a meaningful countenance (you can almost see his pointed index finger and raised eye-brows): "We have some information regarding a joint fuel base formed for the three Baltic States and the Kaliningrad province of Russia." Further—just fancy that!—a single Baltic railway of the same four above-mentioned areas has been

set up! And a joint fishery authority! Horrible! The British MP deems all this to be "further proof of the Russian Government's determination to weld together the whole of this Baltic area, irrespective of the former existence of three "autonomous Baltic States."

If measures dictated by economic profit, and welcomed by economic experts, as well as by public feeling in all Baltic countries, can be interpreted as symptoms of "Russification and integration," then this manifestation of Mr. Russel's ignorance, and his speech to the European Consultative Assembly is plain irresponsible propaganda.

As I pointed out elsewhere, the bourgeois governments had been trying vainly for 20 years to effect a unification of the Baltic countries. Today it takes you only a few hours to travel from Tallin via Riga to Vilnius without customs, without being forced to buy three different railway tickets (not to speak of the economy on maintenance of three railway administrations); goods circulate freely, fishermen assist each other in rationalising and broadening their trade—instead of competing with each other, and they have ventured far into the Oceans, which formerly would have been impossible... In a word, for Mr. Russel's information, these and many other steps towards economic and cultural development are symptomatic of progress, and could not have been realised under three separate bourgeois governments in the Baltic States.

What is it they are actually driving at, these representatives of "free" Western Europe? Struggling against terrible adversities, they are pushing for economic unification—which is so shaky that it can be destroyed by prices on

chickens or cabbage; the British have been barred from the Common Market; the Strasburg Parliament has turned into a tongue-wagging institution, recalling the late League of Nations; the "captive nations" are told their existence depended on federation. At the same time, reasonable economic and organizational measures are labelled "Russification and integration." Truly, this is no longer a question of what is more to be marvelled at—their irresponsibility or their ignorance. It calls to mind the classical proverb "Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi," and the British MP would do better to save his deficient political perspicacity for home consumption.

I shall mention one more guest to the Strasburg colloquium, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kraft, spoken of earlier. He even took the floor twice to stress the vital importance for the West of maintaining the "captive nations" as a "deterrent," since their trouble-making capacity" allegedly restrained the "agressiveness" of the communists. To this, the Rumanian Visoianu immediately replied that "the spirit of resistance in our nations does not depend on what foreign states are doing." In fact, the hopes Kraft and his like placed in the "trouble" the Eastern and Central European nations would cause the Soviet Union, have been outdated for some time, and belong to the first post-war years. At that time Europe in general and the countries that had been occupied and exploited by the hitlerites in particular were in a state of devastation, and their people were suffering great hardships. Unfortunately, Mr. Kraft's ideas are fossil concepts, and he does not even want to know of the enormous progress made in the life-time of one generation

by the countries of the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union.

The chairman of the Austrian delegation at the Consultative Assembly, who was also a guest at the colloquy, had every reason to state that the Soviet Union was endeavouring to improve conditions of daily life, and that people who were better situated could not be expected to adhere to the same ideals they held when they were suffering privations. Kraft was not impressed by this, and he expressed his regret that hopes for a large step forward along the path of European unification during 1963 had proved vain. "Instead, we had a setback," he said, and continued: "However, this cannot mean, of course, the end of our hopes." And why not? Kraft does not give a reason. Hidebound by his obsolete views, he sees no other solution than a West European union that might be strong enough to dictate its will to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. Pending this, let the "captive nations create trouble." Kraft has not advanced very much from the emigré post-war slogan: "Let there be explosions at home, so that we may grow powerful here." In default of arguments he declared stoutly: "I believe that before this century is through there will be a strong and united Europe." May Mr. Kraft live to see it!

In concluding this account of the Strasburg colloquy, it might be interesting to dwell on the speech of the Rumanian Coste, ACEN "Secretary General." The very title of his report—"East-Central Europe—factor of Western Security"—is characteristic of ACEN leaders. If other orators and guests deliberated on various political themes such as self-determination, colonialism, contacts

between East and West, their own impotence, the timidity of the West etc.—then Mr. Coste centred his attention solely on strategic problems. It is frequently so that the less a person knows of something, the less say he has in the course of developments, the more willingly does he indulge in discussing them... Thus, Coste's reflections are a mixture of superficial journalism and "Kaffeehauspolitik." He starts with an elaborate explanation of the term "deterrent," since the full-time paid ACEN officials see in this the only justification of their existence. Then, proceeding from the premise that NATO would never come anywhere near a balance of the Soviet ground forces, he suggests "a complete spectrum of deterrents." Though impressive to the ear, this term appears contradictory and muddled in its interpretation. Further, the ACEN strategist again falls flat in his attempts to prove that under conditions of "nuclear stalemate" the strategic weight of the Central and Eastern European countries is greater—one must boost up one's own importance, if nobody else does it. Then comes a lightning review of Soviet politics, accompanied by the proposal that a presentation of the Soviet Union as a power capable of recklessly irrational behaviour must be preserved and fostered." The speaker thus divulges unintentionally the true aim of ACEN to present the Soviet Union in a false light and distort to the utmost its foreign policy.

The speaker concludes with a military-strategic analysis, complete with numbers of divisions, planes, the respective strength of national armies in the countries of the Socialist camp. "... The captive nations can help or deny help to Western

saboteurs (!) behind the enemy lines (!) for demolition tasks; they may or may not join special forces (!), dropped behind the lines (!) to organize guerilla units (!). Furthermore, the "captive" nations may follow or ignore the appeals of the West for large-scale passive resistance, e. g., by way of general strikes which would burden the Soviets with the task of running all communications and services."

It is almost incredible that the ACEN strategist should have gone to such an extreme of irresponsibility! With unmatched impudence and arrogance, he ventures to prescribe to the Western Powers a line of policy towards the Socialist camp: to withhold recognition for the German Democratic Republic, to refuse signing a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and countries of the Warsaw treaty, to refuse credits to the Socialist countries, not to "fraternise" with members of parliaments, scientists, artists, and above all, business representatives of these countries, not to praise the achievements of socialist regimes, to deny any kind of honorary awards to representatives of these countries... and let nobody presume, he exclaims menacingly, "that all this will be early forgotten," and that it will be easy to stir our peoples to action when the need arises!

Coste's speech is a model of instructions for saboteurs, the pronounced expression of the programme and aspirations of all enemies of peace. Where can all this find sympathetic response? It goes beyond a "cold war strategy," beyond a "brink policy"—it is openly addressed to instigators of "hot war." Such plans can be only advanced by a person utterly devoid of any feeling

of responsibility, divorced from life's reality, possessed by an impotent craving for destruction.

His concluding words read: "Meaningful political actions in the United Nations and in high-level negotiations in support of these yearnings are the least our peoples are entitled to ask from the West if they are to exert a restraining influence on Moscow (hear, hear!) and if they are to help when their help might be sorely needed."

FRIENDSHIP WITH THE REVANCHISTS

The shadow of Western Germany loomed on the ACEN horizon from the very outset. The reason was, that the same American quarters that had put so much effort into creating ACEN as a centre of subversion and sabotage in Eastern and Central Europe; as a weapon of anti-Soviet propaganda; as a possible "trump-card" in negotiations with the Soviet Union—the very same quarters also staked on Western Germany as a force that might undermine the peaceful aspirations of European peoples. They assigned to Western Germany the main role in materialising their cold war policy against the Socialist camp in general and the Soviet Union in particular—in the economic, political, and consequently also in the strategic sphere.

True—on some vital points the revanchist demands of the Bonn government leaders received no open support—for example, on the question of Germany's frontiers. Sometimes, though rarely, opinions were voiced to the effect that the division

of Germany—the two German states—ought to be accepted in the interest of peace. However, official American policy, at least during the 50ies, stood for Germany's reunification, by which was meant that the German Democratic Republic ought to be handed over to the German Federal Republic.

In view of the actual situation in Germany, the Western allies did not dispose of unequivocal legal grounds for demanding a reunification of Germany by a common action in which the Soviet Union should participate. Hence, they produced from a junk-store the threadbare old principle of self-determination, by dint of which the Western Powers intended to stage some sort of voting in Germany—confident that the majority of the GDR population would choose reunification on terms agreeable to the West. They deliberately ignored the clearly formulated statement that "reunification is not a national, but in the first place a social and political problem," made by the USSR government on June 12th, 1964, in connection with the conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic. The same statement points out that the revanchists camouflage their aggressive tendencies with the lofty claim for the right of self-determination of all nations, though they know perfectly well that the principle of self-determination is not applicable to the German problem and is irrelevant to the reunification of Germany.

