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# Inventing Culture and Nation: Intellectuals and Early Latvian Nationalism

Ieva Zake

*The article argues that Latvian nationalism started out as a doctrine of cultural egalitarianism. This was due to the crucial role played by the emerging native intelligentsia, which came from peasant backgrounds and received education in Russian universities during the 1840s and 1850s. Using historical accounts and intellectuals' publications, it is shown that Latvian intelligentsia was influenced by the burgeoning Russian and German nationalist ideas at the time, which it re-interpreted within traditional cultural context. To a large extent, these intellectuals created a national identity for themselves in order to claim an equal position among intellectual elites of other nations. These conclusions imply that it is necessary to study nationalisms as a part of not only social and economic, but also cultural, modernity.*

*Keywords: Nationalism; Intellectuals; Culture; Modernity; Russian Empire; Eastern Europe*

## Introduction

Similar to other cases of new nations' nationalisms in Eastern Europe, a more or less clearly defined conception of Latvians as a distinct people was created considerably late—in the middle of the nineteenth century. It originated among a group of sons of native peasants who were able to access higher education after the modernising reforms in the Russian Empire. These young students, journalists and teachers successfully combined their efforts to create an identity for themselves and for their social background. I intend to show that this emerging Latvian nationalism was

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largely a cultural, meaning-making project, which, until the First World War, did not become a widely supported social movement or political ideology. Nevertheless, the early nationalist claims became a normative standard of Latvian identity for decades to come. The nineteenth-century Latvian intellectuals were later remembered as heroes engaged in a struggle to ‘awaken the nation.’<sup>1</sup> The need to assert Latvia as a political nation during the 1920s and 1930s determined such an interpretation. In reality, as I argue here, the nineteenth-century nationalists predominately were interested in proving Latvian cultural difference. In fact, this dominance of cultural meanings even hindered the development of demands for national autonomy.

Overall, the early process of ‘inventing’ Latvians from the peasant population of Russia’s periphery was not as unambiguous as its later, much simplified accounts present. Early Latvian nationalists did not merely awaken a pure Latvian tradition that has been suppressed by Russian Imperial rule. Instead, Latvian (similarly to Lithuanian and Estonian) nationalism was a set of intellectual ideas that combined Russian and German nationalisms as applied to a local context. In this process, native peasant culture was transformed into such national symbols as folk songs, folk wisdom, myths, language and national history. The theoretical justification for this was borrowed from the spreading Russian and German nationalist philosophies, which the first self-identified Latvian intellectuals encountered at the universities. However, while utilising the exciting political ideas of their time, the emerging Latvian intellectual elite did not form separatist goals. Rather by becoming nationalists, they were attempting to join a broader cross-cultural dynamic of nationalist philosophy, which they perceived to be the most progressive. To them, discovering and creating one’s ‘personal’ nation meant becoming sophisticated members of the world’s intellectual community. Also, by turning toward the new international fashion of nationalism the young intellectuals could express their dissatisfaction with the dominant cultural and social regulations.

Essentially, a large part of the Eastern European nationalisms was the building of the nationalist meanings—in culture, history, language and so on.<sup>2</sup> In order to understand how and with what resources the young national enthusiasts of the nineteenth century operated, I suggest analysing the ways they both adopted and resisted Russian and German influences. This kind of dynamic was particularly characteristic of the meaning-making process of in nationalisms of small and new nations. In sum, with this article I would like to propose that study is needed of how the conception of ‘Latvian people’ and ‘Latvian culture’ could not have been formed without the young intellectuals’ restless sense of inferiority (in relation to dominant Russian and German doctrines) as combined with their heightened aspirations to enter intellectual elites of the world on equal (i.e., nationalistic) terms.

### **Analytical Considerations**

The case of Latvian nationalism offers compelling evidence to the continuous debates among historians and social scientists about the timing and nature of nationalism.

Most often the research on nationalism has tended to privilege big nations and states (e.g., Marx, 2003; Greenfield, 2001; Brubaker 1992), while the historical formation of the small and new nations has been treated as secondary. Ironically though, in the most recent European history, small nations and their nationalisms have demanded much attention with their separatist movements, conflicts and even wars. Although these active nationalist movements and doctrines have been rarely studied,<sup>3</sup> they could be crucial in explaining the origins of the nationalist threats to democracy today.

The debates usually concentrate around two major arguments. The first one (mainly presented by Gellner, Deutsch, Anderson, Hobsbawm, Tiryakian and Nevitte) asserts nationalism as a modern phenomenon inherently linked to the dramatic social, economic and political transformations from traditionalism to industrialism, modern statehood and new means of communication. It emphasises that even though ideas of cultural difference had existed for centuries, only modernity with its universal education, rationalist and secular political philosophy, print capitalism and industrial revolution could produce a conception of national identity and nationalist ideology (see, e.g., Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992; Anderson, 1983). Although some modernists emphasise the role of the modern statehood (e.g., Breuilly, 1994; Kohn, 1965; Kedourie, 1966), while others focus on the formation of industrial and capitalist economy, all modernists agree that there is a significant difference between pre-modern and modern forms of nationalism (McCrone, 1998). Overall, according to the modernists, nationalist movements emerged and strengthened in a close relationship with the gradual changes brought about by modernity.

The other, pre-modernist, approach has become more fashionable among social scientists. Pre-modernists criticise the modernist perspective for treating nationalism as merely a side-effect of modernisation or an imagined collective identity typical of secularised societies. Pre-modernists approach nationalism by considering how different forms of national awareness existed already before modernity. For example, Joseph Llobera (1994) in his research makes an argument that the medieval societies organised their lives in distinctive ways, which constituted them into separate cultures. Therefore, the later modern nationalisms essentially could not have developed without recreating such medieval 'ethnic' particularities.

Some of the most influential pre-modernist work has been done by Anthony Smith (1979, 1981, 1986, 1991), who particularly stresses the importance of unifying myths, symbols and pre-modern memories as building blocks for the modern national identities. He argues that some earlier ethnic background is required for people to identify with and consolidate themselves into a nation. The ideological force pushing people to act in the name of the nation is not modernity alone, but an older cultural community or religio-ethnic identity. In short, pre-modernists argue that the separating lines between modernity and traditionalism in the case of nationalism do not need to be exaggerated.

