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# THE BALTIC QUESTION IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS, 1949–90

## Kristina Spohr Readman

While previous research by international lawyers has emphasized Bonn's value-neutral *legalistic* approach to the Baltic question from 1949 to 1990, this article – based on documents from the German Foreign Ministry archives – shows that the West Germans saw the Baltic issue as a *political* problem that interfered with their highest national aim: German unification. It addresses the following questions: first, why Bonn never made an official announcement of, and never publicly gave a justification for, its stance on the Baltic question; and second, why Bonn granted Baltic refugees the same rights that it offered other *Heimat*-less foreigners, whereas the remnants of Baltic diplomatic services or self-proclaimed exile governments found no official recognition in Germany. Finally, it comments on the role of the so-called German Balts in West German politics, and in Bonn's Baltic policies specifically.

**Keywords:** German Balts; Baltic exiles (refugee displaced persons); West Germany; non-recognition policy; expellees; German question: Baltic States

This article investigates the nature of West Germany's Baltic policies between 1949 and 1990. While there exists some scholarly literature in the field of international law (Meissner 1952, 1956; Hough 1985; Mälksoo 2003), historical research on Bonn and the Baltic question, with the exception of Boris Meissner's work, is non-existent (Meissner 1995).<sup>1</sup> It is crucial to understand that Bonn's stance towards the Baltic question cannot be examined in isolation from the 'German question', which deeply affected the Federal Republic's very being and hence all her political choices at home and *vis-à-vis* the world. Internationally, the German question stood at the heart of the Cold War in Europe. The divided country with its divided former capital Berlin epitomized the division of Europe and the world into East and West. Germans – like Baltic peoples – suffered from unresolved legal issues in the wake of the

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Second World War. Germany faced the issues of reunification, and an un-concluded peace treaty. For the Baltic peoples (inside the USSR and outside) it was a case of national survival after the Soviet Union's annexation of the territories of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. Both groups – Germans and Balts – could couch their claims in the language of the UN Charter and later the Helsinki Final Act, in which reference was made to the people's right to self-determination and the peaceful change of borders. Based on the significance of international law and universal normative values in Western policy with regard to the German and Baltic problems, it is not surprising that in line with its Western allies, Bonn also never recognized *de jure* the Baltic states' incorporation into the USSR.

Yet juridical language, policies founded on international law, and the 'German question' were not all that shaped Bonn's approach to the Baltics. The moral and political legacy of the 1939 Hitler–Stalin Pact also deeply influenced the Federal authorities' thinking. As 'Germans', this Pact had made them complicit with the Soviet Union, and thus they were tied through guilt and moral responsibility to the fate that Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians suffered with the disappearance of their countries from the European map. At the same time there was another more positive historical link between Germany and the Baltic nations: the long tradition of close cultural, economic and political ties which had flourished due to the existence of a German nobility and bourgeoisie in the Baltic region. These German ties made Bonn look at the Baltic problem through a different lens, not least because following the wartime as well as post-war 'population transfers' German Baltic refugees/re-settlers formed a tightly knit and vocal community in West Germany which actively sought to preserve its identity and to keep the memory and awareness of the fate and history of its Baltic homeland alive. Furthermore, apart from their activities in support of other expellee groups in the *Bund der Vertriebenen*, German Balts – by occupying important positions in the West German Foreign Ministry – were not exactly without influence in West German foreign (and domestic) politics.

With reference to both domestic and international developments during the Cold War, this article examines why the Bonn government abstained from any official and explicit announcement of its non-recognition policy throughout the Cold War; how Baltic refugees, their organizations and their concerns were treated in West Germany; and how Bonn's relationship with Moscow, East Berlin, and the Eastern Bloc more generally affected its Baltic policies between 1949 and 1990.

## West Germany's Legal Position on Baltic Annexation

After the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949, the Bonn government did not make any official statements – either on a domestic or an international platform – regarding its policy towards the Baltic states. In fact, it was only in responses to individual court cases and queries on the recognition of Baltic citizenship and the validity of Baltic passports during the early 1950s that Bonn made clear its *de jure* non-recognition of the Soviet annexation.<sup>2</sup> Not until spring 1954 did officials of the *Auswärtige Amt* (AA) define Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in their internal papers as subjects of international law and their situation as a

Soviet *occupatio bellica*.<sup>3</sup> It was specified that despite West Germany's partial identity with the *Reich* – as *Fortsetzer des Rechtsobjekts Deutschland*<sup>4</sup> – which pointed to Germany's historical complicity in the Baltic states' loss of independence (the Hitler–Stalin Pact 1939), a *de jure* recognition by Bonn could not be deduced, because the Nazi–Soviet border treaty of 10 January 1941 (which would have implied such recognition) had never been ratified. Consequently, from the perspective of the German juridical system, territorial sovereignty, citizenship and right of ownership of the Baltic states and their citizens continued to exist until a definitive *de jure* regulation was recognized by Germany.<sup>5</sup>

For the AA – officially reinstated on 15 March 1951 and headed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer until 6 June 1955 – the new Federal Republic's position of non-recognition was inextricably linked to the practice of the Western occupying powers during 1945–49. Each zone acted according to the laws of the relevant Allied occupying power. In the case of the Western zones this meant the United States, Britain and France, none of which had recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. For instance, the authorities of the Western powers respected the continuity of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian citizenship, a stance that was reflected in German court decisions in the Western zones. By contrast, the courts in the Soviet zone insisted on treating Baltic citizens as Soviet citizens – as dictated by Moscow.<sup>6</sup>

The influence of the Western victor powers' rule in their respective German zones after 1945 certainly highlighted the semi-sovereign character of the Adenauer government during its early years. This may explain why West Germany's position regarding the Baltics crystallized through individual responses to individual cases in individual zones. It was only in September 1952 that an official document was issued to *Länder* Interior Ministries and German diplomatic and consular representations abroad recognizing the continued citizenship of Baltic nationals and the continued validity of Baltic passports. This circular – which was intended to facilitate the creation of a harmonized administrative practice within West Germany – laid out Bonn's position of *de jure* non-recognition of the Baltic states; it recipients, however, were urged not to publicize its content.<sup>7</sup>

The refusal to make any officially binding public statements on non-recognition (Vitas 1990; McHugh & Pacy 2001) and a guarded approach to the question of opening Baltic diplomatic missions<sup>8</sup> meant that the Federal Republic appeared much more reserved on Baltic issues than other Western powers. But then, given the unresolved German problem, Bonn's political position was rather precarious in these early Cold War years.

### The Issue of Official German–Baltic Relations, 1950–54

From late 1950 – when the Allied High Commission allowed Bonn to begin restoring diplomatic relations with the world – Baltic representatives, who were either members of their countries' interwar diplomatic services or from exile/refugee organizations, pushed constantly for the establishment of official or semi-official relations with the Federal government.<sup>9</sup> At bottom, the intention of these representatives was to ensure that the interests of Baltic citizens – who had arrived

in West Germany as refugees and were categorized as so-called *heimatlose Flüchtlinge* (displaced persons or DPs)<sup>10</sup> – were well looked after and that assistance could be given on issues related to their social welfare and legal status. Most importantly, however, they wanted to gain approval for the setting up of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian diplomatic representations in Bonn.<sup>11</sup> Enquiries by Baltic individuals and by existing Baltic diplomatic missions abroad were either lodged directly with the Federal authorities or made to those of the Western occupying powers.

While West German officials initially underlined the need to obtain Allied approval for any decision taken, the Allied administration indicated that the issues raised by the Balts should be addressed by the Germans themselves, as they saw these matters as lying within the Federal Republic's own political domain. Indeed, despite their overarching Allied rights, the Western victor powers did not consider it appropriate to exert executive control over a specific direction of Germany's Baltic policies – a sign of how foreign political sovereignty and responsibility was gradually shifting from the Allied High Commission to the Bonn government.<sup>12</sup>

This shift in responsibilities became particularly visible during talks between representatives of the US High Commission and the AA in 1951–52 regarding a request by the Baltic missions in Washington to allow Baltic diplomatic representation in Bonn. While the State Department did not consider this request 'inappropriate',<sup>13</sup> it exerted no pressure on Bonn, especially when the West Germans appeared hesitant. This hesitancy can be explained by the fact that the Baltic states lacked exile governments of similar legitimacy and authority to the Polish one, as well as the tensions that existed between different Baltic émigré groups within each national community. The continued presence of Baltic diplomats and missions in Washington, London and elsewhere further obscured the issue of who could and/or should be treated as the legitimate representative of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.<sup>14</sup> The problem, as Bonn saw it, was that at an institutional level, representatives of the old Baltic diplomatic corps were embroiled in a battle of authority with the committees and councils of the many exile groups.<sup>15</sup>

These practical difficulties combined with considerations of *Deutschlandpolitik* to leave the question of Baltic diplomatic missions hanging in the balance during the winter of 1952.<sup>16</sup> From the point of view of German officials, the main priority was the signing of the *Generalvertrag* (or *Deutschlandvertrag*) between the Federal Republic and the Western Allies, a treaty intended to end West Germany's occupation status.<sup>17</sup> Bonn's standpoint remained unchanged for more than a year,<sup>18</sup> at which point it was decided that in practice the accreditation of permanent Baltic representatives as diplomats to the Federal government was out of the question. This was despite no final decision having been reached on the form of Baltic representations and the nature of German–Baltic relations.<sup>19</sup>