I mentioned before in passing that the ACEN busy-bodies did not like the question of Germany's reunification to be accorded priority. It was a bad blow to the prestige of their organization. Inconceivable, that the fate of some 20 million Germans occupying a comparatively small territory, not

particularly rich in natural resources at that, should be given preference over the problem of "liberating 100 million," inhabitants of rich lands, reaching from the Black to the Baltic seas!

They formulated their dissatisfaction in the following way: "The circumstance that the conference of foreign ministers limited its scope to Germany, did not forestall realistic discussions . . . ACEN hold that the reunification of Germany, and the "restoration of independence and freedom" to captive European nations are but two aspects of the general European problem."

We know that emigrés from the German Democratic Republic are not represented at ACEN, and only its most solemn meetings are graced with the presence of some minor officials of the West German Embassy in Washington.

How to explain the paradox that the most important (from the point of view of American policy) "captive" country—the GDR—should remain unrepresented at ACEN? Apparently, this happened in compliance with the Bonn Government, to whom the GDR simply "does not exist," and therefore can have no "emigrés." Those who have abandoned the GDR are in the eyes of Bonn ordinary German citizens, fled from the "occupied" part of Germany to the "free" part of their Motherland. It would have been easy enough for the ACEN wirepullers to get up some kind of "national committee" of German emigrés, similar to those of Central and Eastern Europe, but such a committee would have to speak in the name of "emigrés" from the GDR, which in its turn would have implied recognition of a "non-existing" state. So they preferred to remain satisfied with various "Landmannschaften," societies of war-veterans,

"Stahlhelm," fraternities of front-line fighters in black, brown, or khaki uniforms; with revanchist speeches by ministers of the Bonn government, and with ignoring any proposal coming from the GDR. Anything but have somebody outside Bonn speak in the name of Germany.

It must also be borne in mind that some leaders of the "captive" nations take a sceptical attitude to the policy of Germany's reunification, which is inevitably linked with revisionism and even revanchism. Elsewhere I quoted excerpts from a discussion that took place in 1962, in the course of which Prof. Brzezinski (a Pole of American citizenship), member of the Russian Institute, and director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, pointed out that Western Germany constituted a threat in the eyes of many Europeans. He was seconded in this by his colleague Moseley, director of studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, participant of many negotiations and conferences with the Soviet Union. Each of them had his personal suggestion how to allay suspicions among the European nations of Western Germany's menace. The former advocated political slogans expressing consideration for the interests of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, instead of acting in a way dictated by circumstances which "no longer exist, and have not existed for the past years." The latter strove to soothe the suspicious Europeans by explaining that the GFR was now a comparatively small unit in the world picture, that it had to be a component part of the West in order to survive, and that all her armed forces were under NATO, not under German national control. The latter assertion does not, of

course, correspond to actual fact, and as to Brzezinski's advice—it is hard to find the “rational grain” amidst its vague general phrases.

At any rate, the problem of coordinating the interests of the ACEN leaders with those of the policy of Germany's unification cropped up with the very birth of the “authoritative institution” which subsequently found itself more than once directly confronted with this problem.

While the chairmanship was held by the Pole Korbonski (1958/59) and the Czech Zenkl (1959/60), an anti-German policy was pursued.

Early in 1960, Baron Guttenberg, Christian Democratic Union member of the West German Bundestag, visited the USA, on the invitation of the State Department. ACEN also arranged a reception in his honour, and he delivered a speech obviously designed to reassure the “suspicious Europeans.” The central contemporary problem, he said, was “victory of freedom in the struggle between East and West”; he went on to say: “I know, and I can assure you that my friends in Germany know it too, that there can no longer be a separate German problem, nor any separate policy, nor any kind of separate European problem.”

With his hand on his heart, he went on to impress it upon his listeners that Germany had learned many lessons (presumably from the catastrophe of hitlerite aggression against Europe); first of all, there must never again be a German policy detrimental to Germany's neighbours, or disregarding these neighbours; secondly, it is in the interests of Germany's “reputation” and “good name” that her leaders should dedicate themselves to the common task of Europe of which the

German problem is but a component part; thirdly, the fate of Europe is inextricably linked "with our great friends and allies in the USA."

The honourable guest then regaled his listeners with a brief slanderous lecture on Soviet "treacherous" plans, on Berlin, on co-existence and political realism, concluding it with a challenge to the West to take up "aggressive positions" against "the Soviet Union's constant interference in matters concerning our countries."

The speech is streaked with vague soothing phrases, yet permeated with open hostility against the Soviet Union. It does not appear as though the Baron and his fellows in Western Germany had learned their lesson from the World War.

In reply to this speech, the deputy chairman of ACEN Sidzikauskas (Lithuanian) took the floor—incidentally, he was Minister of the Lithuanian bourgeois government to Berlin for many years. It is noteworthy that the ACEN chairman Zenkl (Czech) was not present at the meeting with the Bonn parliamentary representatives; perhaps he was reluctant—even in the ACEN atmosphere—to shake hands with a representative of a country that had signed Czechoslovakia's death warrant.

Sidzikauskas, however expressed full agreement with the guest from Germany in his usual eloquent terms, and did his utmost to assure himself of Bonn Government support for the "captive nations." He voiced his delight in seeing that despite "temporary adversities" the GFR occupied an increasingly strong and influential position in Europe and in the world, and expressed the hope, in behalf of ACEN, that this influential position would be used for the benefit of all Europe, "including its now captive Eastern part."

Sidzikauskas became ACEN chairman after Zenkl, and his exuberance on meeting the high-standing Bonn guest may be understandable; on the other hand, it may be safely stated that not all of his colleagues by far shared his delight or approved of his eulogies. Which does not refer to the Hungarian Ferenz Nagy, who succeeded Sidzikauskas, and also pursued a pro-German policy in the ACEN leadership. (1961/62).

Ferenz Nagy is conspicuous in the constellation of the ACEN general committee. In the past, he was elected secretary general of the Hungarian party of small farmers, and in 1941 he became chairman of the "Peasants' Union" which he himself organized under the auspices of the Ministry for Home Affairs. After the liberation of Hungary from the hitlerite invaders, Ferenz Nagy held the post of Minister for Economic Reconstruction. Then he became chairman of the Hungarian National Assembly, and finally Prime Minister. Compromised by his participation in the so-called plot of "Hungarian society," he escaped to Switzerland, and in 1948 to the USA. There he entered the "Hungarian National Committee," part of the ACEN nucleus, and also the "International Peasant Union" which numbers many ACEN representatives among its members. In 1961/62, Nagy was chairman of ACEN.

Apparently, by 1962, Ferenz Nagy had paid visits to 40 countries of Europe and Asia on various ACEN, i. e. FEC, i. e. CIA missions, and delivered numbers of speeches on the dangers of "bolshevism" and the imperative need to struggle against it. He is an ardent supporter of the theory that favours "armed liberation" of "captive nations." He expounded

this theory at a conference of ACEN and FEC leaders in April 1962. However, it then no longer coincided with the interests of the USA who had come to the conclusion that the slogan "armed liberation" ought to be discarded, and future relations with the socialist countries ought to be based on a tactics of alienating them from the Soviet Union through intensified contact and economic advantages. Nagy's views were censured accordingly at the above-mentioned meeting.

The attitude to the German Federal Republic on the part of individual emigré groups of ACEN, and all it implied regarding ACEN's stand, became to a certain extent a criterion for their orientation.

The most negative position was that of the Poles, irrespective of party adherence. This is not surprising, since any type of Germany if it thought in terms of Bonn, would definitely demand a revision of Germany's present Eastern frontiers. Despite official assurances that this could only happen peaceably, it is clear to any politically minded person, that a reunification on the basis of a capitalist Germany—even if such a reunification could be imagined as accompanied by considerable political and social concessions on the part of the GFR, would inevitably imply an eventual demand for the former frontiers. As recently as in his 1963 Christmas message Chancellor Erhard stated that the German people would never recognise Germany's "division."