Acknowledging the important aspects of both debating sides, I suggest that in order to explain Latvian (and potentially other small nation nationalisms) both

arguments are useful only partially. While Gellner and other modernists are right about the timing of nationalism, they tend to grant too much power to economic, scientific and social changes (such as the growth of local bourgeoisie) and disregard the importance of culture. As it will be clear from the following, Latvians as an ethnic collective were conceived during the mid-nineteenth-century's reforms of Russia's modernisation and this project was concentrated on building a cultural identity with clearly cultural emphasis on language, folklore, history and peasant lifestyle. Eventually, these cultural elements became the core of the definition of 'Latvianness'. Although, according to some social scientists this cultural content may actually disqualify Latvian doctrine as nationalism (e.g., Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1981, pp. 277–282), its importance and ability to re-emerge cannot be denied.

On the other hand, while pre-modernists emphasise the cultural meanings of nationalism, they suggest searching for its pre-modern roots and the ways in which nationalism calls upon ancient cultural heritage. These suggestions are also only partially applicable to Latvian nationalism and other similar cases. While, for example, Anthony Smith correctly highlights the importance of myths, folklore, history and language in the formation of modern nationalisms, it has to be noted that the sources of such cultural building blocks were not local traditions, but actually influences from the outside. In other words, the 'authentic' Latvian culture was not summoned and revived from its pre-modern sources, but often literally invented by young intellectuals, who emulated Russian and German nationalists.

Overall, in order to account for the emergence of nationalisms such as Latvian, a synthesis between modernist and pre-modernist perspectives needs to be found. As correctly indicated by Toivo Raun and Andrejs Plakans (1990) in their critique of the modernist Miroslav Hroch's theory of Eastern European nationalisms, the Baltic nationalisms do not neatly fit into the models of progressive growth of the nationalist mass movements. Such theories as Hroch's conception of the three stages (scholarly interest, nationalist agitation and mass movement) generally treat nationalisms as gradual and incremental processes that culminate in political mass mobilisation. However, a more careful analysis of such cases as Latvian or Estonian nationalisms show that in some of the 'phases' the changes happened too quickly, while in others nationalisms were stalled for decades without 'graduating' to the next level. In fact, important triggering forces pushing along the development of these nationalisms were hardly the internal maturation of the ideology and the movement, as externally produced historical coincidences.

Apart from demonstrating how modernist and pre-modernist approaches have to be re-considered, I also intend to add some missing pieces to the existing knowledge about the role of intellectuals in nationalism as opposed to the well-researched intellectuals in socialist and revolutionary movements (see, e.g., Aron, 1957; Schumpeter, 1960; Almond, 1965; Horowitz, 1968; Feuer, 1969; Lasky, 1976; Ulam, 1976, 1977; Kamenka & Smith, 1979; Etzioni-Halevy, 1985; Brym, 1980; Burbank, 1986; Gouldner, 1985; Eyerman, 1994; Olausson, 1987). Although recent sociological studies of nationalism give little credit to intelligentsia and either focus on the elites

and masses (e.g., Tiryakian & Nevitte, 1985) or approach nationalism abstractly as a 'tool' of industrialisation, I propose that the groups of intellectuals play a crucial, yet under-studied, role in creating and dissemination political ideologies.

It also needs to be noted that studying the case of Latvian nationalism can have broader importance. Apart from suggesting that the most productive analysis of nationalism, to my mind, could proceed only on the basis of case studies, I also propose that Latvian nationalism shows a particularly interesting aspect of all nationalisms, but especially small and young nation nationalisms. Such nationalisms as the Latvian are cultural 'hybrids' containing and combining a variety of ideas and conceptions. I define 'nationalism' as a set of influential cultural and political ideas that privilege ethnic belonging over any other type of collective identity. In the process of its development, nationalism as an intellectual doctrine at the same time incorporates and resists ideas coming from a variety of sources, including those of their imperial oppressors.

### **Historical Background: Peasants and the Modernisation of the Baltic Provinces**

The nineteenth century in the history of Russian Empire and its provinces is often legitimately labelled 'the century of reforms'. The spread of Enlightenment's liberal ideas among both the Baltic German and Russian elites during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries preconditioned their growing interest in modernising and improving social and economic situation in Baltic provinces. After a prolonged political debate, in 1804 Alexander I signed the Livland Peasant Law, which marked the beginning of reform. It stipulated that peasants were no longer attached to their landlords, but instead to their general area of residence. The landlords no longer had rights to sell or buy peasants, while peasants were not allowed to leave the area of residence. This moderately liberal and egalitarian law created various categories within the peasant population. Some groups gained rights to own the land and settle their disputes with landlords in court, while others remained full serfs to the German nobility.

In terms of the motivation for these changes, the Tsar Alexander I was interested in presenting himself as an enlightened autocrat, while the Baltic German elites believed that emancipation of serfs could be to their benefit. The Imperial government hoped that the new reforms would resolve the growing three-way conflict in the Baltic provinces between Russian administration, landed German nobility and landless peasants. Therefore, as the reform process continued, by 1816–1819 serfdom was abolished throughout the Baltic provinces. Although the adopted laws with regard to freeing serfs were incredibly complicated and involved a very slow restructuring of social and political system, the results were undeniably significant. For example, by the early decades of the nineteenth century, most of the peasants were free persons able to protect their rights in local courts. However, the land was still the property of German landlords, which the freed peasants could use after signing contracts. This new documentation required a precise personal identification, which meant that the

freed serfs had to be assigned last names. This long process of name-giving served as one of the most important elements in creating distinctions between Latvians, Germans and Russians that would run deeper than those of class or order differences. Unfortunately, throughout the reform process, one of the main problems was the Russian administration's indecisiveness and attempts to please both the Baltic German landowning nobility and native peasantry. On the one hand, Russian administration was afraid that German nobility was going to demand more and more political power and influence, while, on the other hand, the Russian government and the Tsar did not want too much freedom for potentially dangerous rebels among the peasants, especially after the bloody upsurges of Polish farmers. Thus, the Imperial administration was caught between the need to retain control in the region and prevent violent conflicts.

During the mid-nineteenth century, the situation grew even more complicated. It became clear that the modernising reforms had created more social and economic contradictions in the Baltic provinces than they had managed to solve. The landowning nobility now were mainly interested in keeping and expanding their holdings; therefore, instead of renting the land to the native peasants, they just hired them as cheap agricultural labour. This caused widespread peasant unrest. Also, while some liberal Baltic German landowners wanted to create a class of smallholders out of the native peasantry, others grew increasingly dissatisfied with the continuing reforms chipping away at their properties. Nevertheless, the Russian administration was set on its plans of modernisation and required that the Baltic German landowners sell their land to the native peasantry.