Nor was Bonn prepared to grant any juridical recognition to official or semi-official intermediary agents of exile groups. Only if representation was totally unofficial and concerned solely with the social and economic concerns of Baltic nationals were contacts deemed acceptable. It was emphasized that no Baltic representative who came to speak to German ministerial officials was to be privileged over another and that all should be treated as private persons. Indeed, the hope was that intra-Baltic tensions regarding the authority and legitimacy of different

organizations and representatives would resolve themselves and would not be played out in front of the AA.<sup>20</sup>

Such tensions were particularly acute between the Lithuanian *Oberstes Komitee zur Befreiung Litauens* (VLIK) and the remnants of interwar Lithuania's diplomatic corps, headed by former diplomat Stasys Lozoraitis (Snr.), who was based in Rome. These competed fiercely for recognition as the official Lithuanian representative in Germany.<sup>21</sup> Founded in 1944 in Lithuania, VLIK had moved to Pfullingen in Germany in 1945. Particularly assertive in its approach, it incorporated representatives of most Lithuanian parties and resistance groups, and claimed to act as a parliament.<sup>22</sup> On this basis it considered itself the official successor organ representing the Lithuanian government. Having first sought Bonn's affirmation of its *de jure* non-recognition policy of Baltic annexation in 1950,<sup>23</sup> VLIK then pressed strongly for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the West German government authorities, showing a pronounced tendency to style itself as an exile government. In line with Allied policy, Bonn refused to recognize it as such.<sup>24</sup> Even so, P. Karvelis, leader of VLIK's self-declared 'Department for Foreign Affairs' from August 1952,<sup>25</sup> did not miss a single opportunity to make himself heard and to seek special status.

During one visit, on 25 August 1953, Karvelis demanded 'a permanent delegate at the Federal government, just like the Estonian and Latvian exile groups had been granted'. He was immediately informed that 'the accreditation he alluded to would not be forthcoming' and that furthermore, contrary to his insinuation, no such accreditation had been given either to the Estonian representative Karl Selter or the Latvian Roberts Liepiņš, although both undeniably cultivated close contacts with the AA. The latter expressed its willingness to discuss Lithuanian issues unofficially with VLIK representatives, but would also extend the same access to any other legitimate representative of Lithuanian interests, as was the practice with nationals of the other two Baltic countries. Lozoraitis (Snr.) was informed of this AA response.<sup>26</sup>

The presence of VLIK helps to explain the especially strong politicization of the 6,000–8,000 Lithuanian emigrants within the Federal Republic, some of whom were also organized in the *Lithuanian Central Committee*, the *Lithuanian Red Cross in Germany* and other Lithuanian societies. In the context of the Cold War, Karvelis' stream of irksome letters, his frequent visits to the AA and the constant demands for diplomatic recognition contrived to render German–Baltic relations more problematic than they had been at the outset.

By comparison, the approximately 11,000 Latvians<sup>27</sup> and 4,000 Estonians<sup>28</sup> in Germany were organized primarily into what German government documents termed 'so-called displaced persons societies'. These included the *Lettische Volksgemeinschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.*, *Dauvagis Vanaji* and the *Estnische Volksgemeinschaft*,<sup>29</sup> and were first and foremost concerned with the socio-economic and cultural needs of their citizens. It is noteworthy that all these societies were of equal status to exile societies of German refugees/citizens,<sup>30</sup> such as the *Pommersche Landsmannschaft*, *Ostpreussische Landsmannschaft* and *Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft*. Significantly, German homeland societies also included the *Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaft im Bundesgebiet e.V.* and *Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Litauen* – German Baltic associations whose objective was to uphold the traditions of old, a German Baltic identity, and the

knowledge of the common history of Balts of German origin with the Baltic states, while also reminding the government of the Baltic states' fate.

German Balts' (mostly cultural) activities as well as their 'political' visibility within the AA<sup>31</sup> and the leadership of the *Verband der Landsmannschaften*, VdL (later *Bund der Vertriebenen*, BdV) during the early 1950s<sup>32</sup> were an additional reason why the West German authorities were constantly reminded from within of the Baltic problem (Ahonen 2003).<sup>33</sup> Yet the German Balts' activities, either within the VdL/BdV or as individuals, were not focused on the situation of the Baltic states per se. Rather, they were concerned with issues of compensation related to their resettlement during and after the Second World War. Crucially, in contrast to the other *Landsmannschaften* (LMs), German Balts did not demand their *Heimatrecht*, i.e. the right to return to their homelands, although they were in solidarity on this issue with the other LMs within the BdV. That they refrained from such political ambition was largely due to the different historical circumstances surrounding their resettlement from the Baltic states (Ahonen 2003, pp. 42–3).<sup>34</sup>

In 1950–51 Estonians living in West Germany had requested rights to cultural autonomy similar to those enjoyed by German Balts in Estonia during the interwar period. Yet, with reference to the law regarding the rights of *heimatlose Ausländer* of 25 April 1951, the West German government indicated that there was no need to grant such autonomy. As displaced persons the Estonians held the same rights as West German citizens, and thus in cultural terms were not to be discriminated against. Interestingly, Bonn could not have made a federal decision on cultural autonomy anyway, because the individual *Länder* held cultural sovereignty.<sup>35</sup>

Regarding diplomatic representation of Estonians and Latvians in Germany, Selter (who was openly supported in his efforts by the acting consul general of Estonia in New York, Johannes Kaiv) and Liepiņš (the representative of Karlis Zariņš, head of the Latvian diplomatic corps based in London) made similar approaches to the AA to those of Lozoraitis (Snr.). In doing so, however, they were not competing with the leaderships of national emigrant organizations. In fact, the Estonian and Latvian societies in Germany appeared to be much less politicized than their Lithuanian counterpart, and they certainly made no claims to be acting as exile governments.<sup>36</sup> Having understood that they would not achieve diplomatic representation, Selter and Liepiņš focused instead on assisting their compatriots with legal, social and cultural matters, an effort which the German authorities were willing to support. The two men evidently had far fewer difficulties than Karvelis in interacting with the officials of the AA.<sup>37</sup>

The remnants of the diplomatic corps of the three Baltic states were unmistakably their own political force, as consultations of June 1952 between Baltic diplomats proved.<sup>38</sup> They had no interest in any rapprochement with politically ambitious exile groups; indeed, they feared that such rapprochement would complicate – perhaps irresolvably – the issue of legitimate representation of their countries as well as questions concerning the authority, hierarchy and responsibility of different organizations. Baltic diplomats were keen to reflect the historical continuity of their respective foreign services from the interwar period to the present, because keeping this unbroken line allowed for official recognition abroad. New self-declared authorities/exile governments were thus seen as muddying the waters with their

political factionalism and lack of proven historical connections to the time of Baltic independence. Worse still, these aspects threatened to destroy the juridical continuity thesis of the Baltic states' existence altogether.<sup>39</sup>

In terms of international law the West German political establishment had no doubts as to the illegality of the Baltic states' absorption into the USSR, and Bonn had no interest whatsoever recognizing this annexation *de jure*. While this position had been laid down in internal papers and made public in the context of individual queries regarding Baltic citizenship, no conclusive public statement had been made at international level. Bonn's difficulty with the Baltic issue related to the practical conduct of 'German–Baltic official relations': what, for instance, should be considered the legitimate 'political organs' of these 'occupied states' and peoples? And to what extent could and should one engage with the different representatives and their organizations? With German–Baltic relations in limbo, the AA took a keen interest in establishing how other Western states handled the Baltic question and the issue of representation. To this end, information was gathered on Baltic diplomatic representations elsewhere.<sup>40</sup> Based on this data, table 1 provides details of the diplomatic representation of the Baltic states in 1954.

In the absence of any official enactments or announcements by the Adenauer government on the Baltic issue, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian queries concerning the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with 'Germany' continued to pour into the AA during 1953–54. By this time, however, the emphasis of these enquiries had shifted away from the creation of full-scale legations towards establishing consulates or passport bureaus.<sup>41</sup> The latter option appeared to be the most likely, especially since the *Länder* Interior Ministries had stipulated in May 1953 that displaced persons had to

**TABLE 1** Diplomatic representation of the Baltic states (1954)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Legations	–	Washington	Washington
	London	London	London
	–	–	Vatican
	–	Rio de Janeiro	Rio de Janeiro
	–	Paris	–
	–	–	Montevideo
General consulates	New York	–	New York
	–	–	Toronto
	–	Den Haag	–
Consulates	–	–	Chicago
	Rio de Janeiro	–	–
	Sao Paulo	–	Sao Paulo
	–	Oslo	–
	–	Toronto	–
Representation of interests	Paris	Madrid	–
	Madrid	–	France*
	–	–	Italy*
	–	–	Sweden*
–	–	Switzerland*	

\*Semi-official or totally unofficial.



produce valid official papers in order to obtain an identity card. The International Refugee Organization (IRO), which had issued refugee IDs since the war, had ended its mission in West Germany in June 1952.<sup>42</sup> When some regional ministerial edicts asked Baltic citizens to turn in their passports, the AA deemed it necessary to remind the Federal Interior Ministry of the Baltic states' unique juridical situation under *occupatio bellica*. In this regard, Baltic citizens should be allowed to retain their valid native passports, which should in turn entitle them to the same rights as any other DPs who were to get new IDs. On the back of this AA recommendation, the Federal Interior Ministry took steps to ensure that this policy was implemented nationwide.<sup>43</sup>