The Czechs are equally greatly suspicious of a reunification of Germany, especially since the Slovak separatists have stirred into activity within the framework of Czechoslovak emigré groups. As to the Hungarians—all but the rabid reaction-

aries among them apprehend Germany's reunification, while the Albanians and Bulgarians are probably indifferent to the problem.

Matters stand differently with the Rumanians, who had always been strongly influenced by French culture, and who had come under the sway of German fascism only during the very last pre-war period, and even then not very firmly. Among the Rumanian emigré spokesmen are two former ministers of foreign affairs—Gafenku and Visoianu. The apparent rapprochement between Bonn and Paris was obviously much to their liking, giving them hope that the French end of the new axis might protect them against the danger inherent in the German end. It may be added that Rumania had experienced the concrete meaning of this danger to a far lesser degree than either Poland or Czechoslovakia.

As to the Baltic emigré top-shots, it would have seemed reasonable to expect from them no particularly friendly feelings towards the policy of the GFR. They had been eyewitnesses (for the second time at that) of all the pleasures of German occupation—national humiliation, harsh economic exploitation, political oppression, concentration camps, forcible mobilisation and such like manifestations of the "German spirit." Both the Lithuanian and the Latvian emigrés could be supposed to know that their countries belonged to the "Eastern space", earmarked for German colonization, with the native population intended for farm-labour and other kinds of unqualified work.

And yet, it proved that the Baltic emigré leaders were not apprehensive of the descendants of their "700-year enslavers," who themselves had invaded the East twice in our life-time, each time

displaying utter disregard and contempt of the native population. Admittedly, some individuals and some groups of people differed somewhat in their attitudes and views regarding the role attributable to Western Germany in the present and future position of the Baltic peoples. Some lone voices of protest rang out against those who had pandered like quislings to the German invaders during the war, and against the shortsighted policy of linking the fate of the Baltic people to a concept of "liberation" that was founded on Germany's re-unification.

However, by and large hatred of Communism and its chief bearer—the Soviet Union—predominated, and every way and means of struggle against it were deemed permissible and justifiable. The Latvian emigrés bear out this attitude particularly strongly. During the personality cult period, in 1940—1941, with its occurrences of arbitrary exile and arrests, far-reaching opposition against the Soviet power was rampant among the bourgeoisie of countryside and towns.

In consequence of this, when in June 1941 Hitler launched his treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, a considerable part of the Latvian bourgeoisie were inclined to welcome the hitlerite armies as liberators from "communist terror." Many reactionary nationalists joined in the anti-national and antisemitic activities of the invaders. Blinded by class hatred, many participated actively in the punitive actions organized by the hitlerite power, entered the nazi police force, and vented their hatred of Soviet power on innocent people, in the first place on workers and farm-labourers, and on those who had been active during the short period of Soviet power but had

not managed to evacuate into the rear of the country.

The cruel inhumanity, the lawlessness reigning in Latvia in the years of Hitlerite occupation is depicted in the books "Daugavas Vanagi—Who are They?" and "Political Refugees Unmasked." Many of the names encountered there were previously known little if at all in Latvia's social life, but gained evil and bloody fame through collaboration with the Gestapo and the police forces. Naturally, the vast majority of these people fled with the remnants of the battered German army first to Germany and then largely across the ocean—to the USA, Canada, Australia, some Latin American countries. Swept up in this flight from the Homeland were rank-and-file Latvians who had been mobilised in the so-called Latvian Legion, and civilians intimidated by propaganda that poured down on them from Germans and Latvian quislings alike about the horrors in store for them if Soviet power is re-established. The Germans exerted every effort to take Latvian civilians along with them in their flight from Riga, and later after their defeat in Kurzeme from the so-called "Kurzeme cul-de-sac"—and unfortunately, many submitted, though sometimes under open pressure.

The majority of refugees realised their fatal error soon enough, finding that they had abandoned their motherland for DP camps in Germany*. Whoever could took the first opportunity to continue their flight across the ocean, while a very negligible number found temporary refuge in

* About one third of the refugees succeeded in returning to Latvia.

England, Sweden, and in a few single cases, in other Western European countries.

The main body of former hitlerite collaborators either remained in Western Germany, or else emigrated to the USA, and from their midst came the large and small emigré leaders.

Two of these "pillars of Latvian emigration" Vilis Hazners and Vilis Janums, can serve as an example. Both stood in the service of the hitlerite occupation administration, both are notorious as executors and initiators of punitive operations carried out by the hitlerites against civilians, both have the lives of many innocent people on their consciences. Yet Hazners is a committee member of the "Union of Latvians of the Free World," member of the Latvian delegation at ACEN, board member of the "American Latvian Association," chairman of committee of the "Daugavas Vanagi" (Daugava Hawks) in the USA, chairman of the former Latvian officers' union in New York (as a matter of fact, for ACEN documents he appointed himself former "member" (?) of the Latvian Army Headquarters) etc. During the period of hitlerite occupation Hazner, as chief of the Abrene district police, conducted the extermination of "undesirable elements." In addition, Hazner is at the head of the "Committee for Free Latvia" that works hand in glove with the super-reactionary American organization "Crusade for Freedom" in the USA.

Vilis Janums, former SS Standartenführer, repatriated himself to Hitler Germany in his day, to return to Latvia in 1941 with the vanguard of the German army. This is enough to qualify his political face: repatriates were only allowed to return to Latvia if they undertook special assign-

ments. Janums did: he was chief adviser to Oskars Dankers, Latvian quisling No. 1, and subsequently SS Regiment commander in the Latvian Legion. At present, he is chairman of the central administration of the militarised fascist organization "Daugavas vanagi," in which many a war criminal has found refuge and which is overtly or covertly linked with all Latvian emigré organizations. The centre of this organization is now in Münster (GFR); Janums, too, has taken up residence there, in the office of member and even deputy-chairman of the permanent ACEN delegation in the GFR. It goes without saying that he is a *persona gratissima* there, and has doubtless kept up all his old connections dating back to his activities in the hitlerite intelligence service. He is also a member of the Latvian delegation at ACEN.

The former nazi stooges were in low spirits. Their homeward road was barred for them by their own criminal deeds, mass murders, denunciations of Soviet citizens who during 1940—41 had (truly or allegedly) been active in social life. But man must live. Some managed to find work "in their speciality", i. e., continue their service in the German police force; others settled down (or were settled down) in different jobs, qualifying for them anew where necessary, while maintaining contact with their former masters; many became leading officials in diverse emigré organizations and mutual aid funds, functionaries at camps, servicemen in security squads of the USA, and British armies in Western Germany, etc. A large number of fascist stooges joined the militarised organization "Daugavas vanagi."

The ringleaders admitted that during the war

they had pinned their hopes to Germany, but in choosing the smaller of two evils, as one of them expressed it appropriately, they had found themselves "on a sinking boat." However, there was no way back, and there was nothing for it but proceed along the same old line; they even contrived to create a semblance of ideological justification for their treason, past and present, to their motherland and to the Latvian people.

I dwell at some length on the Latvian emigrés to demonstrate the process by which the most highly compromised and most active emigré topshots arrived in the camp of revanchists. Developments were very similar among Lithuanian and Estonian emigrés.

We meet Baron Guttenberg once more in 1962, when he came to Chicago among other Bundestag members, to attend a conference dedicated to the Berlin problem and the future of Eastern Europe, and called jointly by the American "Foundation of Foreign Affairs" institute, and by the Herder Institute in Marburg. The inauguration speech by social-democrat member of the Bundestag Jaksch, was designed to reassure the "suspicious Europeans." "German-Polish reconciliation will be possible," the orator declared, "and old friendships between democratic Germany and the Danube peoples can be resumed with prospects of collaboration among free nations in a united Europe." This is but one of the innumerable meaningless utterances that may be interpreted at anyone's discretion: on the one hand, here we have a German social-democrat apparently assuring the emigrés from Central and Eastern Europe that they may count on an amiably disposed democratic Germany. On the other hand, the quest-

ion of the conditions on which "Polish-German reconciliation" will be attained, and "old friendships" with the Danube peoples will be resumed remains open, and the concept of "democratic" Germany remains unspecified. Not a word is said of the Baltic peoples. Conclusions can be drawn at discretion.