Overall, the mid-nineteenth century was characterised by continuously new problems arising from the transformed social and economic structure. Among them were the growing debts of the new peasant landowners, increasing rural population and insufficient amounts of land for everyone resulting in the expansion of landless peasantry and enlarged migration to the cities. On the positive side, during the late nineteenth-century period some native peasants' capital grew, thus creating preconditions for the formation of a native rural middle class and, as Russian government opened its universities to the native peasants, the development of the native intelligentsia. This, I argue, was a crucial development for building a new, ethnic identity.

Although some of the new native Latvian activists during the 1860s and 1870s declared the peasants' intention of becoming Russified in the name of opposing the hated Baltic Germans, the late nineteenth-century Imperial administration perceived the Baltic peasant population and its demands as an increasing nuisance. The new conservative Tsar Alexander III deeply distrusted both Baltic Germans and native peasant populations. Therefore he adopted numerous centralising and homogenising policies in the name of transforming Russia's population into a culturally and ethnically unified nation. For example, all lower-level schools as well as teachers' seminaries were subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Education, which enforced Russian as the sole language of instruction. The University of Dorpat was reorganised

in order to increase the number of Russian faculty members and students. Also, the Russian government openly supported the missionary activities of the Orthodox Church and viewed conversion as one of the best way of Russian nation building (Rogger, 1983). Also, a variety of reforms in public administration forced the new Latvian intelligentsia (teachers and civil servants) to search for jobs in Russia, while Russian bureaucrats filled the positions in Latvia (Balodis, 1991, p. 146).

Nevertheless, as numerous historians point out (see, e.g., Plakans, 1985, p. 112; Berzins, 2000, pp. 462–469), these late nineteenth-century policies of so-called ‘Russification’ did not achieve their intended result. Instead, for example, the number of publications in Latvian rose and the genres of writing diversified. Moreover, the regulative policies heightened the anti-Russian sentiments among the new groups of native students and teachers. In Latvia as well as in Estonia and Lithuania, the force arising from the early modernising reforms and opportunities for social mobility could no longer be stopped.

### **The First Latvian Intellectuals: Discovering an Identity**

One of the most important results of the discussed reforms was the birth and rapid growth of the native Latvian intelligentsia during the nineteenth century. It formed not only in the newly created social, cultural and political context, but also using directly financial and political encouragement from the Russian Imperial administration. Moscow hoped to see the spread of pro-Russian sentiments among the educated peasants, who could then effectively oppose the cultural dominance of Germans and help to promote a pro-Russian identification among the elites and the population. However, the goals of the emerging Latvian intelligentsia ran into a conflict with these Imperial intentions. Latvian intellectuals, infatuated with both German Romantic nationalism and Slavophilism, became more interested in learning their own ethnic roots instead of identifying with the Imperial power.

The first group of active Latvian nationalists was about fifty young intellectuals—students, journalists, scientists, writers and poets—in the 1850s and 1860s. The roots of this intellectual movement were in Tartu (Dorpat) University, and expanded later to St Petersburg, Moscow and Riga. The main precondition for this movement was the newly developed possibility for the native rural populations to access Russian universities. Young men (the children of the slowly forming native rural and urban middle class) managed to take advantage of Russian government’s educational reforms and received excellent education and professional training. However, culturally the process of becoming educated at the time mainly meant being either Germanised or Russified. As descendents of native peasantry, these young men felt strong resentment toward the ruling aristocratic and landed classes of the Baltic Germans and refused to unquestionably accept the superiority of German cultural context. And the young native intellectuals did not become utterly dedicated allies of anti-German Russian bureaucrats and intelligentsia either.

What happened is that once the young, ambitious men had landed in the universities, their quasi-exile from their social context and immersion in dominant cultural requirements brought them together. As a group they discovered a need to find or create their own, distinct identity—that is, to ‘establish’ their ethnic origins. With this intention in mind, they organised regular meetings in which they discussed the past and future of Latvian peasants, and helped each other write and publish various national-oriented materials that were inspired by a search for a national culture, language and historical origins (Balodis, 1991, pp. 126–136). They came to be called the ‘Young Latvians’ first by the critical authors among the Baltic German elites and later by everybody else. The most influential Young Latvians were Krisjanis Valdemars, Juris Alunans, Atis Kronvalds, Fricis Brivzemieks and Krisjanis Barons.<sup>4</sup> The Young Latvians were what James Billington (1980, pp. 146–190) would call ‘national revolutionaries’, albeit without a political programme. Many of them were teachers working in either Moscow or St Petersburg, while others were officers in the Imperial army or worked as clerks in the Russian bureaucratic system. They had met as students and become involved in writing and publishing in the new Latvian-language newspapers and magazines such as *Majas Viesis* (*Guest to Your Home*) and *Peterburgas Avises* (*St Petersburg’s Gazette*). Most of them came from rural backgrounds and were the first ones in their families to have higher education. A few of the Young Latvians were rebels from educated families that expected their children to assimilate into either Baltic German or Russian cultural contexts. In order to understand their nationalist interests and aspirations, as noted earlier, I suggest that we consider two major forces: the young native intellectuals’ need for a separate and authentic identity, and exposure to Russian and German nationalist ideas in universities.<sup>5</sup>

As the young Latvian students worked hard on acquiring an education and absorbed diverse cultural influences, they could not help but feel that they were viewed as inferior and were even expected to feel ashamed of their social origins. They saw how their educators for the most part wanted the former peasants to renounce their roots and blend into either Russian or German cultural traditions. Contrary to these expectations, the young intellectuals’ efforts to rise above the social limitations set by social origins radicalised them. The conflict between who they felt they were expected to be and who they themselves wanted to be produced a deep and powerful desire for a reliable, yet unique identity. These young men found the solution in searching for and discovering the authentic cultural context embodied in the ‘lost’ culture of their peasant people.

The second source of the Young Latvians’ interest in national identity was their encounter with the boiling, intense and quite contradictory intellectual atmosphere of German Romanticism, Russian Slavophilism as well as the ideas of so-called ‘Westerners’ that characterised Russian universities at the time. These exciting and seemingly progressive philosophies actually showed to the young Latvian students how to look for one’s ‘nation,’ what elements can be used to define it and how to locate the sources for building one’s national identity. Latvian students learned from

other nationalisms that there were diverse nations with distinct cultures and that they were real, discernible entities. And this was the answer that they were looking for. Now they could excitedly pick up the tools provided by Slavophilism and nationalist romanticism and set out actively to create their own national belonging. This project promised not only an encouraging sense of identity for the Young Latvians, but also an uplifting feeling of historical and national mission. Equipped with such powerful motivations, this first group of nationalist intellectuals set out on their journey of inventing a nation.