Given this situation, some AA officials (especially the seemingly Baltic-friendly Messrs Bräutigam and Meissner of the political department) pointed to the legitimate and practical need for a Baltic passport bureau in the FRG. To date, Baltic citizens in Germany had had to apply to their respective legations in London in order to obtain new passports and/or to extend the validity of existing ones. Based on such considerations, an intra-ministerial discussion was stipulated in July 1954.<sup>44</sup>

Developments that occurred within the Lithuanian *Oberste Komitee* in the meantime were to have a significant influence on the German authorities' eventual rejection of requests for Baltic consulates and/or passport bureaus. On 26 March 1954 VLIK appointed Karvelis as the 'Delegate of the Highest Committee at the Federal Government'. In this capacity, he claimed to represent 'until further notice the Lithuanian Republic fully and wholly'.<sup>45</sup> This proclamation of exile government status (which included an attempt to gain official recognition from the US government) naturally challenged the authority of Lozoraitis (Snr.), whose appointees were recognized by a number of countries as the official representatives of the Lithuanian state (as heads of legations, *chargés d'affaires*, consuls general, or consuls, etc.). Crucially, Western, and specifically West German, policy remained unchanged.<sup>46</sup> When the Lithuanian press agency ETLA sought to portray VLIK as *de facto* Lithuanian representation to the German Federal government, AA officials immediately emphasized that Bonn did not recognize any exile governments and also had no diplomatic relations with any of the three Baltic States.<sup>47</sup>

As Meissner (1995, pp. 220–1) has observed, however, the reluctance to engage formally and publicly with the Baltic question was occasioned not just by intra-Baltic rivalries over legitimacy of representation but also by the political sensitivities of the young Federal Republic. The West Germany founded on 23 May 1949 was a provisional entity. It considered itself the only legitimate German state (*Alleinvertretungsanspruch*) – a view which was reflected in the Three Power Declaration of September 1950. The symbol of this provisional state – the 'Basic Law' (not 'Constitution') – enunciated the injunction for a reunification policy: to achieve unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. Unification in legal terms meant unifying German territories within the borders of 1937, as had been defined in the London Protocol of 12 September 1944; in practice, however, the post-war plans for unification understood the term *Gesamtdeutschland* (Germany as a whole) as referring only to the FRG, GDR and Berlin. Legally, the question of the eastern territories remained to be resolved at a future peace conference between the Allies and Germany, as had been agreed by the signatories of the Final Protocol of the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945).<sup>48</sup>

In the Cold War context of the early 1950s, the Adenauer government took a particularly hostile view of the Soviet Union and communism and the East German regime. Insisting that reunification would not be pursued at the expense of freedom, it embarked on Bonn's Western integration. In this politico-ideological context, the absence of any constructive *Ostpolitik* is hardly surprising. In as much as this was Adenauer's policy, there was also a strong sense that a semi-sovereign Bonn had to act in line with the policies of the Western victor powers. With the German unification question open, Bonn was anxious not to create any additional tension in East–West relations, or to provoke the USSR by giving the impression that it was launching an eastern policy in relation to Soviet territories (including the Baltic states) (Adenauer 1965, p. 539; Herbst 1996, pp. 63–193).<sup>49</sup> A visible stance on the Baltic states – whether through a public announcement of the non-recognition policy, or the establishment of relations with Baltic diplomats or 'exile governments' on German soil – was thus perceived as dangerous.<sup>50</sup> Bonn was similarly wary of responding to Baltic demands for consulates and passport bureaus during 1954, by which time Adenauer was already contemplating the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR.

It is clear, therefore, that legalistic considerations did not play the crucial role in determining Bonn's approach to Baltic issues. As can be seen from an AA internal memorandum prepared by Boris Meissner in April 1954, the juridical situation was not seen as precluding passport bureaus, or even the possible setting up of diplomatic or consular missions at a later point in time. Instead, it was a combination of political reasons that forced Bonn to take a reserved and quiescent approach to the 'Baltic question'. Meissner wrote that:

On the one hand, until the Soviet government takes a clear position on the German question, the burdening of relations with the USSR by addressing the Baltic case has to be avoided. On the other hand, the Federal government's measures regarding the Baltics must not be allowed to be interpreted as favoring a specific exile group.<sup>51</sup>

Yet, as Meissner's paper reveals, 'the political meaning of the Baltic question for Germany' was even more complex. If on the one hand an overly pro-Baltic stance was considered problematic for the rebuilding of German–Soviet relations, the 'Baltic question' also constituted a possible means for exerting pressure on the USSR over German issues. Given the Soviets' intransigence in this latter area, Meissner wondered 'whether it was not the right time to use the Baltic card tactically', by signaling 'to the Soviets that German recognition of the Soviet sphere of interest in Eastern Europe would only be granted if the Soviets were more forthcoming on the question of the Oder and Neisse territories'.<sup>52</sup>

The possibly fatal implications that a Soviet–German *quid pro quo* of this kind would carry for the Baltic states' continued *de jure* existence were not touched upon by Meissner. Although the Germans were keen to emphasize the application of international law as a universal norm in politics, they nevertheless appeared willing to treat the Baltics as pawns in 'great power calculations' with the USSR.<sup>53</sup> As well as suggesting use of the 'Baltic card' as part of *Moskaupolitik*, Meissner's paper suggested that it might also be played in order to strengthen Bonn's claim to territories on the

German Baltic Sea coast – especially Eastern Prussia – and to gain the support of the Western powers in this regard. The spring and summer of 1954 seemed a particularly auspicious moment for a West German political offensive, given the US House of Representatives' investigation of the Baltic states' seizure and forced incorporation by the USSR and the treatment of the Baltic peoples, as well as US Secretary of State J. F. Dulles' recent proclamation on 'the right of all peoples to choose the government under which they will live'.<sup>54</sup> The Baltic issue clearly held a particular prominence in the public eye. Crucially, this US rhetoric was applicable to both the Baltic and German questions alike, and Bonn used precisely this language whenever it put forward the unification issue. Meissner hence argued that 'if political connections in the Baltic Sea region were made clearer, US interest could probably be awakened in North-Eastern German territorial questions if tied to the Baltic question'.<sup>55</sup>

This Germano-centric thinking, however, also offered potential benefits as far as the Baltic cause was concerned. Meissner believed that if passport bureaus could be established quickly, they could gain important political significance. Such a measure could act as an additional incentive for the USSR to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn, whilst also easing the plight of *Heimat*-less Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians in Germany.<sup>56</sup>

The fact that Meissner's suggestion of a *quid pro quo* was never pursued underlines the state of flux that obtained in Bonn's Baltic policy, at a time when the young FRG had much bigger and much more imminent foreign policy worries. One certainty, however, did emerge in the autumn of 1954, when Bonn decided against the creation of Baltic passport bureaus or consulates. Quite apart from the problems this would have caused for relations with the USSR and the continued difficulties posed by the Lozoraitis–VLIK dispute, AA officials argued that Balts in Germany were well cared for by their own societies, while passport issues could be dealt with by the missions in London, Washington or New York.<sup>57</sup> The AA's letter to Baltic representatives nevertheless underlined that Baltic citizens would in future be granted the same security in the Federal Republic as citizens of states with whom Germany conducted diplomatic relations.<sup>58</sup> After 1954, the issue of diplomatic representation seemed to die down. Meanwhile, at grassroots level, German-Baltic societies were founded.<sup>59</sup> These were intended as non-political forums that would foster cultural relations between Germans and Balts.<sup>60</sup>

## Bonn, Moscow and the Baltic Question, 1955–61

The year 1955 was crucial for the Adenauer government and also a landmark for Bonn's Baltic policies. The chancellor succeeded in anchoring the Federal Republic in the West by gaining NATO and WEU membership, and saw the *Deutschlandvertrag* come into force on 5 May 1955. Within this context Adenauer began to reconsider both his *Deutschlandpolitik* and his uncompromising *Westpolitik*. Rather than moving closer to unification, the rift between the two German states, as well as between West and East in general, had deepened. Moreover, it appeared that the Four Powers had started to accept the status quo in Europe. Bonn feared US disengagement from Europe and a bilateral American–Soviet accord on Germany over Germans' heads as

Washington sought to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union. Finally, there were humanitarian issues such as the fate of German POWs in the USSR to contemplate. It was against this rather complex domestic and international background that Adenauer embarked on rapprochement with the Kremlin.<sup>61</sup>

In September 1955 Adenauer visited Moscow, where tough negotiations on the 'normalization' of West German–Soviet relations took place. The key issue was the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the other two points being economic and cultural relations. As regards diplomatic relations, a secret AA note prepared by Meissner identified the following political questions that were still to be resolved: German civilian prisoners and prisoners of war; the GDR; and territorial questions, specifically North-East Prussia, Memelland, the Baltic states and the Oder–Neisse line. The Federal authorities insisted that they were not prepared to prejudice the possible resolution of the *Deutschlandfrage* or the issue of German war prisoners and expellees by publicly discussing the 'Baltic question'. Yet despite or perhaps because of Germany's own complex post-war status and recent history, Bonn was determined to stick by its *de jure* position of non-recognition of Baltic annexation, just as it held onto its principled position regarding German interests.<sup>62</sup>

To this end Moscow was handed the so-called *Vorbehaltsschreiben* of 14 September 1955, in which West Germany reserved its position as follows: 'The establishment of diplomatic relations between the governments of West Germany and of the USSR [does] not represent any recognition of each other's current territorial ownership,<sup>63</sup> nor does it affect the FRG's right to sole representation'. Given that Moscow's main political aim at the time appeared to be gaining *de jure* recognition for its territorial possessions in Eastern Europe, this letter constitutes a crucial landmark as far as West Germany's Baltic policies are concerned. Here, on an international platform and in an official public document, the Adenauer government implicitly stated Bonn's policy of non-recognition of Baltic absorption into the USSR.