Baron Guttenberg came forth with an appeal to speed up the unification of Western Europe, so that—to use his own expression—the Atlantic "system" be transformed into a "union of two giants," viz. NATO should be superseded by a union between the USA and United Western Europe. The Europeans cannot afford to remain dwarfs in a world of giants, Guttenberg holds, while the Americans cannot be expected to provide indefinitely the power which Europe refuses to develop herself. This signifies, that the aim of Bonn policy is to get up as quickly as possible a United Western Europe as an equal partner of the USA, both in strength and rights, thus changing the present position of NATO where the USA is the dominating force over loosely linked states of second or third rate importance. The Baron does not specify the conditions on which Western Europe will be thus united, nor who will implement the will of the countries comprising it. It may be safely presumed, however, that Germany will be assigned a leading role in the matter.

It appears that United Western Europe is so urgent a task that it ought to be taken up before Germany herself is reunited. Should anybody consider that Western Germany's integration into a united Western Europe may deepen the division of Germany, he can listen to another ambiguous

answer from Baron Guttenberg, ambiguity being the Germans' strong side: "Germany's division is part of Europe's division; to overcome the one means to overcome the other." The contradiction here is only apparent: first Western Germany must become part of United Europe, be it without previous reunification. Then, once it occupies a leading position there (which is the secret hope of the revisionists and revanchists), Western Germany will achieve the annexation of the GDR, whereupon the Western European "giant" will embrace all European nations.

What precisely is meant by *all* European nations, and what the Eastern frontiers of United Europe are going to be—this is wisely passed over in silence.

The same Chicago conference was addressed by several more German professors, and American professors with German surnames, and Mr. Emmet, chairman of the organization "American Friends of Captive Nations," emphasised the close link between the unification of Germany and the liberation of Eastern and Central Europe.

After the Strasburg Colloquy, in the spring of 1963, three groups of ACEN delegates who had participated there, visited a number of European countries on their way back to the USA, so as to give voice to their opinions and assure themselves of support. One of them, presumably the most important one, since it was headed by the then ACEN chairman, Dimitrov (Bulgaria), visited Munich, Bonn and Rome.

Doctor Georgi Dimitrov (Gemeto) was quite a figure in Bulgaria's political life long before World War II. He was also well known for his notable careerism that had induced him to

change his political affiliation more than once. He was also not averse to earthly wealth and deducted his personal share from every sum that passed through his hands. Heading the international peace movement in the Balkans between 1934 and 1940, he had at his disposal a monthly sum of 40.000 Swiss franks, a considerable part of which went to cover his private needs.

In 1941 a conspiracy headed by Gemeto was disclosed. From the British intelligence he had received a radio transmitter, explosives, and several million levas for sabotage and other subversive activities against the German troops. He was arrested, but managed to hide in the premises of the British military mission from where the British got him across to Istanbul. Already then Gemeto raised his voice against the Soviet Union. Early in 1945 he was arrested once more, and once more managed to find shelter, this time in the villa of the American envoy. Thanks to insistent American intervention he was permitted to leave Bulgaria, and in the second half of 1945 he settled in the USA. Continuing his adventurous activities, he went into partnership with Ferez Nagy, his present colleague at the ACEN general committee, to create the so-called "Green International", and simultaneously became representative of the Bulgarian national committee "Freedom and Independence of Bulgaria," in which capacity he was actively engaged in founding ACEN.

Under American instruction and Gemeto's leadership, a Bulgarian militarized unit was organized in the German Federal Republic. One of Dimitrov-Gemeto's former aids who returned to his mothercountry gave the following information

on the Bulgarian national committee and its sub-committees: "We had instructions to collect detailed information on the situation in Bulgaria. We questioned thoroughly every newly arrived emigré and submitted the information to Gemeto who passed it on to the Americans. Besides, through us he recruited emigrés to be sent to Bulgaria for subversive actions."

Gemeto paid several conspiratorial visits to Austria and Germany for negotiations with CIA agents on the question of conveying saboteurs to Bulgaria. He even established a special school for this purpose in Frankfurt-am-Main. He visited European capitals in the course of his activities, met German social-democrats, as well as representatives of the ill-famed "Free Europe Committee" (in Paris), on which he and the whole ACEN leadership subsist.

We may thus see that Dimitrov is a character well enough qualified for work at ACEN—an adventurer, a careerist, an agent of the intelligence service, a sabotage organizer.

In Munich, the ACEN men discoursed with the director of the "Free Europe" radio station. It needs no sixth sense to conjecture the topics of these conversations; they obviously touched upon anti-Soviet propaganda. Representatives of one common management—the CIA—met there, and they preferred discretion with regard to their speeches and decisions.

On the other hand, no secret was made of the exchange of opinions that took place in Bonn with prominent Bundestag members and Foreign Ministry officials concerned with Eastern Europe. Most prominent among the Bonn parliamentaries who played host to the guests from across the

ocean was our old friend Baron Guttenberg. Under his chairmanship, and in the presence of three more Bundestag Christian Democrat deputies, the members of the parliamentary sub-committee on Eastern Europe discussed "thoroughly and frankly" all problems of mutual interest. Three points in their "communiqué" strike the reader.

Firstly, what problems of mutual interest can there be between the Bonn Bundestag and ACEN? Considering the role of Baron Guttenberg who had frequently met the ACEN ringleaders in New York, and if we remember what kind of reflections he shared with them, we shall come pretty close to the truth in presuming that these common interests amounted to coordinating the revisionist policy of the leading party of the Bonn Bundestag with the anti-Soviet tendencies of ACEN. It is not improbable that the Baron should have received instructions from the very same centre which sponsors the ACEN general committee, and that consequently it was as much a talk among men who hold the same views as the one in Munich had been.

Secondly, we learn that a special sub-committee for Eastern Europe exists in the CDU/CSU fraction, the functions of which are not very clear. It is not an ordinary parliamentary committee, but one belonging to the party and at the same time keeping contact with the organization of the East European émigrés.

This dual role of the sub-committee appears the more conspicuous, if we remember the reception of ACEN members by the social-democratic fraction of the Bundestag. The social-democrat leaders Ollenhauer and Wehner were absent; the guests were received by Bundestag member Paul. The

central theme was—the tendencies of Western politics with regard to Eastern Europe. What it was the social-democrat representative told his ACEN guests belongs to obscurity. An “exhaustive and satisfactory exchange of opinions” took place at the Foreign Ministry of the Bonn Republic, however, the fact that the New York guests were received only by the deputy head of the East European department, shows that only secondary importance was attached to the visit.

As a partial compensation for the inadequate level of their reception at the Foreign Ministry of the GFR, the ACEN representatives received the warmest attention at the ministries for Family and Youth Affairs, for Refugees, for All-Germany Affairs (whatever has ACEN got to do with these?), and by the Chancellor's Department for Press and Information. The ACEN delegation had the pleasure of giving a reception in honour of the Mayor of Bonn.

Rome and the Vatican did not receive the ACEN delegation “on a high level” either, but the archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry and the Vatican were enriched by an ACEN memorandum entitled “The Choice of the West in East-Central Europe.”

We thus see that the ACEN leadership maintain “normal,” even “friendly diplomatic” relations with the Bonn statesmen and spokesmen, and coordinate their plans with revanchist quarters, while the Polish and, to some extent, the Czech emigrés are viewing this rapprochement with some mistrust.

But what I as a Latvian find most amazing is the attitude taken up by part of the Latvian emigrés, an attitude which towards the end of

1962 was expressed by one of the ringleaders of the "Daugavas Vanagi" in the GFR as follows: "The road home for the Latvian exiles will lead through Berlin and Königsberg; therefore, the Latvians and the Germans must cooperate and wage a common struggle."

It is not expedient here to dwell upon the Latvian hawks; it has been done in the publication "The Daugavas Vanagi—who are they?" (Latvian State Publishing House, Riga, 1962). Yet the reader may be interested to know, that this is the largest of Latvian emigré organizations, and that its leaders and many of its members are former SS-men, participants in the "murder squads" of Hitler's punitive detachments, former policemen, active adherents of the propaganda of fascism and antisemitism. The "Daugavas vanagi" organization is linked with close ties to all central and local Latvian emigré organizations, and "hawk" representatives are in the leadership of these organizations. Hence, we should not be surprised to find former members of the SS, of punitive detachments and the gestapo ensconced in ACEN from its very conception, as was previously mentioned.