Importantly though, although the Young Latvians were posing some threats to the domination of Baltic Germans as an alternative type of cultural elite, their programme was not explicitly political. As noted by researchers of modernisation processes in the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire, the nineteenth century was an important time for the transformation of the Baltic German cultural and social identities, too. For example, the so-called ‘newcomers’ among the Baltic German elites were more interested in the socioeconomic development of the Baltic provinces than preservation of the old systems of social stratification, and they had no problem identifying with the Russian state at large as opposed to the previous Baltic isolationist tendencies (Hirshauzena, 2001).

Nevertheless, the changing cultural and identity models among the Baltic Germans and Russian were not compatible with the complexities of the emerging Latvian identity, which among the new native intellectuals was primarily a cultural project. It was largely determined by this new intelligentsia’s attempts to assert their own rights to cultural importance rather than long-term political goals. This attitude even characterised the next generation of Latvian nationalist intellectuals as demonstrated by journalist Fridrihs Veinbergs (1844–1924), who not only believed that one of the main goals of nationalism for Latvians was to establish cultural equivalence to Baltic Germans, but who also wrote in 1885 that: ‘Latvians cannot play any large political role because their number is too small. Today and in the future Latvian political life is going to have a provincial character.’<sup>6</sup>

### **Early Latvian Nationalism and Its Legacy**

Thus, ideas about Latvia as a nation first formed not on the actual territory of Latvia, but in a somewhat exiled situation among students and teachers in Russia. As a result, from its early days, Latvian nationalist doctrine contained a certain sense of alienation, perception of a continuous threat and suspicion toward the existing power structure. During the nineteenth century, these sentiments found their expression in Latvian intellectuals’—the Young Latvians’—struggle for cultural egalitarianism. Their original conception of the Latvian nation was centred on asserting a unique and equally valuable (to Russian, but mainly Baltic German) Latvian cultural context. As noted earlier, no organised mass movement or mobilising political force developed from this early nationalism of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the growing political aspirations of certain parts of the native intelligentsia

found their expression not in nationalism, but in socialism and radical Marxism with its open, often violent opposition to imperialism and social stratification. In fact, the issue of national identity and interests became a source of seriously divisive conflicts among Latvian intellectuals at the turn of the century with the nationalists consistently remaining a minority.

Returning to the original conception of 'Latvianness', it needs to be asked: what was at the core of this supposedly recovered national culture as the Young Latvians developed it? Their project was focused on the native peasants as essential 'Latvian people' as opposed to ethnically diverse and even cosmopolitan city dwellers. The Young Latvians strongly believed that only the rural population truly embodied Latvian ethnos and thus the farmer lifestyle became identified as the 'organic' repository of the national essence. 'Latvians' were defined as those residing in the countryside and governed by German landowners and Russian Imperial administration. At the same time, it was clear that powerlessness and rural residence alone were not enough to establish a distinct ethnic group. Instead, this national core in the countryside had to be presented as an alternative cultural domain, which had existed and thrived outside Germanised and Russified urban life. Therefore the Young Latvians invested enormous efforts in making sure that the rural residents were viewed not just as a lower stratum, but also as a distinct cultural group practicing a unique tradition, which, in fact, the Young Latvians actively proceeded to create.

Consequently, the Young Latvians' nationalist efforts had a deep-seated ambiguity: on the one hand, they argued that the peasants embodied and practiced true Latvianness, which had to be presented to the rest of the world; on the other hand, these young intellectuals understood that the peasants themselves hardly were aware of having lived as a distinct ethnic group. Therefore, they had to be informed about this. In other words, the Young Latvians' project of creating a nation (by and for themselves) had two major thrusts—it had to, first, substantialise, and, second, disseminate the unique identity. This was meticulous work focused on giving form and content to the new Latvian culture and then teaching it to the peasant population. It is possible to say that it was completely up to the Young Latvians to decide which aspects of the rural lifestyle could now become sources of Latvian culture and which could not. The general guidelines for this project were provided by Slavophilism and German nationalism, but the Young Latvians themselves made all the main decisions about the content and nature of the new Latvianness. Russian and German nationalist philosophies suggested focusing on folk culture, history and language, and the Young Latvians enthusiastically took up the work to realise these recommendations.

Thus one of the first and most influential projects of the Young Latvians was to collect, classify and publish Latvian folk songs. Although already at the very beginning of the nineteenth century a number of Baltic German priests had engaged in collecting and publishing Latvian folk songs, they had concluded that Latvian folklore did not contain any promise of becoming an advanced cultural nation (Berzins, 2000, p. 308). The Young Latvians' interest in folklore was provoked by

these dismissive descriptions and fuelled by a desire to assert it as a respectable candidate for an ancient culture. Moreover, by studying Latvian folklore they attempted to join a cross-national and progressive intellectual movement, as an influential Young Latvian Krisjanis Valdemars explained it to his friend Frīcis Brīvēmeņiķis (1991, p. 109):

It would be very useful for those theoreticians [who reject the need to study folklore] to acquaint themselves with Europe's most progressive nations, let's say English, Swiss, the modern times' most progressive people—the Czechs. Everywhere they would see many and diverse ethnographic accounts being published, rich ethnographic museums being built by the aforementioned nations.

In other words, for Valdemars, researching and collecting folklore was one of the main tasks in making Latvians into a nation equivalent to other nations.

Following this initiative of Valdemars, some of the Young Latvians, such as Krisjanis Barons, turned the collection and study of Latvian folk songs into a lifelong work. After reviewing numerous ethnographic accounts of folklore done by German nationalists at the library of the Tartu University, Barons became convinced that folklore and folk songs in particular were the most important reflection of the unique soul or spirit of a people. Therefore he wrote that 'our folk songs have not been collected yet and many of them unfortunately have been already lost from people's mouths and forgotten, but someone who would not waste their mind and efforts, could still bring to light many valuable songs and stories' (*Majas Viesis*, 7, 8, 1857). He was driven by a romantic nationalist idea that every nation represents an original contribution to the cultural diversity of the world of nations and the fear that by losing these cultural values, the whole of humanity would be culturally poorer. Cultural egalitarianism and the idea of the value of difference were among the most important motivations for the Young Latvians' focus on studying folklore. Later Barons (1894) also became convinced that the four-line folk songs were not only a representation of Latvian cultural uniqueness, but could serve as a productive basis for the native literary, linguistic, religious and even scientific tradition if preserved in some scientific manner and made available to the Latvian public. So he set out to create a classification of the folk songs in a manner that would reflect not only the peasant social system and life course, but also reconstruct the complete Latvian worldview. He claimed that folk songs contained a distinct form of national philosophy and religion, which entitled Latvians to a respectable place among other cultural nations: 'When we uncover the true and healthy core of our folk songs, we see in them the best idealist efforts of the human spirit, the deepest, most beautiful and virtuous emotions of the human heart and soul, which do not age with time' (Barons, 1894, p. 28).