The honeymoon of German–Soviet 'diplomatic rapprochement' proved short lived. In response to the declaration of the two-state theory by the USSR and GDR in July 1956, Bonn introduced the *Hallstein-Doktrin*. Although Adenauer is known to have made secret moves in parallel towards a less rigid *Ostpolitik*, the only publicly visible movement in West German–Soviet relations occurred on the issues of economic and technological trade and the repatriation of Soviet and German citizens (Repatriation Agreement of 8 April 1958). Repatriation was very much part of Adenauer's humanitarian concerns for German citizens and so-called *Volksdeutsche* in the USSR, and followed from the German–Soviet Agreement on POWs. Here the Baltics played a role in Germany's calculations in so far as the Repatriation Agreement affected, amongst others (such as Germans in Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, etc.), German Balts and Germans living in the Baltic area.<sup>64</sup>

The repatriation issue revealed the historical nature of German–nation that covered a much wider area than the German nation-state had done at any time of peace, as well as the devastating consequences of Hitler's bellicose eastern policies and their distinctive facet of resettlement. Despite massive post-war expulsion of 'German' nationals from eastern territories, many remained scattered in what became, after 1945, the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. The Soviet–German repatriation question undoubtedly added another layer of

complexity to the story of West German–Baltic relations, as in this particular case it implicitly reminded people of Germany’s complicity with the USSR over the Baltic states’ fate.

With the Kremlin suggesting that repatriation be completed by 1959, Adenauer was keen to see this accomplished smoothly. Yet, as could have been expected, Soviet bureaucracy made life difficult for those wanting to leave the country.<sup>65</sup> Amongst other psychological and physical pressures, exit was promoted to the GDR instead of the FRG. Significantly, in Bonn’s eyes the Agreement was not fulfilled on time by the USSR; indeed, in 1970 the AA estimated that 7,784 Germans had still not been repatriated.<sup>66</sup>

As regards the fate of Soviet citizens in West Germany, Moscow actively used repatriation as a politico-ideological tool against the West; a tool to emphasize its view on territory and citizenship. As far as Baltic refugees in West Germany were concerned, repatriation was used as a means to challenge the Baltic states’ *de jure* status of continued existence under *occupatio bellica* as held up by most Western governments, and to intimidate Baltic nationals. Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin announced on 13 September 1955 that 101,000 Soviet citizens – a figure which was believed to include Balts – were held back in West Germany against their will. This rhetoric made many Baltic nationals fear that the Bonn government would give in to the Kremlin’s pressure and repatriate them to the USSR, particularly if Moscow sought to make emigrant repatriation a *quid pro quo* for the actual return of German POWs from the USSR. In this situation, Bonn anxiously sought to reassure the public that it could not be blackmailed over the POW issue, and that no Eastern refugee would be repatriated by force, not least because such action would violate West Germany’s Basic Law.<sup>67</sup> Indeed, the issue of repatriation was dealt with entirely separately from the POWs in 1958.

The repatriation saga, however, led to further calls for the accreditation of Lithuanian and Estonian diplomatic representatives to the FRG, which were again rejected by the AA. In addition to the usual factors, the government now cited the need to ‘show consideration for the new nature of Soviet–German relations *post*-September 1955’ and the problem of Soviet propaganda. In an internal memo AA official (and German Balt) Berndt von Staden emphasized that the creation of consulates would make Germany’s defense of its legal standpoint on the rights of Baltic nationals more difficult *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. Since Balts held DP status in Germany, they were effectively not in need of consular protection (neither Soviet, which Moscow desired, nor Baltic) – hence, the objection to consulates. Interestingly, von Staden refloated the opening of passport bureaus for Baltic citizens in Germany; this time suggesting that they be run by representatives of the Baltic legations in London with the Federal government’s permission. However, nothing came of von Staden’s suggestion and the passport bureaus issue was now buried for good.<sup>68</sup> As the years went on, questions turned to the practical problems of naturalization and the subsequent loss of native passports. Many Baltic émigrés chose naturalization, not least to avoid the complications in international travel which Baltic travel documents entailed. Yet giving up native passports was a tricky issue, because the choice to naturalize, of course, weakened the Balts’ case as defenders of the continuity of their states.

Generally speaking, Balts were dissatisfied with Bonn's eastern and Baltic policies during the mid-to-late 1950s. In the wake of the Hungarian crisis, these appeared to reinforce the wider impression of a weak and passive West that was allowing the Kremlin too much leverage. As for the Adenauer government's policies specifically, most criticism focused on the *Hallstein-Doktrin*, which was considered utterly unconstructive. Indeed, at a meeting of the *Baltischer Rat* (Baltic Council, the amalgamation of representatives of the Baltic states in West Germany) the Estonian Karl Selter criticized the AA for its lack of a clearly defined *Ostpolitik*, and blamed Adenauer's rigid *Westpolitik* for preventing the resolution of the Baltic question.<sup>69</sup> Whereas in the immediate post-war years the Balts had joined the *Landsmannschaften* in calling for a firm line towards the USSR, they were now interested in Bonn's engagement with the Soviets. The LMs, by contrast, continued to swear by the *Hallstein-Doktrin*, which they considered the only possible means of reunifying Germany within the borders of 1937 and enabling them to return to their former homes.<sup>70</sup>

Baltic émigrés were also less than enamored by certain domestic policies of the Adenauer government, which they saw as rigid, unhelpful and even unjust. Especially criticized was the failure to satisfy the claims of Estonian and Latvian ship owners whose ships had been confiscated by Nazi Germany during the Second World War, the needs of former Baltic officers seeking their pension entitlements, as well as demands for compensation from those who had endured the horrors of Nazi concentration camps. Balts also highlighted a failure to harmonize administrative practice and of law in the *Länder* according to federal non-recognition policies, and problems relating to the ownership of former Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian embassies or their lands in West Berlin.<sup>71</sup>

The issue of the former Baltic embassies was highly significant, for quite apart from their considerable value (in as far as they had not been destroyed), these properties symbolized the continuity of the Baltic states. The matter was further complicated by the Four-Power division, which made it less than clear which German or Allied authority was responsible for queries relating to Baltic property located in the Western sectors of Berlin. Much of the early AA correspondence relating to property focused on clarifying questions of competence, rather than dealing with the many practical issues relayed by Baltic representatives. In spite of fears that the property in question would be passed to the USSR, the West Berlin land register continued to list the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as the legitimate owners. In practical terms, the land and/or properties of the embassies were administered by Allied Control Council-appointed trustees, who constituted the first port of call when it came to enquiries regarding the sale of real estate. Only in the second instance did this become a matter for (what after 1961 was) West Berlin's legislature. This system allowed for the sale of Latvia's real estate during the late 1980s; however the properties belonging to Lithuania and Estonia were returned to the governments of the re-established independent states in 1991.<sup>72</sup>

In so far as Adenauer's government adhered religiously but silently to its policy of non-recognition, there was no diplomatic activity surrounding the Baltic problem during the remainder of the 1950s.<sup>73</sup> However, as the decade drew to a close and the Bonn government found itself confronted with Soviet ultimatums over Berlin,

a number of events contrived to place the Baltic question back on the international agenda. The first of these came in late 1958, when Lithuania's representative at the Vatican, Stasys Girdvainis, was downgraded in status from *envoyé* to *gérant des affaires* following the enthronement of Pope John XXIII. The Lithuanians were deeply disappointed and pleaded with the Pope for revocation of the decision. However much the Vatican sought to downplay the implications of this step, the lesser status of the Lithuanian representative was clear for all to see.<sup>74</sup>

This sudden and surprising development prompted the AA to analyze and re-evaluate its own Baltic relations in the light of other states' 'diplomatic' practices. A circular was issued to all West German foreign missions requesting a report on the current practice of their host countries towards the Baltic problem.<sup>75</sup> The subsequent findings (see table 2) were followed up by the AA in March 1961 when the new Brazilian government, looking to establish diplomatic relations with the communist regimes of the Eastern bloc, announced the closure of its Baltic diplomatic representations.<sup>76</sup> The end of 'official Brazilian–Baltic relations' not only deeply alarmed the Balts but also posed a challenge to Bonn and the survival of its *Hallstein-Doktrin*. Indeed, the latter policy was beginning to look increasingly out of touch with reality, given political realignment in international relations by a number of states.