Ex-Major Vilis Hazners, chairman of the American "Daugavas vanagi" branch, continues active in ACEN, and in December 1963 delivered a report . . . on the position of churches in "captive" European countries. A former member of murder squads in the role of specialist on church matters—this, indeed, is unparalleled!

However, the institution that has trained a whole string of ACEN officials, is in closest contact with the institution which Hazners used to serve (unless he is doing so still), as did many

of his fellow-"hawks". Blinded by their anti-communism, they cannot admit that the policy of the ruling circles of Western Germany is today the most aggressive and adventurous policy in Europe. How can they step into the same boat with revanchists who have repeatedly stated that the GFR desires to regain part of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Baltic territory—or else it will start a world conflagration?

ACEN itself published in its bulletin for April-May 1964 an article by Edmund von Gordon (too many "vons" among the friends of the emigrés!), editor of the monthly "Der Europäische Osten", published in Munich (no doubt, under the wing of Radio "Free Europe"). The article declares unequivocally, and with real teutonic impudence, that no other than the Germans ought to evolve the program and plan for settling the tensions in Europe. They are the closest neighbours of Russia and of the peoples Eastern Europe, and many of them have lived most closely together with the Slavs and other "peoples of the East," and thus know them well and "have comprehended their mentality." Therefore the Germans could offer "good and expert advice." And the basic principle of the "European programme" is: "The Soviet Union must withdraw from Central Europe." Mr. von Gordon has not profited either from the lessons of the Second World War.

THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

From the very first days of its existence the ACEN established contact with the so-called European Movement, a social organization de-

signed to further the idea of United Europe. True, this contact extended only to the Committee for Central and Eastern Europe, not to the leading organs. The functions of the committee are not very clear; they seem to confine themselves to speeches by individual representatives at the ACEN Strasburg sessions. As far back as 1955, the chairman and the honorary chairman of the Central and Eastern Europe committee were the speakers on this occasion. It transpired that the committee had been set up on the initiative of Macmillan, future British Foreign Secretary and Premier, whose career ended ingloriously in connection with the Profumo-Keeler affair. It further transpired, that after prolonged efforts Macmillan had succeeded in "setting up a committee truly representative of all nations and all parties (of Central and Eastern Europe)." Thus, this committee turns out to be a rival of ACEN which equally claims that its leaders are the "lawful" representatives of the nine "captive nations" of Eastern and Central Europe. However, while ACEN is rooted in American soil, the European movement concerns itself with the same questions from a purely European aspect. To emphasize its significance, the Committee for Eastern and Central Europe endeavours to create the impression as though only through its intermediary ACEN's voice could reach the European ministers of the European Council. It is in behalf of this Council that the chairman of the committee proclaimed both categorically and confusedly: "In the eyes of the Council (of Europe) the Elbe is not Europe's frontier. Our continent extends as far as there are nations of European culture determined eventually to join the common European state.

It is not our task to name them; each nation must declare it for itself." The duty of "free" nations consists in securing the advent of the day when all nations will be able to express their will regarding their partnership in the European Federation... The speaker felt confident that the nations "will choose correctly," yet it must be their own choice. "Our task (whose exactly?) is to free them..." Whether it is stupidity or fantasy that predominates here, it is hard to say; the correct term may be fantastic stupidity.

If the honourable chairman, the British major Baddington-Burns, remarked profoundly that it was to the advantage of any discussion "not to leave the initiative to the Russians," he may feel reassured; it seems to me that the Russians will gladly cede the initiative in such fantastically stupid talks to the major, fellow-champion of Macmillan who has left the European political scene forever.

However, rivalry continues to smoulder between the American "captive" Europeans and the European "captive" Europeans (the reader may pardon us this conglomeration of meaningless words, which only reflect the meaningless activities of the emigrés and their friends.). The more information penetrated the "verbal curtain" of anticommunism into the "Free World" from the "realm of colonialism and slavery," the more popular grew the policy of peaceful coexistence of nations, the more visibly grew the steady disintegration of unity among Western countries, starting "from the head", i. e., from discord among the Great Powers; and the more evident grew the disunity between the European Movement and ACEN. Finally, it came to open conflict

at the Brussels conference on Eastern and Central Europe on January 10th, 11th, 1964.

Three days before the opening of the conference, on January 8th, ACEN sent a letter to the President of the European Movement Maurice Faure, endorsed by all members of the ACEN general committee, declaring that "neither the national committees and their councils (of ACEN), nor their common organ, the Assembly, were in any way associated with the Conference."

What had provoked this wrath, expressed in such categorical dissociation from ACEN's erstwhile friend, the European Movement?

Firstly, ACEN was displeased because the Committee for Eastern and Central Europe had arbitrarily changed from a political organization into a research group. If we decipher this, it means that the Committee no longer claims representation of countries and nations, but merely consists of persons invited, at the discretion of the European Movement, to do research work on questions concerning Eastern and Central Europe, whereby it is not obligatory, that these investigations should amount to anti-communist or anti-Soviet propaganda. This new line in the European Movement naturally went against the grain of ACEN, who consider themselves the "lawful" representatives of "captive" countries and nations, although nobody ever elected them, or gave them any authority to speak even in the name of the respective emigré groups. Moreover, it is common knowledge that the essence of ACEN activities is wholesale discreditation of the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, and an unbiased and fair judgment on this question acts upon them like a red rag on a bull. Suffice it to

recall how impudently they criticised the late President Kennedy for his "tepid" proclamation in connection with "Captive Nations Week," with what impotent fury, how arrogantly and senselessly they instructed ministers of foreign affairs of Western powers, the UNO Assembly, and the Security Council on their conduct, pronouncing, Cassandra-fashion, gloomy forecasts on the downfall of Western civilisation. All this explains the fury of these anti-Soviet tongue-waggers, on sensing that the European Movement, which even purely geographically stands far closer to the nine countries whom ACEN claim to represent, has taken a new course, counter to ACEN's wish and without its permission.

Secondly, and this ACEN deems really criminal, the European Movement has shown itself inclined to "recognise the status quo," and to collaborate with the "communist regimes" unconditionally and without provisos. The Soviet people welcome a course of broad, stable contact with capitalist and non-socialist neutral or non-aligned countries. Needless to say, the Western statesmen see in such contacts not only—and not so much—a strengthening of friendship and peace among nations. They envisage developing contacts with socialist countries as a means of propaganda of the superiority of the "Free World," as a means of ideological subversion, as a means of disrupting the internal and external unity among the socialist nations. Yet even these ulterior motives cannot change the significance of closer contacts for the cause of peaceful coexistence. Sooner or later, honesty, truth and trust will take the upper hand over intrigue and subversive propaganda.

This is the very reason why the ACEN leader-

ship was deeply perturbed, when the European Movement diverted from the ACEN "general line"—or, to put it differently, as soon as the European Movement displayed a timid intention to march in step with time, as distinct from the New York agents of anti-communism, who remain "perched on the same stone," themselves turning into fossil.

Nor could they refrain from adopting their old arrogantly condescending tone, advising the European Movement that economic and cultural relations were not a panacea, and that the West could only profit from them if they were combined with "meaningful political action," that might prove the unshakable adherence of the West to the attainment of self-determination in Eastern Europe.

ACEN cannot but admit that the emigrés are now divided into these two schools of thought, yet they took comfort in the fact that at the Brussels conference no agreement was reached between the adherents of economic and cultural interrelations between West and East on the one hand, and the adherents of strategic and political action (read: anti-Soviet reactionaries) on the other, and that the conference closed without adopting resolutions or coordinated conclusions. Cold comfort, indeed. The relentless power of progress and human thought will soon prove its inconsistency, and ACEN will be forced to lay down their rusty arms which they can only wield with the support of their sponsors, anyway.