Next, following both Russian and German nationalist examples, the Young Latvians worked on developing the Latvian language (Institute of Literature, Folklore and Art of the University of Latvia, 1998, pp. 118–136). Among the first examples of their linguistic efforts was a small compilation called 'Little Songs' ('Dziesmiņas')

published in 1856 by a poet, philologist and journalist Juris Alunans. It contained translations of poetry from other cultures into Latvian with a specific purpose: to demonstrate how beautiful, independent and flexible was the Latvian language. In 1858 (*Majas Viesis*, 19, 1858), he published a grammatical article entitled 'Latvian Language', where he vehemently argued that language had an enormous power and its development would ensure the future of the nation itself. In the spirit of German Romanticism, Alunans asserted that without language there is no nation, and thus the Latvian language needed to be revived and purified of all German and Russian borrowings (Cakars et al., 1990, pp. 242–243). He believed that neither Latvians nor their language would vanish; instead it had the potential of developing its own literature and journalism.

At the same time, such Latvian intellectuals as Alunans admitted that Latvian was clumsy and unable to adapt to socio-economic and cultural changes, and advanced philosophical and scientific ideas. Therefore they continuously worked on inventing new words and developing terminologies. Alunans himself regularly published about correct usage or grammar in such articles as 'A Short Guide to How the Names of the Peoples Have to be Written in Latvian' (*Majas Viesis*, 20, 1857) or 'About the Making of New Words in Latvian Language' (*Majas Viesis*, 25, 1857). Another Young Latvian, Kaspars Biezbardis, even attempted to describe the philosophical ideas of Kant and Hegel in a way that could be accessible to the peasant readership. In 1869, he published a book entitled *Our Language and Its Orthography* arguing that Latvians must reject the writing rules imposed by German and instead create their own writing system. The long-term goal of such interest in language was to make it suitable for national education and teaching on how to be a member of a distinct national group with its own culture and consciousness (Buceniece, 1995, pp. 378–380, 383–384, 406–410, 446).

Another crucial element in creating the new Latvian culture was uncovering, or rather inventing, Latvian history. For example, Juris Alunans published articles suggesting that if only the Germans had not enslaved Latvians for centuries, Latvian civilisation would have been equivalent to that of Ancient Greece (Cakars et al., 1990, p. 241). He also wrote numerous idealised visions about the glorious past of the heroic Latvian heroes. Similarly, F. Malbergs in an article entitled 'Briefly on How Latvians Originated and How They Lived in the Past' (*Majas Viesis*, 20, 1856) attempted to present a coherent narrative about the historical emergence of Latvians as a people. Kaspars Biezbardis tried to locate the historical origins of Latvians using Herodotus (*Majas Viesis*, 10, 1860), while Krisjanis Valdemars encouraged the documentation of contemporary history and promoted writing a chronicle of Latvian life in the nineteenth century (Cakars et al., 1990, pp. 232–233). Later, Andrejs Pumpurs, a well-educated retired officer of the Russian Army, compiled folk tales, legends and some historical documents into the Latvian epic *Lačplesis* (*Bear Fighter*) about a folk hero fighting against German and various generic intruders. The template for this work was borrowed from similar German or Finnish national epics. Essentially, it was a compilation of myths and a lyric story that proved useful in a

variety of political, educational, literary and artistic contexts as a 'testimony' or even 'historical truth' about Latvians' history, heroes and identity.

Overall, in their historical pursuits the Young Latvians attempted to show that Latvians as a population had a unique tradition even though they did not have a unifying state. Also, the Young Latvians' idea of national history developed in a stark contrast to the Baltic Germans' simultaneous attempts to create an historical narrative that was personal and based on the idea of the preservation of a continuous tradition. For the new Latvian nationalists, the motivation was exactly the opposite. To them, invention of a national history basically meant the rejection of personal history of oppression; therefore the Young Latvians constructed an invented narrative about the glorious and harmonious life of the Latvian tribes prior to the invasion of the German crusaders (Hirshauzena, 2001, p. 15). Using Bernard Lewis' (1975) concepts about the political uses of history, it is possible to say that the Young Latvians, first, tried to 'remember' certain aspects of the peasant history and make it relevant to the purposes of arguing that the rural population was an ethnic group (which is similar to the ways both Persians and Israelis 'remembered' specific parts of their history to serve the nationalist needs of their states). And, second, they literally invented historical narratives in order to separate Latvians out from the history of these two as well as other nations. Similarly to other myths of the Golden Age of equality and even tribal democracy that had been used from British to Turkish and Arab nationalisms, the Young Latvians fabricated a story of the glorious Latvian people and thus re-wrote history according to the interests of their present needs.

After the initial work on the cultural project of the nation was well under way, the Young Latvians and other inspired enthusiasts focused on taking advantage of Russian liberal attitude toward minority education at the time. Most of them worked as teachers, setting up schools in remote rural areas, travelling around Latvian farms and teaching children, as well as publishing newspapers and magazines for peasants about agriculture, natural sciences, history and literature. These nationalist-oriented teachers continuously fought with Russian bureaucracy to increase the number of schools, to institute teaching in Latvian and even establish local universities, even under the difficult conditions of Russification. They also organised various educational events such as lectures, book readings and discussions with the purpose of 'training' the national consciousness and disseminating it among the educated circles. However, it has to be noted again that the main purpose of these efforts was not the building of some definite political consciousness. This national education was supposed to convince the peasant population that was it possible for them to be educated and highly cultured as Latvians, not mere Germanised former peasants.