**TABLE 2** International recognition policies regarding the Baltic states (1960)

<i>De jure</i> non-recognition of Baltic annexation into the USSR	Incorporation <i>de jure</i> recognized
USA*, Uruguay*, Brazil*, Vatican*, Spain†	Bolivia, Japan, Sweden
Luxemburg <sup>(NOR)</sup> , Ireland <sup>(NOR)</sup> , Iceland <sup>(NOR)</sup> , Iran <sup>(NOR)</sup> , South African Union <sup>(NOR)</sup>	Austria <sup>§</sup> , Argentina <sup>§</sup>
UK† <sup>(NFD)</sup> , France† <sup>(NFD)</sup> , Canada† <sup>(NFD)</sup> , Australia† <sup>(NFD)</sup> , Cuba‡ <sup>(NFD)</sup> , Columbia‡ <sup>(NFD)</sup> , Mexico‡ <sup>(NFD)</sup> , Denmark‡ <sup>(NFD)</sup>	
Switzerland <sup>§§</sup> <sup>(NFD)</sup> , West Germany†† <sup>(NFD)</sup>	
Belgium <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Netherlands‡‡ <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Norway <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Finland <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Greece <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Turkey <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Afghanistan <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , Ethiopia <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup> , New Zealand <sup>(NFD, NOR)</sup>	

\*Official relations.

†Semi-official relations.

‡Some remnants of relations.

††Recognition of Baltic passports.

‡‡Members of the Baltic exile government in London granted '*visa de courtoisie*'.

§Implicit *de jure* recognition: Baltic passports not recognized.

§§Qualification: Baltic assets managed in fiduciary form by Switzerland.

<sup>NOR</sup>No official relations.

<sup>NFD</sup>No final decision on nature of non-recognition policy.

States that did not have diplomatic relations with either the USSR or the Baltic states: Portugal\*, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic\*, Ecuador, Nicaragua\*, Paraguay\*, Peru, Venezuela, Liberia, Taiwan (\*states would not recognize annexation due to their anti-communist position).

Source: adapted from a survey by the AA, B12/Bd.452, 'Aufzeichnung (8.8.1960)'.

The Baltic question was also reactivated by an intervention from the German Baltic Council, which requested a meeting between Baltic representatives and the Federal foreign minister ahead of the Four-Power foreign ministers' conference on Germany and Berlin scheduled for the summer of 1959 in Geneva. The Baltic Council wanted to present the minister with a memorandum on the Baltic States' juridical status, just as their American counterparts had previously done with Secretary of State Herter.<sup>77</sup> An internal memo by the AA *Ostabteilung* consented to informal discussions with Baltic representatives, but rejected calls for an official high-level meeting. Here, Bonn's quiescent Baltic policy was contrasted with that of Washington, which maintained official relations with Baltic diplomatic representatives.

West German authorities were also put on the spot by a query from the *Baltische Gesellschaft* as to whether the Baltic flags could be hoisted together with that of the Federal Republic at the 'Baltic Week' event they were planning to hold in Bad Oeynhausen from 17 to 23 September 1960. Deeply aware of the symbolism of flags, especially as Bonn would not allow the East German flag to be flown, the AA consulted its Western partners as well as conducting its own analysis. It was eventually decided to forbid the display of Baltic flags alongside that of West Germany – a position which was for the most part consistent with the views expressed by Western Allies. Bonn was anxious to avoid symbolic identification of its policies with the political goals and interests of the Baltic 'exile governments', as well as any escalation of East–West tensions within the context of the looming Berlin crisis. Moreover, in legal terms the flying of the flags would indicate a shift in Bonn's Baltic policy from a passive, legalistic stance to one that expressed an active political standpoint, something which would no doubt be perceived by the Kremlin as an unfriendly step. The same reservations were also seen to apply to the flying of Baltic flags alone. Given that Bonn conducted a *Nichtzulassungspolitik* with regard to the flag of the so-called Soviet zone, the display of Baltic flags did not seem any more justified. None of this detailed reasoning was passed on to the Baltic Society, however: in what was yet another *verbal* AA response, it was stated simply that the 'current political situation' did not allow for the display of flags.<sup>78</sup>

The sudden construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 made it clear to the Adenauer government that reunification was effectively off the international agenda. Bonn's *Deutschlandpolitik* was now merely concerned with keeping the German question juridically open. The FRG was therefore especially keen to go along with the growing emphasis in Western political language on universal norms and values. In this respect, the UN declaration of 14 December 1960, which emphasized the 'principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all', became the cornerstone of *Deutschlandpolitik*.

It is in this context that West Germany's support for the Council of Europe resolution (189) 'on the situation in the Baltic states on the twentieth anniversary of their forced incorporation into the Soviet Union' has to be seen. Support for the draft resolution, adopted on 29 September 1960, was seen as a way of countering claims by the United States that Germany had been doing little to support the Baltic cause whilst taking for granted the support of the free world for the plight of East Germans. Yet with an eye to the politico-moral effect that the resolution would produce in Moscow,



Bonn insisted that all facts in the resolution had to be absolutely objective. For instance, it was believed that only 11 Western states adhered firmly to *de jure* non-recognition, not the 'great majority' of nations of the free world as was stated in the draft resolution. In other respects, Bonn maintained a low-key approach to the issue, out of fear of upsetting Moscow and of drawing attention to Germany's historical complicity in bringing about the occupation of the Baltic states. Thus, one can see that despite its public use of universally applicable legalistic language, in practice West Germany was clearly not implementing a foreign policy free of 'national interests'.<sup>79</sup>

### ***Neue Ostpolitik*, Human Rights and the End of the Cold War**

The 1960s were a decade of transition. The Adenauer era and the post-war phase came to an end, and West Germany readjusted its *Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik* to the new post-Wall and post-Cuba international realities of the Cold War (Garton Ash 1994; Bender 1996; Suri 2003). A report on a visit to the Estonian SSR by an unnamed official of the West German embassy during 1963 underscored Bonn's extreme caution regarding the Baltic problem, and its adherence to a strictly legalistic policy approach. The report outlined Moscow's efforts at Russification in the face of deep-rooted Estonian national consciousness by native Estonians, but argued that all Bonn could do in support of the Balts was to intensify human contacts through West German travel to the Baltic<sup>80</sup> – something that might appeal especially to German Balts.

Of far greater concern to the West German authorities were ongoing court cases in West Berlin regarding the real estate of the former Baltic legations, and Britain's handling of the Baltic gold problem in its negotiations with Moscow over mutual compensation claims arising after 1 January 1939. The AA saw the latter as an indicator not only of British–Soviet relations, but also of the actual state of the United Kingdom's political line on the Baltic question. Potential British claims in the area of former East Prussia meant that Bonn also had a more direct interest in these negotiations. Ultimately, however, no such claims were made and, to the German authorities' great relief, the issue of sovereignty did not arise. The Anglo-Soviet Agreement of 13 February 1967 stipulated *inter alia* that the USSR would not pursue its claims to former Baltic assets held in the United Kingdom, and that Britain would make a payment of £500,000 to the USSR in the form of British manufactured goods. Baltic gold was sold off in order to satisfy the claims of British creditors, and Britain also recognized *de facto* incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. Yet it did not alter its juridical standpoint on the Baltic question: Baltic diplomats in London retained their diplomatic courtesies *ad persona*.<sup>81</sup> This British policy in turn encouraged the West German authorities to abstain from amending their own Baltic policy.

When Chancellor Willy Brandt launched his *Neue Ostpolitik* in 1969, the Baltic question came back onto the agenda. As Bonn entered into negotiations on the Eastern Treaties (with Poland, Czechoslovakia and, crucially, the USSR and East Germany), there were great fears among the Baltic exile communities and German Balts that the so-called Moscow Treaty in particular would imply Bonn's *de jure* recognition of the

Baltic states' incorporation in the USSR. Numerous Baltic individuals sent letters to the AA. Responses were low key and tended to refer simply to Bonn's 'well known juridical position on the [Baltic] matter' without any further explanations, as the AA sought to avoid anything that could be interpreted as a change in position or an official declaration.<sup>82</sup>

Importantly, the Baltic was not touched upon in German–Soviet Treaty negotiations. This was perhaps because the Soviets did not even consider it an open question, while Bonn was focused on its own *Deutschlandpolitik* priorities. The Moscow Treaty of 12 August 1970 placed great emphasis upon the 'inviolability of borders' and mutual 'renunciation of the use of force'. Bonn, however, upheld its legal position that borders – both German and Baltic – were not conclusively fixed: the *Vorbehaltsschreiben* of 1955 retained its validity, and the preamble to the Moscow Treaty made reference to the principles and aims of the UN Charter, one of which is the right to self-determination. The approach to the Baltic question remained low key.<sup>83</sup> All the same, when MP von Fircks publicly sought clarification of the government's position in the *Bundestag* on 9 October 1970, Federal Foreign Minister Walter Scheel declared that: 'No Federal government has made a declaration that included recognition of the Baltic States' incorporation [into the USSR]. The signing of the German–Soviet Treaty has not changed anything'.<sup>84</sup>

The emphasis within *Neue Ostpolitik* diplomacy on 'freer movement' and 'human contact' carried important implications for Germany's Baltic policies. Although the non-recognition policy ruled out any direct contacts between West German officials and those from the Baltic SSRs, the AA quietly promoted the intensification of exchanges between journalists, students and researchers as well as the distribution of Western literature.<sup>85</sup> In this context, the opening of a West German general consulate in Leningrad in autumn 1972 had an important role to play. The consulate was responsible for the cities of Riga and Tallinn, but not for the Estonian and Latvian SSRs, a position that the AA deemed crucial in terms of upholding Bonn's juridical standpoint on the continued *de jure* existence of the Baltic states.<sup>86</sup>