AFTERWORD

FROM SUBVERSION TO SELF-DETERMINATION

A cursory backward glance at the 10 year old history of ACEN leads above all to the conclusion that it is an organization that is least of all expressive of the aspirations of the emigrés or refugees from among whom its leaders spring. To an even lesser degree does ACEN concern itself with problems of interest to the nations, the nine nations, which the insignificant group of people comprising ACEN claim to represent. On paper, these representatives number about 200, yet in actual fact the nine members of the General Committee plus its general secretary manage all the Assembly matters at their own discretion. They are the ones who travel around, visiting American, Latin-American, European, and Far Eastern cities. They are the authors of all kinds of memoranda, appeals, challenges, telegrams. As to the other ACEN members, they are occasionally invited to participate in elaborating some particular questions; and as regards the many thousand strong bulk of emigrés and refugees, they are assigned the role of walkers-on—if that. Yet only in the very recent period has ACEN gone so far as to admit a profound split in the Eastern and Central European emigré circles, fundamental

differences between the generations, divergencies of political opinion. They also admit that these signs of disintegration and decline are growing more marked as time goes on, and the differences of opinion more irreconcilable.

Initiated by the CIA, albeit under the mask of a Free Europe Committee, ACEN was naturally incapable of independent political orientation, as it was unable to express any kind of public opinion, but was compelled to serve the purposes of its CIA bosses.

These purposes can be expressed in one word—anti-communism. Its manifestations were variegated, yet each and sundry question dealt with by ACEN was invariably presented in the light of hostility to everything linked with the existence and growth of socialism and communism throughout the world.

During the period of its formation, ACEN, this would-be “authoritative institution,” was set two main aims: material and ideological subversion. Plans were forged to dispatch saboteurs into Central and East European countries, to organize saboteur groups there (“Let there be explosions at home so that we may grow powerful here”), to maintain counterrevolutionary trends. On the ideological front, the “Free Europe” radio station was started, specially designed to disseminate anti-communist propaganda, to kindle hatred against soviet and people’s democratic power, to stir up hope that this power might be destroyed.

This aggressive line coincided with—or, to be more precise, adjusted itself to the first period of the cold war. However, as hope upon hope was thwarted for the American sponsors of ACEN; as the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s

democracy continued restoring with undiminishing speed what had been destroyed by the war and by hitlerite rule—the initial fervour of the ACEN sponsors waned more and more. A hint was given, rather peremptorily, that the erstwhile aggressive tone should be curbed, warnings were voiced against too generous promises of aid to “captive” nations, and it was increasingly emphasised that the success of ACEN activities depended in the final issue on the influence its leaders were able to exert upon their respective nations. In a word, the frontal attack for which ACEN had been created and fostered during the first years of its existence had failed, and its bosses felt compelled to change their tactics, thereby placing a greater share of responsibility for success upon ACEN itself.

They cast about feverishly for new ideas and new methods that might instil new life into the old body, so as to justify its existence and secure a subsistence for its ring-leaders who had severed themselves from their compatriots not only in their motherlands, which they had abandoned of their own accord, but even in their own emigré quarters.

Emphasis was laid on two points: the theory of “deterrents,” and Soviet “colonialism.”

On both points the emigré top-shots were guided by cunning speculations, striving, on their part, to shift the bulk of responsibility for failures in their anti-communist policy over to their American sponsors. Restraining “communist expansion,” they maintained, was a task to be pursued along two lines: military-strategic, and psychological. The former, they argued, fell doubtless to the share of the Western Powers—armies and

nuclear weapons were in their hands. While the latter was within the competence of ACEN. Thus, ACEN took it upon itself to foster (psychological) hostility against Soviet Power among the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe; to see to it that these people keep the rear and the communication lines of the Soviet troops under permanent threat of danger thus staying the westward spread of Communism.

In this way ACEN strove to create the impression that the Eastern and Central European nations were of strategic and political importance for the plans of the Western Powers. Sometimes ACEN spokesmen went so far as to claim even greater importance for this "deterrent" factor than for the military and political strength of the West.

In all these contrivances they proceeded from two utterly erroneous premises—the alleged aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, denied today even by the most rabid enemies of Socialism and Communism, and the myth that the ACEN spokesmen were expressing the political attitudes of the masses in their respective countries.

The conclusions arrived at by these self-styled strategists of Fifty Seventh Street are as erroneous, as the whole foundation on which their strategies are built is unsubstantial. There is not even enough ground here for serious argument. Suffice it to quote a Hungarian emigré Sulyok who has long since severed relations with ACEN and who qualified all this commotion and fuss over an imaginary armed clash in Europe as "irresponsible, unscrupulous, and futile instigation." He writes: "If the laws of logics and democratic principles . . . could be applied to . . . American Central-European emigré politics, then this whole

mass of political scum who are a dead weight on the emigrés even today, smothering any healthy tending, would have been liquidated long, long ago..."

The Americans, and the ACEN leaders themselves, soon realised that "dissertations" on strategy would get them nowhere. Indeed, how long can one go on conjecturing which side is superior in military strength, who possesses larger numbers of atomic bombs, whether the Soviet troops will invade Western Europe if their rear is threatened with uprisings and subversive action? How long can one go on publishing all this balderdash in memoranda and reports? They therefore agreed, temporarily, upon a period of "nuclear stalemate."

The second spring from which ACEN drew inspiration, Soviet colonialism, dried up as quickly as the former one. The ACEN ringleaders and their instigators used heavy enough verbal ammunition: Expose! Indict! Red imperialism! Exploitation! Oppression! Rights of Man!

The argument they considered particularly powerful and convincing was their allegation that the era of "classical" colonialism was over, while "the Soviet Union continued holding large numbers of nations in a state of colonial dependence." Consequently, the question of Soviet colonialism must be put before UNO.

However, ACEN intended to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. It is common knowledge that the problem of liquidating colonialism was moved at UNO by the Soviet Union, whose initiative found wide response. The liberation movement of colonial peoples had gained such impetus after World War II, that the ruling powers

were simply compelled to give independence to a whole number of former colonies. That this was done reluctantly goes without saying, in particular on the part of Britain, for it meant giving up rich sources of income gleaned arbitrarily from exploited labour for scores of years, and rich natural resources.

ACEN reckoned that by advancing the issue of "Soviet colonialism" as one of primary importance, it would render a good service to the colonial powers on the one hand, and their friends who were exerting themselves to stay the rapid process of national liberation struggles, on the other. The stratagems employed by ACEN leaders were the same throughout. Their ingenious strategic efforts had been designed to shift responsibility for their own failure to the Western Powers, who disposed of the actual war potential; in raising the issue of Soviet colonialism, they hoped that in the heat of the propaganda campaign they might enhance their rapidly falling value in the eyes of their sponsors.

However, they had again miscalculated. Neither verbal, nor statistic ruses proved of any avail. They deliberated on "classical" and "new" colonialism, on neo-colonialism, or complete and partial colonialism, on the universal validity of the Declaration on the African and Asian countries. They counted up the number of countries that had freed themselves from colonial oppression and entered UNO, they declared that "old" colonialism was dead... All shots misfired, nothing could prove the establishment of nine new colonies in Europe while practically none had remained in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The socialist camp continued in its successful development, and

no symptoms of economic exploitation of small countries by the Soviet Union have been observed. On the other hand questions pertaining to Portuguese and British colonialism in Africa are never off the UNO agenda, the neo-colonial Congo continues in ferment, dangerous problems spring up in Cyprus, in Vietnam, in Malaysia, and even the "purely internal" problem of the savage apartheid policy in South Africa has grown into an international problem fraught with menacing consequences. Some smart journalist conceived the "brilliant" idea, that the Soviet Government was in fact implementing "apartheid" for numerous nationalities and races on Soviet territory, explaining with brazen cynicism that this apartheid policy was a far graver threat to international peace than the barring of "millions of uncivilized savages" in one of the South African countries (meaning the South African Republic) from settlement in districts where white men, women and children were living "by will of fate." That racialism renders people blind is common truth, and the position of negroes in the USA exemplifies it amply; but that racialism should render a man insane—a man who doubtless considers himself a citizen of a "free" world, this is not so common after all. We may ask, parenthetically, what Mr. Lawrence of the "New York Herald-Tribune" (it is he who conceived the above-mentioned "idea"), actually wants. If the Soviet Government holds various nations of its country in a state of apartheid, it only means that the disintegration of the Soviet State which he yearns for is the closer at hand, and the threat to international peace is accordingly smaller. So why Mr. Lawrence's indignation? He ought to have expressed his satisfaction with the

"Soviet apartheid policy." The racialists' savage struggle against Negro equality in the Southern states of the USA can hardly be called a colonial problem, but it is certainly an essential part of the problem of freedom and human rights. Yet the ACEN spokesmen, and numerous reactionary circles in Europe and the USA, take every opportunity, however unsuitable, to accuse the countries of the socialist camp precisely of violating freedom and human rights, although not one of the hundreds of thousands of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and to countries of people's democracy has attested to this threadbare anti-communist argument.