However, the intellectual movement of the Young Latvians was not as homogeneous and harmonious as it may seem. It had to deal with numerous complications among which the most difficult one was the conflict between two views with regard to such fundamental issues as the meaning and future of Latvians as a nation. Krisjanis Valdemars and his followers emphasised that their goal was to liberate the peasants through individual self-improvement, material and economic success, rather than

folkist focus on national spirit and language. He was a universalist, who believed that full integration into a Russian Imperial identity would be very advantageous to Latvians. He particularly emphasised the need of economic and educational advancement for Latvians. The other and much bigger group of the Young Latvians was infatuated with the creation of a solely cultural, linguistic and historical tradition of Latvian ethnicity. This folkist approach was more appealing to those young intellectuals who dreamt of an idealist and egalitarian world consisting of unique national peoples. They also realised that their importance as intellectuals would be much deeper in a cultural, rather than materialistic, society. The folkist view of the future seemed more exciting to the majority of the new nationalist intellectuals, and consequently the cultural perspective prevailed over the economic program of Valdemars.

Overall, due to their passionate interest in national culture as opposed to an economic and political programme, the Young Latvians' activities did not produce a well-articulated ideology. They were mainly interested in re-interpreting the deep-seated conflicts between the peasants and Baltic German landowners. While the more conservative-oriented parts of the Baltic German elite believed in preserving the existing system of social order, the Young Latvians argued that dissimilarities between the peasants and Baltic German landowners were essentially ethnic and cultural. Thus contrary to, for example, the development of Ukrainian nationalism (see, e.g., Pritsak, 1985), Latvian nationalism did not proceed along the path of making itself political, but fully invested itself in developing a philosophy of Latvian cultural equivalence.

Even later, due to a variety of complications (such as most nationalists living in exile after the failing Revolution of 1905), the nationalist ideas found no substantial realisation in any movement or organisation in the territory of Latvia itself (Page, 1970, pp. 66–67; Kreslins, 2000, p. 59). Instead, most of the political aspirations of the new Latvian intelligentsia turned to socialism. Feeling increasingly marginalised by the Russified educational and administrative systems, the young native intellectuals became interested in socialist revolutionary ideas and eventually established the Social Democratic Party, which was the first ever well-organised Latvian political force (Raun, 2000). At the turn of the century, some of these socialists tried to create a conception of a combined national and social revolution. Their inspiration was Otto Bauer and other Austrian socialists' ideas, as well as the model of Swiss federation (Germanis, 1992). As a result, the Social Democratic Party split into two groups that were strongly opposed on the issue of Latvian national autonomy. Notably, these ideological conflicts took place only among exiles and political refugees, and the nationalist ideas remained marginal (Kreslins, 2000, pp. 59–60; Page, 1970, p. 65). Meanwhile, the nationalist-oriented activism in Latvia was still focused on education, journalism and art as it had been started by the earlier tradition of the Young Latvians. Latvian Marxists insisted that national autonomy was a waste of time (Raun, 2000, p. 128) and nationalist-oriented intellectuals also believed that political independence was unfeasible and focused on advocating cultural difference.

In sum, due to the inherited primarily cultural orientation of early Latvian nationalism, the next generations of Latvian nationalists found it impossible and even inappropriate to assert political demands such as national autonomy or independence. Consequently, they remained infatuated with the cultural and mythic side of a nation almost all the way up to the First World War. Teaching Latvian identity and collecting the national culture left them uninterested in a more political meaning of Latvianness.

### **Borrowing and Resisting: Influences of Russian and German Nationalisms**

Adopting Mark Beissinger's (2002, p. 12) concept of 'nationalist tides', I suggest that Latvian nationalist ideas definitely were preconditioned by the spread of nationalist philosophies in Russian and German intellectual circles. Beissinger makes a powerful argument that nationalist movements and ideas never exist in isolation, but spread across borders influencing and provoking each other. The case of early Latvian nationalism shows that the 'nationalist tide' can disseminate not only among minority groups, but also from the dominant to oppressed nations. As the tide of nationalism through Germany reached Russia and its universities, it provoked an upheaval of claims of cultural uniqueness among the minorities. Later, as the minorities (such as Poles, Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians) started to voice their claims for cultural difference, Russian nationalism 'backlashed' and strengthened itself through Russian messianism and pan-slavism. Russian Slavophilism, in combination with German nationalism, served as one of the most valuable resources helping the early Latvian intellectuals to envision the concept of a unique ethnic group and culture. These two nationalisms represented impressive examples of what had to be done and how in order to create a national identity. Latvian intellectuals carefully studied and replicated the practices and strategies of the two other nationalisms—albeit with a goal not only to adopt, but also to resist.

First, it has to be noted that it was Baltic Germans, especially their educated elite, who made the earliest assertions of Latvian difference. They feared that their newly educated former serfs could try to assimilate and corrupt the Baltic German culture as well as create an economic and cultural competition. So, already in 1829, some Protestant German priests asked Latvian peasants 'Why aren't you satisfied with the fact that God has given you life among Latvians?' (Berzins, 2000, p. 407). They pointed out important differences between Latvians and Germans and encouraged Latvians to appreciate and maintain their identity. Their intention, of course, was to preserve the old power balance. However, their plan backfired. The Young Latvians picked up on this idea of crucial differences between Germans and Latvians in order to assert cultural equivalence to Germans as well as Russians. The young Latvian intelligentsia, who had a hard time finding acceptance in Russian and German cultural, economic and political elites, presented themselves as members of an alternative, yet equally respectable culture. By creating their nation, they intended to enter intellectual and cultural contexts that formerly were beyond their reach. Thus,

they took advantage of the philosophical and ideological tools of German and Russian nationalisms that had intended to suppress or assimilate them.

Concretely, the Young Latvians were greatly influenced by the ideas of German Romantic nationalists, who defined the nation by a common language and history, thus a unique culture that could be found only among the common people.<sup>7</sup> To German Romantics, 'true national spirit' and 'authentic roots' assumed the place of religion (Stackelberg, 1981, pp. 3–5, 156–157), which appealed to increasingly secularised German society.<sup>8</sup> Romantic nationalists also canonised an idea that national spirit, identity and collective authenticity should replace the notions of political and civil rights as a lasting element of German nationalism (see, e.g., Herf, 1984; Mosse, 1964; Glaser, 1978; Gregor, 1968). During their student years at the Tartu University, many of the Young Latvians encountered and were fascinated by these ideas, especially Fichte's *Speeches to the German Nation*. For example, the writings of a well-known teacher and the Young Latvian Atis Kronvalds continuously echoed Fichte's thoughts on nation. Kronvalds directly borrowed Fichte's concept of one's love for fatherland as a crucial element of national consciousness and adopted Fichte's definition of nation as a spiritual wholeness and idealist achievement, thus emphasising the romantic type of action. He also translated and published passages from Fichte's work commenting on its usefulness for Latvian purposes (Berzins, 2000, p. 409). Kronvalds and other Young Latvians were not interested in the Romantic nationalist emphasis on German superiority, but they highly valued Romantics' enthusiasm about cultural nation-building. Therefore Krisjanis Valdemars asserted that it was the Germans who taught other, smaller nations to respect their own ethnic origins (Berzins, 2000, p. 410).