Key tenets of *Ostpolitik* such as recognition of the inviolability of borders, respect for human rights and closer economic and cultural contacts with the Eastern bloc were also central to the agenda of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during 1972–75. The unresolved German and Baltic issues were specifically discussed within this context, and their respective claims tied to the universal concept of the right to self-determination, as well as the 'peaceful change' of borders clause, both of which became key principles of the Helsinki Final Act (Meissner 1995, pp. 130–43). All the same, *de facto* recognition of the territorial status quo was undeniably one of the key outcomes of the CSCE. As German AA officials had put it in 1973, while it was important not to forget historical injustice, history could not be rewritten at the CSCE. Evidently, the German authorities were keen to keep the historical burden of German–Soviet complicity in the background as they sought to advance their own *Deutschlandpolitik* goals within the context of the CSCE process.<sup>87</sup>

As far as 'human rights' were concerned, Bonn sought to open up new space for freedom of expression and the exercise of personal rights, with an eye not least to the fate of the East Germans. The codification of the issue of human rights, both in Helsinki in 1975 and through the UN Human Rights Convention of 1976

(Meissner 1995, pp. 130–6), would prove crucial in terms of sustaining the Baltic nations' hopes of national survival and restored independence, especially after the crushing of the upheavals in Lithuania during 1972. As the AA had noted, free expression of religious beliefs and nationalism or rebellion against Moscow went hand in hand during the Lithuanian events.<sup>88</sup> Yet no one was really sure either of the significance that human rights held at the grassroots level or of the long-term impact of introducing this norm into East–West diplomacy (Hiden & Salmon 1991, pp. 134–44; Thomas 2001). Indeed, AA officials questioned whether demonstrations by citizens were isolated and individual incidents, or part of a wider and ongoing process of societal fermentation that was weakening the Soviet regime from within.

In spite of such analyses, the AA seemingly devoted little thought at this time to how West Germany might possibly influence the future of the Baltic question.<sup>89</sup> It may be that Bonn, with its focus on the German question, was not particularly interested; alternatively, it perhaps saw no real possibility of influencing events within the USSR, not least in view of the violent crushing of the Prague Spring just a few years earlier. Still, human rights had at least become a permanent fixture within political discourse (Haines & Legget 2001, pp. 108–10). Human contacts between West Germany and the Baltic SSRs also intensified during the late 1970s and 1980s, regardless of the actual long- or short-term calculations and motives behind *Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik*.

In common with its Western counterparts, the Bonn government was not prepared for the rapid collapse of the Eastern bloc and the simultaneous emergence of demands for Baltic independence. As East Germans poured into the West, Chancellor Kohl quickly began to focus on resolving the German question by driving for rapid unification between East and West Germany and Berlin. Using the language of 'people's right to self-determination', he sought to secure the approval of the four victor powers – and of Moscow in particular – for German unity. The Cold War rhetoric had suddenly become the driving force and justification for Kohl's *Deutschlandpolitik* or rather reunification policies.

Kohl nevertheless adopted a very low-key approach to the Baltic issue, especially after rapid German unification was on the cards from March 1990. German national interest, which demanded good relations with a Kremlin determined to hold the Soviet Union together, had a higher priority than actively supporting the *de jure* legitimate Baltic struggle for independence. In purely juridical terms, however, Bonn did remain true to its non-recognition policy. The Treaty on Final Settlement (2 + 4 Treaty), while fixing Germany's eastern border, left open the possibility of peaceful change of borders elsewhere (Kaiser 1993, pp. 260–8; Spohr Readman 2004); the same can be said of the Soviet–German treaty on good neighborliness, partnership and cooperation of 9 November 1990. As they had done on numerous occasions before, the Federal authorities announced that the 'FRG's position regarding recognition of Baltic incorporation into the USSR ha[d] not changed'.<sup>90</sup> This remained so until the Moscow coup of August 1991, when the Baltic states managed to break free from a Union that stood on the verge of total collapse. It was only at this point that the government of a now unified Germany – in line with other Western governments – took the proactive and public step of *re-establishing* diplomatic relations with all three Baltic Republics.

The Baltic question had finally been resolved. Amongst the many issues that had been left open, Baltic assets and property were returned to their rightful owners (as in the case of what was left of the Baltic legations in Berlin) and German Balts were able to rebuild ties with their old homelands. Unlike, say, Silesians and Sudeten Germans, the German Baltic groups have mostly abstained from demanding the return of their former property from the newly independent states – not least due to their different historical circumstances (von Wistinghausen 2004, pp. 184–6; Cordell 2006).<sup>91</sup>

## Conclusion

Throughout the Cold War West German Baltic policies were tied to Bonn's calculations of *Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik*. In this vein, the Bonn government never made a conclusive statement on the issue, nor did it ever expressly recognize the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR.<sup>92</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when the resolution of the German question seemed still to be in limbo and the Western victor powers were still visibly involved in 'German' affairs, West German Baltic policies were rather ad hoc, uncoordinated, and certainly very cautious. It was only in the context of Chancellor Adenauer's Moscow visit of 1955, when German–Soviet diplomatic relations were re-established, that the Federal Republic (in its letter of reservation) implicitly but officially made its standpoint public. In no other official context was this line of policy ever expressed more clearly: when it came to the Moscow Treaty of 1970, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 or the 2 + 4 Treaty of 1990, reference was always made to the 1955 *Vorbehaltsschreiben* as far as the Baltic question was concerned. Significantly, even Foreign Ministry correspondence rarely elaborated Bonn's *de jure* standpoint in detail.

If the juridical position of the Federal Republic remained rather static throughout the Cold War decades, in practical terms Bonn's approach to the Baltic question evolved in tandem with its changing *Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik*. In the 1950s, it was believed that the Baltic (and indeed the German) question might still be settled relatively quickly through Western diplomatic pressure. Baltic émigrés therefore focused on measures that would symbolize the 'theoretical' *de jure* survival of the Baltic states' existence, such as the establishment of Baltic diplomatic missions in the Federal Republic, ensuring the validity and recognition of Baltic passports, the administration of former Baltic governments' property and real estate in Berlin, and the recognition of Baltic associations as exile governments. Bonn, with a view to the German reunification issue, sought to avoid upsetting Moscow in any way, and took a careful approach to any aspects of émigré affairs that were more than private or personal. Written enquiries from Baltic representatives often resulted in verbal responses, no diplomatic representation or Baltic passport bureaus were established, and no self-declared exile governments recognized. However, the AA did extend an informal welcome to Baltic representatives, both diplomats and members of refugee associations.

As the Cold War wore on and bipolar structures assumed an air of permanence, contacts between the AA and Baltic representatives lost much of their political urgency. In the context of détente and the normalization of East–West relations, the emphasis shifted from seeking tangible political change and quick results towards the use of

language that emphasized keeping both the German and Baltic questions legally open. The focus also moved to the promotion of human rights and the improvement of the people's situation inside the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc. Bonn evidently encouraged these developments within the context of its *Neue Ost-* and *Deutschlandpolitik*. However, despite the common interest of the German and Baltic peoples in upholding universal norms of 'self-determination' and 'human rights', the fate of the Baltic nations was very much secondary to *Deutschlandpolitik* as far the FRG authorities were concerned. Bonn was aware that Germany and the unresolved postwar *Deutschlandfrage* played a central role in the international politics of a bipolar world. The entwinement of German and Baltic questions as two unresolved postwar legal issues was considered by the Germans as a marriage of convenience. This was exposed most clearly during the Cold War endgame: despite employing universal legal rhetoric, Chancellor Kohl conducted *Realpolitik* in his pursuit of national interest, namely German unification, and subordinated the Baltic independence struggle to this goal.

Still, Bonn's Baltic policies were also influenced by the historico-moral burden of the Hitler–Stalin Pact and the partial culpability which Germany had borne for the Baltic states' loss of independence. At the same time, the voice of the German Balts in West German foreign and domestic affairs (also as part of the BdV) contributed to keeping the Baltic question on Bonn's political agenda. In light of Germany's history and complex post-war circumstances, West Germany's Baltic policies were always going to be more complicated than those of other states.

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## Notes

- 1 N.B. Boris Meissner – a German Balt and law professor – was a civil servant in the *Auswärtige Amt* in 1953–56 and 1958–59, and at the German embassy in Moscow between 1956 and 1958. His scholarship is based on published materials in conjunction with first-hand knowledge gained while working in the AA.
- 2 *Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin*: [B]estand11/[B]an[d].570, 'Bundesminister des Inneren [henceforth BminI] (3.8.1951)'; 'BminI (12.9.1952)'. See also reference to letter of AA to Senator für Justiz in Berlin of 21 April 1953 in 'Anlage: Die völkerrechtliche Stellung... (6.4.1954)'.
- 3 B11/Bd.570, 'Anlage: Die völkerrechtliche Stellung... (6.4.1954)'; 'Stellungnahme... vom 6. April 1954 (12.4.1954)'.
- 4 B38-IIA1/Bd.33, 'Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist der einzig rechtmäßige deutsche Staat (undated)'; B38-IIA1/Bd.694, 'Bezeichnungsrichtlinien... Juli 1965'.
- 5 B11/Bd.570, 'Anlage: Die völkerrechtliche Stellung... (6.4.1954)'.
- 6 B11/Bd.570, 'BminI (12.9.1952)'. See Meissner (1995, p. 220).