For all their supreme written and oral efforts, the ACEN leaders have not been able to force the question of "Soviet colonialism" upon the UNO agenda. Even the cooperation in this matter of some rabid and semi-rabid senators and congressmen did not persuade the American Government of the expedience of such a move. The colonialists and neo-colonialists have come to realise that a discussion of "Soviet colonialism" on an international forum would not only fail to be of propaganda value for them, but might easily turn into a boomerang. True, several orators had been instructed to make mention of "Soviet colonialism," yet apart from the British, the Americans, and some of their satellites nobody wanted to touch upon this still-born issue.

Thus, colonialism proved as much of a dud as the strategic importance of "captive nations." This took the sense out of the political line underlying the Congress Resolution of July 17th 1959, the purport of which was to turn the void slogan—"captive nations" into one of the basic premises

of USA foreign policy. On the other hand, the bankrupt ACEN leaders discovered new vistas for justifying the existence of their soap-bubble organization, for shifting the responsibility for their failures on to others, and prolonging their futile, but remunerative activities over an indefinite period of time.

In the first place, it reassured them to find their anti-communist tongue-wagging raised to the status of official American Congress policy: for one week a year, at least, the American propaganda apparatus would be working in their behalf thus raising their prestige in the eyes of part of the emigrés. It also pleased them to see their ranks increased by will of the American lawmakers, since the concept "captive nations" was extended to comprise not merely the nine Central and Eastern European nations, but also a number of others, including Eastern Germany (meaning, the German Democratic Republic), "Continental China" (meaning, the vast Chinese People's Republic), Tibet, North Korea, North Vietnam, the famous "Idel-Ural" "and others," among which Cuba was eventually listed, and to which any country may be added if its regime appears distasteful to the American reactionaries.

In the second place, they could be more daring now in levelling their reproaches at the "West," even at the President himself, and at official USA representatives, accusing them of tardiness, cowardice, compromise, undue caution, of under-rating their own power, of political haggling, shortsightedness, cynicism and all manner of other sins. Simultaneously, they jumped at the opportunity to boost up their own significance, threatening the West that it might forfeit the

confidence of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe,—as though the West had ever possessed such confidence, and as though it could be gained by dint of ACEN eloquence.

In the third place, they availed themselves of the newly widened circle of “captive” nations in order to establish contact with the reactionary regimes of South East Asia, or, to be more precise, with their organ the “Asian People’s Anticommunist League”, and to maintain this contact regularly. What they expect from these contacts nobody knows, but that the trips undertaken by Mr. Sidzikauskas, Nagy, Kütt and others to Japan, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand could not have materialised without CIA sponsorship and finance, stands beyond any doubt. The same applies to the “good will” missions to some Latin American countries. The ACEN travellers had presumably been assigned the role of contactmen with a view to demonstrating the existence of an allembicing bloc of “captive,” “semi-captive,” and “divided” nations extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. All these tourist activities boil down to anti-communist propaganda.

Bar having their picture taken side by side with Chiang Kai-Shek, and shaking hands with the “Generalissimo” in the presence of his beautiful wife and viewing the panorama of the Chinese shores from the Quemoy military base—the ACEN representatives could boast no results from all their bustling activities since the July 17th, 1959 Resolution.

All attempts to revive the live corpse of ACEN were like stimulating injections to a patient on his deathbed—with momentary, and only apparent effect.

The last effort to pass over to an offensive against the hated enemy—communism, was launched under the banner of struggle for self-determination. This term was freely manipulated by the Western powers earlier in history, when they used it in an attempt to enforce their plan of Germany's reunification as a point in negotiations with the Soviet Union, so that the German Federal Republic might impose itself upon the German Democratic Republic.

As soon as the ACEN leaders understood that the problem of restoring bourgeois regimes in Central and Eastern European countries was ousted into the background by that of Germany's reunification, they too proclaimed the slogan of right for self-determination. When they saw that the Soviet Union would make no concessions that might counter the interests of the people's democratic regime of the GDR, the ACEN spokesmen hastened to identify their purposes with the designs of the Western countries regarding the German problem. By doing so, they hoped to induce the Western Powers to take more active and concrete steps so that the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe be revised. Counter to the interests of the peoples in those parts of Europe, most ACEN leaders identified their own reactionary tendencies with Bonn revisionism. The Polish representatives alone found the courage to put the future of the Polish people first, demanding that the frontiers of people's democratic Poland be recognised before the "right of self-determination" (in its specific Bonn interpretation) is granted. The Czechs are also known to have displayed little enthusiasm over the apparent rapprochement between ACEN and revanchist Ger-

many, yet they did not demonstrate their feelings as openly as the Poles had done. For the Czechs, the principle of self-determination implies a double danger: a revival of German claims to Czech territory, and a threat to the integrity of their country in view of the separatist tendencies among Slovak emigrés. As to the Baltic emigré leaders, their attitude is as incomprehensible as it is shameful: not only are they prepared to "be in the same boat" with the descendants of those who had kept them enslaved for 700 years and invaded their country twice, but they are even ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with them.

The historical and juridical essence of the principle of self-determination is a question outside the scope of the present publication. The Soviet Union has solved this once intricate problem, as can be judged by the mutual friendship and fruitful collaboration among peoples in the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp.

In bourgeois theory and practice, self-determination may have a variety of meanings, and the right to self-determination is implemented at the discretion of bourgeois politicians, not according to the people's will.

Thus, the right of self-determination served to justify the dismembering of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the first World War. The right of self-determination of the nations comprising the Empire was then imposed by the victors—the Western Allies—upon their defeated enemy. At the same time, these very victors denied the right of self-determination to the peoples inhabiting the border provinces of Russia, while there was hope for them to maintain a "united and undivided" Russian Empire. Instead of self-determination,

the Entente politicians were prepared to grant to these nations only "autonomy." When it was agreed to recognise temporarily the "independence" of the Transcaucasian and Baltic peoples, this was merely a political ruse designed to weaken young revolutionary Russia; besides, the recognition of the new countries was subject to stipulations regarding their participation in the intervention against the Soviet country.

Thus, the right to self-determination (in Europe) in the period following World War I depended not on the people who had been yearning for national independence long before the war, but on the political speculations of the Great Powers of the capitalist world. What was implemented was not self-determination, but "determination" by the victors.

After World War II, Western reactionary quarters identified the concept of right to self-determination with the national liberation movement, though it is obvious that they are somewhat different matters.

When India and Pakistan became independent states, it occurred to nobody to call it implementation of the right to self-determination. India, for example, numbers at least thirteen basic nationalities, and they availed themselves of their right to self-determination by choosing to become part of the Indian Republic.

It was an entirely different matter in Africa, where the colonizers were forced to grant independence to several dozen colonies, which thus entered the first phase of self-determination. Further developments are undoubtedly still ahead, quite apart from the fact that self-determination has not affected the Portuguese colonies yet, while in the

last remaining British possessions it is still the British Colonial Ministry that does the determining, and not the native population.

And finally, as to Latin America—it is doubtful if anybody would venture to say that the right to self-determination has been implemented there. It is the American monopolies that determine all and sundry. The only instance when a nation won its right to self-determination in armed struggle, was the Cuban revolution, and it is a well-known fact that the American reactionaries and monopolies are still resisting it furiously.

We must bear in mind that even today some politicians have not abandoned their dream of dismembering the Soviet state by means of so-called self-determination, and whose aim is Hitler's slogan "Europe extending to the Urals"; who ignore the fact that self-determination, liberation, and revolution are not equivalents. It must also be borne in mind that since the Great October Socialist Revolution, with the further development of the first Socialist state in the world, and the subsequent development of a socialist camp, the right to self-determination must be appraised not only from the point of view of national and territorial considerations, but also from the point of view of social and political conditions.

How do the emigrés practically envisage the implementation of the right to self-determination?