While defining the nation on the basis of its consciousness, language, history and folklore, the Young Latvians also found it all residing among the rural population. This interest in peasants was, if not determined, then at least greatly influenced by Russian Slavophilism, which itself in fact could not have developed without the influx of German Romantic nationalist ideas into Russian universities (see Kohn, 1955; Hosking & Service, 1998; Schapiro, 1967; Raeff, 1994; Rogger, 1983; Riasanovsky, 1965, 1976; Zenkovsky, 1953). Slavophiles used Romantic nationalists' obsessive concentration on 'the people' to express their impatient and guilt-driven desire for an authentic identity and community and a wish to oppose the dominant conceptions of the great imperial power and autocracy. Thus Slavophilism proposed to build a perfect society, which would be characterised by Russian national simplicity, harmony and homogeneity as opposed to the modern Western class divisions and democracy. It would be held together not by legal regulations and responsibilities, but bonds of love and Orthodox faith. Slavophiles suggested that the model of this society could be found in the pre-Petrine village and the unspoiled wisdom of its inhabitant – *muzhik* (Kohn, 1955, pp. 15–16). By searching for the authentic and inherently noble qualities of the Russian folk, Slavophiles (among them Tolstoy, Dostoevskii and Tjutchev) originated and promoted the Russian version of the 'cult of people' among the gentry and educated circles (see Christoff, 1961, 1972; Cherniavsky, 1969; Knight, 2000;

Billington, 1958). On its basis, intellectuals engaged in political arguments against serfdom and asserted that the Russian people are different from Germans and other Western nations, and therefore cannot be governed by them. Finally, Slavophiles made a powerful argument that the rural population is not just a social stratum, but also a unique and distinct form of identity crucial to building ethnic collective.

The Young Latvians, who encountered Slavophile ideas while working and living in Moscow and St Petersburg, used them to argue not only for the liberation of the serfs in Baltic provinces, but also to claim that the rural population of Baltic provinces represents a unique, non-German culture and lifestyle. This brought the Young Latvians and Slavophiles together and many of the Young Latvians were personally friendly with Slavophiles, published in Slavophile publications and used Slavophiles and their political influence to limit the power of the Baltic Germans.<sup>9</sup> The Young Latvians also directly applied Slavophile arguments about the search for the authentic pre-German and rural society to their particularly Latvian national project. Moreover, Slavophilism helped the new Latvian intelligentsia to deal with another form of Russian nationalism—namely, the conception of ‘Official Nationality’, which centred on the Imperial state, the autocracy and Orthodoxy. It defined Russianness mainly by one’s belonging to the harmonious and unified Empire and autocracy, not ethnicity (Weeks, 1996). Slavophilism opposed this Imperial nationalism and emphasised the *ethnic* uniqueness of Russian village as a basis of Russian nationalism. This was helpful to Latvian intellectuals, who then could argue legitimately that Baltic peasants were also too unique to be assimilated into Imperial statehood.

Additionally, as the Young Latvians worked on building an image of a new Latvian they included opposition to the urban cosmopolitan businessmen as well as Baltic German landowners and priests, who were serious enemies of the nation in the eyes of Slavophiles and other Russian nationalists, too. Moreover, borrowing from the Slavophile encouragement to distrust everything Western and German, Latvian intellectuals produced numerous critiques of German aristocrats by making fun of both Germans and Latvians imitating German mannerisms. Many early Latvian nationalists (e.g., Krisjanis Valdemars and later Fridrihs Veinbergs) believed that close connections with the Slavophile-oriented Russian nationalists could be the only sure way to limit and eventually liquidate the power of privileged classes of Baltic Germans (Hirshauzena, 2001, p. 15).

Overall, on the one hand, the Young Latvians studied and used romantic nationalism to search for Latvian consciousness in order to oppose German cultural dominance. On the other hand, the Young Latvians employed Slavophile ideas of the primacy of the simple people and tried to offer Latvians as Russian allies in their struggle against Germans. Unsurprisingly, as the Young Latvians’ tried to take advantage of the nationalist doctrines of the dominant nations, they ran into a number of difficulties. Although they strongly believed that German rule had been devastating to the Latvian ethnic group, at the same time they could not deny the positive effect of the German intelligentsia and its ideas. Many of the Young Latvians were not only influenced by the German Romantic ideas, but also directly benefited

from the Baltic German patronage. As much as the Young Latvians were longing to break away from the hegemony of German culture and nationalism, they could not create their new nation without it and it deeply bothered them.

Furthermore, at the time, social mobility and individual success in the Russian Empire still meant rejecting one's peasant language and habits. Slavophiles themselves accepted such Young Latvians as Krisjanis Valdemars only so long as he advocated Latvian liberation from German control and full incorporation into the Russian nationality. Moreover, during the late nineteenth century, Russian messianism and pan-Slavism started to flourish. As it combined Russian Imperial nationalism with Slavophile folk orientation, it claimed that in the face of Europe's decline, Russia would provide the moral assistance to all Slavic nations and the whole world. Moreover, according to Russian pan-Slavists, Russia had never conquered other nations as opposed to Western conquests. Its expansion has been either self-sacrificing acts of saving 'brothers who are blood of our blood and heart of our heart',<sup>10</sup> or voluntary decisions of other nations, governments and territories to join the great Empire. Pan-Slavists did not hesitate to support the repression of the Polish minority believing that any conflicts between the Slavs must be solved according to Russia's interests (see Tuminez, 2000; Steinwald, 2000; Kohn, 1953; Miljokovic-Djuric, 1994). This turn of events in Russian nationalism, of course, was hardly helpful to Latvian nationalist intellectuals, who felt disappointed and betrayed. In fact, often the stagnation of Latvian nationalism in the late nineteenth century gets blamed on the unfulfilled hopes that the Young Latvians had in their association with Slavophiles (see, e.g., Germanis, 1992, p. 10).