- 7 B11/Bd.570, 'BminI (12.9.1952)'; 'AA an alle diplomatischen und konsularischen Vertretungen im Ausland (27.9.1952)'.
- 8 Germany was reproached for its reserved position by former Estonian foreign minister Pusta. B12/Bd. 449, 'Bot. Paris an AA (12.3.1954)'; 'Aufzeichnung, (13.12.1951)'. B11/Bd.570, 'Aufzeichnung (3.1.1952)'; 'Abt III and StS, (3.2.1952)'. Cf. B11/Bd.570, 'by Kossmann (14.2.1953)'.
- 9 B11/Bd.570, 'StS an v. Brentano (9.8.1954)'.
- 10 B11/Bd.550, 'Aufzeichnung (9.9.1950)'; 'Vereinigter Litauischer Unterstützungsfonds (11.5.1951)'; 'Konzept (30.7.1951)'; 'Die heimatlosen Ausländer im Bundesgebiet (undated)'.
- 11 B12/Bd.449, 'by Zarins (22.10.1951)'; 'Vereinigter Litauischer Unterstützungsfonds (11.5.1951)'. B11/Bd.550, 'Konzept (30.7.1951)'. B11/Bd.560, 'Aufzeichnung (30.11.1950)'; 'Kossmann, Vermerk (8.6.1951)'; 'Kossmann, Aufzeichnug (3.2.1952)'.
- 12 B11/Bd.567, 'Schlange-Schöningen (8.10.1951)'; B11/Bd.560, 'Aufzeichnung (30.11.1950)'.
- 13 B12/Bd.449, 'Aufzeichnung (13.12.1951)'.
- 14 B11/Bd.570, 'Abteilung III an StS (3.2.1952)'.
- 15 B11/Bd.568, 'Kossmann, Vermerk (1.2.1952)'.
- 16 B11/Bd.568, 'Kossmann, Vermerk (1.2.1952)'.
- 17 B11/Bd.568, 'Hallstein an Brentano (sent 19.5.1952)'; 'Etzdorf, Aufzeichnung (12.1.1952)'. B11/Bd.567, 'Etzdorf [meeting with Liepiņš] (18.6.1952)'.
- 18 B11/Bd.569, 'Entwurf: Vermerk (28.3.1953)'.
- 19 B11/Bd.567, 'Kossmann an GK London (6.6.1952)'.
- 20 On Selter's case, B11/Bd.560, 'Aufzeichnung (30.11.1950)'; 'Vermerk – Betr.: Estnische Emigration (8.6.1951)'; 'Vermerk (23.5.1951)'; 'Abt. III signed Etzdorf (28.12.1951)'; 'Aufzeichnung (3.1.1952)'; 'Vermerk: Besuch Selter (16.4.1952)'; 'Kossmann an Generalkonsulat London (11.6.1952)'. On Liepiņš, B11/Bd.567, 'Kossmann an Generalkonsulat, London (6.6.1952)'; 'Etzdorf (18.6.1952)'. On Lithuania, B11/Bd.568, 'Blankenhorn, Aufzeichnung (22.12.1950)'; 'Dittmann an Krupavicius (9.4.1951)'; 'Stellungahme (2.4.1951 date crossed out)' [NB. letter sent on 9.4.1951]; 'Aufzeichnug (8.10.1951)'; 'Aufzeichnung (11.1.1952)'; 'Aufzeichnung (25.4.1952)'.
- 21 B11/Bd.569, 'Bräutigam an Rom (9.4.1953)'; 'Bräutigam an Rom (13.10.1953)'.
- 22 B11/Bd.569, 'Karvelis an Kossmann AA (9.10.1952)'.
- 23 B11/Bd.568, 'Aufzeichnung an Blankenhorn (22.12.1950)'; 'Hallstein an Krupavicius (9.4.1951)'.
- 24 B11/Bd.550, 'Vermerk – Betr: Heimatlose Ausländer (11.3.1952)'.
- 25 B11/Bd.569, 'Ivinskis an Kossmann AA (30.8.1952)'.
- 26 B11/Bd.569, 'Aufzeichnung (26.8.1953)'; 'Bräutigam an Rom (13.10.1953)'.
- 27 B12/Bd.449, 'Lettische Emigration (12.5.1955)'.
- 28 B11/Bd.560, 'Etzdorf (28.12.1951)'.
- 29 B11/Bd.550, 'Von Trützschler an Dr Kossmann + Anlage (10.4.1951)'. See also B11/Bd.567, 'Die lettische Emigration ...'.
- 30 B11/Bd.550, 'Aufzeichnung (9.9.1950)'.
- 31 German Balts in high AA positions included Meissner, Meyer-Landrut, von Stackelberg, von Staden, von Wistinghausen, and Graf Lambsdorff.

- 32 In the VdL leadership were CSU parliamentarian Baron Georg Manteuffel-Szoegé and FDP MP Axel de Vries, both German Balts.
- 33 On the *Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaft* and their aims, see [http://www.deutsch-balten.de/seiten/01-wir\\_ueber\\_uns/02-aufgaben/01-fruehere/index.php](http://www.deutsch-balten.de/seiten/01-wir_ueber_uns/02-aufgaben/01-fruehere/index.php), accessed 6 June 2005. A cultural society without any political ambition was the *Verband Baltischer Ritterschaften e.V.* (founded in 1949) of the German Baltic nobility; see <http://www.baltische-ritterschaften.de>, accessed 5 August 2006.
- 34 B81/Bd.338. In view of resettlements, the German Balts can be divided into two groups: (1) the majority that were first resettled from Estonia and Latvia to the Reich's eastern territories, specifically the *Warthegau*, as a consequence of Hitler's 'Heim ins Reich' call in autumn 1939, and then endured forced expulsion at the end of the Second World War from what was now Poland to West Germany; (2) those who as so-called *Nachumsiedler* resettled from the Baltic to Germany after 1941.
- 35 B11/Bd.550, 'Hasselblatt an Kordt (26.8.1950)'; 'Vereinigter Litauischer Unterstützungsfonds (11.5.1951)'; 'Konzept (30.7.1951)'.
- 36 N.B. Relations with Estonian emigrant organizations were somewhat complicated in 1953, with the emergence of competing self-declared exile governments: one led by August Rei in Norway, and a 'counter' one led by Alfred Maurer in West Germany. While the former group would last, the latter disappeared with its leader's death in 1954. West Germany – just like its Western allies – recognized neither of the two 'exile governments' as legitimate representatives of Estonia (Mälksoo 2000). B11/Bd.560, 'Estnische Exilegierung in Schweden (12.1.1953)'; 'Vermerk zu 212-14/20 III 8840/53 (undated)'; 'de Vries an Kossmann (19.5.1953)'; 'Estnische Exilgruppen (21.7.1953)'. B11/Bd.570, 'AA and Brentano (9.8.1954)'. See also: [http://www.edk.edu.ee/default.asp?object\\_id=6&id=30&site\\_id=2](http://www.edk.edu.ee/default.asp?object_id=6&id=30&site_id=2), accessed 5 August 2006.
- 37 B11/Bd.560, 'Aufzeichnung (30.11.1950)'; 'v. Maydell, Vermerk (23.5.1951)'; 'Kossmann: Vermerk (8.6.1951)'; 'Kaiv and Krekeler (10.11.1951)'; 'Etzdorf, (28.12.1951)'; 'Kossmann, Aufzeichnung (3.1.1952)'; 'Vermerk (16.4.1952)'; 'Kossmann an GK London (11.6.1952)'; B12/Bd.449, 'Zarins an Schlange-Schöningen (22.10.1951)'.
- 38 B11/Bd.569, 'Diplomatic Representatives... from June 27–30, 1952'.
- 39 B12/Bd.449, 'Rom an AA (29.5.1954)'.
- 40 B12/Bd. 449, 'Schaffarczyk an Dr. Kossmann (23.3.1953)'; 'von Maydell an Schffarczyk... Anfrage vom 23.3.1953'; 'Aide Memoir (27.3.1953)'; 'Rom an AA (29.5.1954)'. B11/Bd.406, 'Schlange-Schöningen an AA (19.2.1954)'. B11/Bd.433, 'Ottawa an AA (19.5.1954)'. B11/Bd.474, 'Bot. Washington (2.12.1953)'. B12/Bd.449, 'Paris an AA (12.3.1954)'.
- 41 B12/Bd.449, 'Bräutigam an Skirpa (13.7.1953)'; 'Rom an AA (18.7.1953)'; B11/Bd.570, 'Stellungnahme (12.4.1954)'; 'Aufzeichnung (18.5.1954)'; 'Hackwitz an Referat 350 (2.11.1954)'; B12/Bd.449, 'Litauische Anfrage (22.6.1954)'.
- 42 B11/Bd.550, 'Mitteilung (24.6.1952)'.
- 43 B11/Bd.569, 'AA an [B]undes[I]nnen[M]inisterium (undated, presumably June 1953)'.
- 44 B11/Bd.570, 'Bräutigam, Vermerk (8.7.1954)'; 'Stellungnahme (12.4.1954)'.
- 45 B11/Bd.570, 'Vermerk (5.5.1954)'.