Furthermore: do the Bulgarian, Latvian, Czech emigrés agree on their interpretations of the concept—right to self-determination? If so, it is, of course, no longer self-determination, but a determination imposed from outside, based neither on national, nor on territorial principles and public law, and its tendency is to liquidate the social and

political order in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

To ACEN, right to self-determination is but a formula that actually means restoration of what has long become past history. They close their eyes to the objective impossibility of such a restoration. Besides, they serve not the interests of their nations, but those of "great politics" business men, who keep them in store for a game the outcome of which does not depend in the least on the emigré leaders, and can be of no benefit to them.

With right of self-determination as the main stake, a hopelessly contradictory situation has arisen, as may be judged from the following diametrically opposed opinions expressed by leading statesmen: the late President Kennedy had stated that, the great currents of history carry the world away from the monolithic idea (?) towards the idea of pluralism, away from communism to national independence and freedom; on the other hand, Senator Douglas advised ACEN to continue with a federation even after the liberation of Eastern Europe, since a group of small states with populations of "some" 12, 20, 30 million "has no future" being wedged between two such mighty powers as Germany and Russia.

As we see, one statesman defends the idea of maximum dissociation (or "pluralism") of nations, while another maintains that small states have no future. Who is in the right?

The facts of history plainly show that the political development of the present-day world is directed towards the formation of large economic units. Yet the concrete historical situation must not be ignored. The great capitalist

powers have always favoured the right of self-determination—in words, of course—for . . . small nations, this being favourable for utilising the advantages of their own large economic systems in grouping around themselves the small dependent countries. But it has so far proved impossible in the bourgeois world to create a federation of countries possessing approximately equal economic potentials. The impossibility of it is inherent in the very system of capitalist economy. United Europe and the Common Market clearly demonstrate the insurpassable obstacles in the way of any effort to unite competitive capitalist states, even though in principle such a move would be in the spirit of our time.

Only Socialism offers the possibility of disinterested unions of states directed towards improving the living standard in each. This is one of the vital reasons of success in the socialist camp.

The kind of self-determination proposed by ACEN is a fraud from the very start, since it proceeds not from the interests of the people but from the self-interest of the leading capitalist power, the USA, which is intent on consolidating its dominating position and the economic dependence on it of other countries.

The propaganda campaign for right to self-determination is, indeed dangerous, but not because anybody might seriously believe, in “democratic elections” or a general vote to be conducted under the auspices of UNO in the nine European countries, in South East Asia, or in Cuba. It is dangerous because it has led to an identification of the ACEN anti-communist aims with the political revisionism and revanchism

proclaimed by the Bonn republic and headed by it. And again, the danger lies not in some nine—or even ninety—renegades concocting memoranda and appeals—but in the spurious picture of the public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe, presented with the help of the American propaganda machinery.

We have seen that aggressive anti-communism turned out ineffective—with all its subversion, its attempts to kindle counter-revolutionary feeling, its strategic moves, its struggle against “Soviet colonialism,” and its final stake on right to self-determination. Realising this, ACEN passed over to defensive tactics. The first steps in this direction were the appeal to deny communism success “for a period of five years.” This is an abstract demand, devoid of concrete meaning, thus no actual results could be expected. How could one deny success to a movement that was advancing steadily along an ascending line, was winning increasing numbers of supporters, was gaining victory upon victory irrespective of the desires to the contrary on the part of international reaction?

Following the example of its sponsors, ACEN therefore chose to turn against individual manifestations of the peace policy of the socialist camp. It launched an attack against the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders, maintained by the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy. It tried to prove this a tactical ruse on the part of the communists, screening aggressive designs. They declared that in insisting on peaceful coexistence, the Socialist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, intended to lull the vigilance of the “trustful” West,

until the moment is rife for renewed attack against the "Free" World.

Closely linked with the policy of peaceful co-existence is the question of consolidating the situation in Eastern Europe, of finally liquidating the effects of World War II and recognizing the frontiers of the Eastern European countries. ACEN is up in arms against this reasonable policy that would secure lasting peace and would pave the way for cooperation among all European countries, and relax the tension still felt between East and West. However, it is just this state of tension that the revisionists, and with them their ACEN stooges, want to sustain.

Hence, they flung all their efforts into discrediting the proposal of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and those included in the Warsaw agreement. This is only natural: an additional guarantee of peace in Europe cannot be acceptable to ideologists of international tension, which the ACEN leaders are. It would deprive them of the atmosphere of shady political adventure, in which their intrigues can flourish, it would invalidate their fictitious arguments, and what is worst—it might even induce their American bosses to revise their attitude to the very existence of the "Assembly of Captive Nations."

The "Washington Post," referring to "Captive Nations Week" in July 1964, wrote, symptomatically, that the July 17th, 1959 Resolution was either "an annual advertisement of our impotence," or else "an annual transgression against honesty."

What threw ACEN into a real panic was the realisation that a non-aggression pact between East and West would consolidate the territorial status quo in Europe, depriving them of their

powerful ally—the Bonn Government. For, no sooner was the pact suggested, when Bonn put everything into action, even threats against their NATO allies, to achieve a negative attitude to it on the part of the Western Powers, unless it stipulated a previous “reunification” of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic (meaning annexation of the former by the latter).

The Bonn leaders realise full well that the number of American supporters of a “non-recognition” policy towards the GDR is dwindling rapidly. They remember how the influential Senator Morse made this unequivocally clear in his Senate speech on August 19th 1963 stating that “the political leaders of Western Germany... are politically blind if they expect the American people to continue much longer putting the problem of non-recognition of the communist regime (viz., the people’s power in the GDR) above prospects of lessening the tension between us (USA) and the Soviet Union. Somebody is deceiving himself in Bonn if he thinks that the East German problem can delay much longer the relaxation of tension between East and West if other circumstances go to further such relaxation.”

Bonn cannot but reckon with the fact that its fruitless obstinacy in refusing to recognise the GDR cannot last, and if a relaxation of tension brings about a final consolidation of the position in Europe, the principle of self-determination will lose all attraction with regard to Germany, not to speak of Central and Eastern Europe where anti-communism is its only, rather shaky, support.

The last spoke which ACEN is trying to put in the wheels of the advancing movement for a real

relaxation of tension concerns developing contacts between East and West.

It has become particularly urgent during the recent years, when even the emigré partisans of adamant aggressiveness against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp were forced to admit that in the "nuclear stalemate" period the idea of armed collision between West and East must be eliminated from the sphere of real politics. Therefore contact with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe must be developed, while continuing the policy of "non-recognition of communist regimes," and sustaining "the spirit of passive resistance," and "confidence in the Western World."

Professor Moseley of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, one of the American ideologists of the "deterrent" policy with regard to the Soviet Union's alleged aggressiveness, formulated this idea in the following manner: everything must be done to preserve and develop cultural and scientific achievements produced by representatives of "captive nations" in the West. These nations (who have proud histories reaching back over a thousand years) have always felt that the West does not really recognise them. Not enough has been done during the last 15 years to give the world an adequate idea of the historic, literary and scientific attainments of these nations. Hence, the West must use all ways and means to establish a wide range of contacts with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, without, however, expressing appreciation of their regimes or leaders.

Professor Strauss-Hoopes, Pennsylvania, adherent of the same ideology, makes the proviso that it is far from clear what results could be expected

from increased exchange of scientists, artists, students, and tourists, that it seems most unlikely that communist regimes might be overthrown as a result of open talks between local and Western intellectuals. Though he thinks it worth while venturing along this path.

However, even this very moderate program was categorically rejected by ACEN. Early in 1964, the ACEN "strategist" Coste of whom we have already heard, declared in behalf of ACEN that economic and cultural exchange could not supersede a "deterrent" Western policy aimed at supporting self-determination for all European nations.

Concluding thus my investigation into the "policy" of the so-called "Assembly of Captive European Nations," I can assure the reader in all confidence, that an organization like ACEN, created by will of the USA Central Intelligence Agency, has never served the interests of Eastern and Central European nations whose wish it is to live in peace and friendship, without fear of extermination in an atomic war. And no matter what ACEN may argue in self-justification, no matter what policy it pursues, no matter what political salto-mortales it performs all peoples, including their own compatriots in emigration must remember that ACEN is an instrument of the cold war, a cancerous tumour hindering the healthy development of mankind. ACEN stands in flagrant contradiction to the ideal of peace among nations.

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