In general, there were three different 'front-lines' on which the new Latvian identity had to be asserted. First, educated Latvians had to *invent their own independent sense of belonging* in which they negotiated complicated relations between anti-Germanism, German nationalist influences, suspicion toward Russian Imperial administration and certain pro-Russian sentiments. Second, Latvianness as a group identity truly did not exist before, so the Young Latvians had to *popularise and make it relevant* to the growing educated circles, rural and urban bourgeoisie as well as the peasants themselves. Third, the Young Latvians also had to *show the Russian public* that there was in fact a unique cultural resource residing among the rural population of the Empire's periphery. The Young Latvians often served as mediators between the native Latvia population and Moscow's educated elites by, for example, writing in Russian newspapers about the conditions of the rural populations and then writing in Latvian newspapers about cultural and social life in Moscow. As the Young Latvians were trying to 'sell' the idea of native cultures to the Moscow's public, they were balancing on a thin line between being perceived as allies in opposing the Baltic German dominance or a 'problem group' resisting assimilation to the Russian cultural context.

## Conclusion

Apart from the dramatic social and economic transformations, a fundamental intellectual precondition to the formation of Latvian nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century was the spread of German nationalism, Slavophilism and Russian nationalist campaigns for creating a homogeneous nation. In order to counter the dominance of German landowning classes in the Baltic provinces, Russian-educated elites and the Imperial administration attempted to create a new intelligentsia from the rural population. These intellectuals would come from the native inhabitants of the Baltic provinces, receive education in Russian universities, study in Russian, become Russified and eventually disseminate Russian identity among the peasants. They were intended to homogenise the dissimilarities and conflicts among the diverse local peoples and help the Russian Empire rid itself of the Baltic German influence.

However, the emerging intelligentsias absorbed, re-interpreted and resisted *both* German and Russian nationalist doctrines. Once these potential intellectuals had been educated in the new nationalist fashion, they refused to serve as tools of 'Russification'. Instead, they desired to become members of the world's intellectual elites by originating their own ethnic identity. While Russian nationalists expected educated Latvians to become Russified and Baltic Germans could not make up their minds whether to welcome or reject the newly educated former serfs, Latvian intellectuals demanded cultural respect for themselves and for their social origins. However, their ideas did not form a political ideology.

The native intelligentsia's nationalism was egalitarian, but this was cultural, not political, egalitarianism. Latvian nationalist intellectuals of the nineteenth century almost completely focused on creating ethnic consciousness, culture (folklore, language and history) and education in national language. Thus, the Latvian case provides support for Anthony Smith's ideas about the importance of nationalisms' cultural content. I argue that it was particularly typical of nationalisms of new and small European nations. At the same time, such nationalisms as the Latvian one developed in close relation to Russia's modernisation, which supports modernist claims about nationalisms' origins. In other words, a combination of modernist and pre-modernist approaches to the emergence of nationalism is required to account for the development of such nationalisms as Latvian. In order to understand them, the existing theories have to approach such nationalisms not only as political or economic, but also uniquely cultural, elements of modernity.

## Notes

- [1] See, e.g., the descriptions of Latvian nationalism in Lieven (1993).
- [2] By emphasising the importance of culture in nationalism's building of collective identity, this research will contribute to what has been called 'the third wave' of historical-comparative work on nations (see Spillman & Faeges, 2003).
- [3] With the exceptions of the classical work by Hroch (1985) and the excellent recent publications by Brubaker (1996) and Beissinger (2002).

- [4] Krisjanis Valdemars (1825–1891) was one of the most educated Latvians and founder of the first group of Latvian students at Tartu (Dorpat) University. Although he studied business, he was very knowledgeable in philosophy, politics and economics. He always insisted on approaching the issues of Latvian identity within the context of broader European historical development. He wanted to convince the Russian elites that the fate of Latvians was a problem concerning the whole of Russia. As a journalist, he founded the newspaper *Peterburgas Avizes* and regularly published on the issues of agriculture, navigation and education. Valdemars worked as a clerk in the Financial Ministry in St Petersburg and used his connections to lobby liberal reforms in Baltic provinces. Juris Alunans (1832–1864) rebelled against his parents' intentions to make him into an educated German and instead joined the Young Latvians. He also studied business and public policy at Tartu University and, under the influence of Valdemars, became a journalist and poet. He actively studied Latvian history, invented new words and hoped to write a Latvian encyclopedia. Unfortunately, he died early and his projects were left unfinished. Krisjanis Barons (1835–1923), on the other hand, lived a long and productive life. He also was a student at Tartu University, where he met Valdemars and was invited to work at the *Peterburgas Avizes*. He wrote on a wide range of issues such as Darwin's theories, steam machines, ethnic relations among European nations, hygiene and agriculture. When he worked as a teacher in Moscow, he met another aspiring Young Latvian, Fricis Brivzemnieks (1846–1907), who offered Barons the opportunity to collect and systematise folk songs. Brivzemnieks also was a teacher, but thought of himself as an anthropologist and ethnographer. He also wrote poetry, thus contributing greatly to the establishment of the Latvian literary tradition. Atis Kronvalds (1837–1875) was another teacher, who believed that a unified nation could develop only if Latvians were educated. He vehemently demanded an increase in instruction in Latvian and became a founder of Latvian pedagogical tradition. He actively published on a variety of scientific topics for Latvian peasant audiences.
- [5] Some historians have suggested the third motivating force—namely, the desire to reject and put to shame an earlier tendency of the few educated Latvians to deny their social origins by accepting German lifestyle and culture (see, e.g., Kreslins, 2000). My belief that this need *not to be* like the educated Latvians in the past was mainly determined by the two other motivations I am suggesting here: the search for an authentic identity and nationalist philosophies picked up at the universities.
- [6] Quoted in Hirshauzena (2001, p. 15), translation from Latvian is mine.
- [7] On German Romantic nationalism, see Stackelberg (1981); Morris (1982); Levinger (2000); Vondung (2000).
- [8] See the discussion of relations between nationalism, civic freedom and political representation in German and Prussian nationalism in Levinger (2000, pp. 73–93, 158–159, 229–230).
- [9] In terms of practical goals, the Young Latvians propagated having close relations with the Imperial and Russian nationalist bureaucracy. They thought that by using Russia's under-government, institutional confusion, corruption, arbitrariness and lack of system it would be possible to fulfill certain interests of the native populations (see, e.g., Svabe, 1991, pp. 276–277; Velychenko, 2000).
- [10] Khomiakov, quoted in Kohn (1955, p. 110).

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