- 46 B80/Bd.36, 'Washington an AA (25.8.1952)'; B11/Bd.570, 'Litauer in zwei Lager gespalten (17.7.1954)'; 'Vermerk (5.5.1954)'; B12/Bd.449, 'Pro Memoria, Lozoraitis (9.1.1952)'; 'Rom an AA (29.5.1954)'; 'Aufruf (20.5.1955)'. See also B11/Bd.570, 'Vermerk (5.5.1954)'.
- 47 B11/Bd.570, 'Stellungnahme (12.8.1954)'; 'ETLA (15.5.1954)'.
- 48 On Potsdam and the border issue, see, for instance B11/Bd.289, 'Meissner, Aufzeichnung – Betr.: Vorbehalte hinsichtlich östlicher Territorialfragen bei Augnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion (27.6.1955)'. B11/Bd.651, 'Auszüge aus dem Potsdamer Abkommen...'; 'Entwurf – Merkblatt (undated, but other material is from 1953)'. See Münch (1976, p. 42).
- 49 See also B11/Bd.567, 'Etdorf (18.6.1952)'.
- 50 B11/Bd.567, 'Etdorf (18.6.1952)'; B11/Bd.568, 'Stellungnahme (2.4.1951 date crossed out) [NB. letter sent on 9.4.1951]'; 'Aufzeichnung (8.10.1951)'; 'Aufzeichnung (12.1.1952)'.
- 51 B11/Bd.570, 'Stellungnahme (12.4.1954)'. The latter point was made primarily with regard to the Lithuanians (i.e. the LVIK/Karvelis–Lozoraitis dispute).
- 52 *Ibid.*
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 B11/Bd.570, 'Stellungnahme (12.4.1954)'. B11/Bd.569, 'Statement by Dulles... (30.11.1953)'; B11/Bd.474, 'USA und Satellitenvölker (2.12.1953)'.
- 55 B11/Bd.570, 'Stellungnahme (12.4.1954)'.
- 56 *Ibid.*
- 57 B11/Bd.570, 'Vermerk (29.11.1954)'; B11/Bd.556, 'Aufzeichnung (29.7.1954)'; 'by Bräutigam (21.10.1954)'.
- 58 B12/Bd.449, 'An Liepins (8.10.1954)'. As in previous correspondence, however, there was no mention of Bonn's non-recognition policy.
- 59 *Estnisch-Deutsche Gesellschaft, Deutsch-Lettische Gesellschaft and Deutsch-Litauische Gesellschaft*. At the end of 1954 these united to form the *Baltische Gesellschaft*.
- 60 B11/Bd.556, 'Meissner (22.6.1954)'; B11/Bd.556, 'de Vries an AA (22.6.1954)'. B12/Bd.449, 'de Vries an Kossmann (22.11.1954)'.
- 61 See Herbst (1996, pp. 126–59); Bender (1996, 29–55); Ahonen (2003, p. 119).
- 62 B11/Bd.289, 'Geheim! Meissner, Aufzeichnung (23.6.1955)'; 'Geheim! Meissner, Aufzeichnung (27.6.1955)'.
- 63 B41/Bd.109, 'Fragestunde am 7./9.10.1970, gez. Lahn (1.10.1970)'
- 64 On *Erstumsiedler, Nachumsiedler, and Memelländer*, see B12/Bd.487, 'Erklärung (September 1957)'. B12/Bd.495. B41/Bd.109, 'Repatriierungserklärung (undated – April 1958)'.
- 65 B12/Bd.495, 'Moskau an AA (1.7.1960)'.
- 66 B41/Bd.109 *IIA4-81.12*, 'VS – NfD, Boldt (16.6.1970)'.
- 67 B12/Bd.452, 'Von Staden (12.10.1955)'; B12/Bd.449, 'Bräutigam an v. Herwarth, (5.12.1955)'. See also B11/Bd.569, 'AA an BIM (undated, June 1953)'.
- 68 B12/Bd.452, 'Von Staden (12.10.1955)'; B12/Bd.449, 'Bräutigam (5.12.1955)'; B11/Bd.569, 'AA an BIM (undated, June 1953)'; see also B39-IIA2/Bd.51, 'Vermerk (27.11.1962)'; 'Bock an Ref. V 3 [502] (22.3.1963)'; Karvelis an AA, Kopie (10.10.1962)'.
- 69 B12/Bd.452, 'Tagung (14.11.1956)'; 'Sitzung... am 27.3.1957'.
- 70 B39-IIA2/Bd.19, 'BdV Präsident an BK (16.4.1962)'.



- 71 B12/Bd.452, 'Tagung ... 22.10.56 (14.11.1956) + Sitzung ... am 27.3.1957'.
- 72 B12/Bd.449, 'Bräutigam an Senator (4.1.1956)'. B41/Bd.13, 'An Ref. V 5 (4.6.1965)'; 'gez. Dr Hecker (7.7.1965)'; 'by Dr Hecker (21.7.1965)'. See B41/Bd.77; B81/Bd.235. See also [http://www.estemb.de/lang\\_6/rub\\_91/rub2\\_730](http://www.estemb.de/lang_6/rub_91/rub2_730), accessed 6 June 2005.
- 73 B39-IIA 2/Bd.19, 'Abt 2 an Ref. 314 (31.7.1956)'; 'Newspaper report on "Freiheit ..." [Tagung 20.9.1956] (7.10.1956)'.
- 74 B12/Bd.452, 'Die Exilmissionen (29.1.1959)'.
- 75 B12/Bd.452, 'Aufzeichnung (8.8.1960)'; 'Reykjavik an AA (16.9.1959)'.
- 76 B12/Bd.452, 'Rio an AA (15.3.1961)'.
- 77 B12/Bd.452, 'EntschlieÙung (5/1960)'; 'Abt7 an Bundesminister (2.5.1960)'; 'Ref. 704, Aufzeichnung (2.5.1960)'.
- 78 B12/Bd.452, 'Ref. 704 (5.8.1960)'; 'Ref. 704, Aufzeichnung (20.8.1960)'. 'Fernschreiben aus London Nr. 625 vom 9.8.1960'; 'Fernschreiben aus Paris Nr. 779 vom 10.8.1960'; 'Fernschreiben aus Brüssel Nr. 138 vom 19.8.1960'.
- 79 B12/Bd.452, 'Lage ... (7.10.1960)'; 'CoE ... Resolution 189 (29.9.1960)'. B12/Bd.452, 'Stellungnahme (27.9.1960)'.
- 80 B40/Bd.61, 'Moskau an AA (3.5.1963)'. For figures, see B41/Bd.109, 'IIA4-81.12, gez. Effenberg (26.4.1971). Here it was highlighted that while there had been a decline in the Russian population in the Russian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Gruzia, Azerbaijani, Khirgis, Tadjik, Armenian and Turkmen SSRs, Russification was rising rapidly in the Baltic Republics. In 1959 there were 231,000 Russians in the Lithuanian SSR, in 1970 their numbers had increased to 268,000. In Latvia the figures were 556,000 to 705,000 and in Estonia 240,000 to 335,000.
- 81 B41/Bd.64, 'London an AA (10.3.1964)'; 'London an AA (1.7.1965)'; 'Fernschreiben aus London Nr. 981, 7.5.1966'; 'Fernschreiben aus London Nr. 351, 17.2.1967'; 'Blumenfeld AA an Bundesminister für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen (20.3.1967) + Abschrift'.
- 82 B41/Bd.109, 'Lozoraitis an Scheel (19.4.1970)'; 'Lahm an Minister (20.5.1970)'; 'Hofmann an Dg II A (22.5.1970)'; 'Vermerk (9.6.1970)'; 'Lahm an Lozoraitis – Entwurf (9.6.1970)'; 'Baltischer Rat an Bundeskanzler (20.7.1970)'; 'Ozolins an Brandt (20.7.1970)'; 'Blumenfeld an New Farmers ... (10.12.1970)'; 'ENC, Memo, (9.7.1970)'; 'AA an Grigulis (16.9.1970)'; 'An Blumenfeld, Vermerk (18.9.1970)'.
- 83 B41/Bd.109, 'Fragestunde am 7./9.10.1970 (28.9.1970)'; Lahm – Ref. L1 (1.10.1970)'.
- 84 *Stenographische Berichte des Deutschen Bundestags* 71. Sitzung vom 9. Oktober 1970, p. 3931.
- 85 The latter initiative was promoted by German Balt Wolf von Kleist of the *Baltische Briefe* (a periodical of the *Deutsch-Baltische Landsmannschaft*).
- 86 B41/Bd.107, 'Blumenfeld (28.6.1972)'; 'Von Kleist (23.6.1972)'; B41/Bd.109, 'Meyer-Landrut (6.12.1972)'. Moreover, Vilnius remained under the responsibility of the German embassy in Moscow, primarily because of the Memel-German issue. See Meissner (1995, p. 225); von Wistinghausen (2004, pp. 3–12).
- 87 B39-IIA2/Bd.61, 'An Litauische Volksgemeinschaft (5.6.1973)'; 'Ref. 211 an Ref. 213 (15.5.1973)'.
- 88 B41/Bd.107, 'Scheel (7.11.1972)'.

- 89 B41/Bd.109, 'Heiliger Stuhl an AA (30.5.1970)'; 'Ereignisse in Litauen (29.8.1972)'; B41/Bd.107, 'Botschaft Moskau an AA (18.7.1972)'; 'Heiliger Stuhl an AA (18.7.1972)'.
- 90 EST-VM Saksamaa 1990–1992, 'Schriftliche Anfrage Hans Graf Huyn (1.10.1990)'; 'Dr Irmgard Adam Schwätzer an MdB Huyn (16.10.1990)'.
- 91 See <http://www.stern.de/politik/ausland/523340.html?eid=521890>, accessed 6 June 2005.
- 92 See an AA assessment in 1973, the position of which was to remain unchanged until 1991, B39-IIAI/Bd.61, 'Fleischhauer (15.5.1973)'.

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