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THE BALTICS AS COLONIAL PLAYGROUND: GERMANY IN THE EAST, 1914–1918

Robert L. Nelson

Referencing the ‘colonial’ history of the Baltics over the last century most likely brings to mind the imperial hand of Russia. One hundred years ago this region was indeed under Russian hegemony, and for more than four decades the Soviet Union held the first and last word in the socialist republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Today, however, as these states emerge as one of the newest regions of the European Union, a different and understudied imperial past of this area increases in importance. The most significant power in the ‘West’, Germany, has a long, checkered history in the Baltics, and in the first half of the twentieth century two of those experiences were directly colonial in nature. While the lion’s share of attention has long been upon the second encounter in 1941–1944, we must look to the First World War to understand the birth and modern formation of the German understanding of the Baltics as a colonial space on the borderlands of the ‘European’ metropole. It was during this first occupation that Eastern Europe fully evolved into the latest playground in the worldwide game of the so-called ‘New Imperialism’. And this was a truly transnational understanding of the Baltic Space, for the seeds to the German plans for the Baltics detailed below were found in the concept and practice of ‘inner colonization,’ a form of settler colonialism copied directly from the prairies of North America. Below I will first trace the journey of this concept across the Atlantic to East Central Europe in the late nineteenth century. Then, through the story of its main proponent, the German agrarian economist Max Sering, I will describe the radical change in the German understanding of settler possibilities in the East during the First World War. Finally, through the exploits of another scientist, this time the geographer Fritz Curschmann, I will recount the culmination of the colonial fantasy of the East in 1918.

The Baltics in the German Colonial Imagination to 1914

The great medieval ‘German colonization’ of the Baltic Sea region, the eastward migration of the Teutonic Knights, was exploited as a metaphor in the decades leading up to the First World War. Yet, little of the ‘reality’ of the 1300s could provide direct and useful links between the religious orders of that period and the East Prussian settlement bureaucrats of 1913. Ascribing modern notions of German nationalism to the Crusaders fighting for God and Rome was highly problematic to say the least. Yet, ‘Germans’ had ‘ridden East’, conquered ‘Slavs’, brought ‘Culture’, and it was impossible to avoid juicy comparisons, the ultimate being of course the German victory in 1914, 504 years after their initial defeat, at Tannenberg. Thus, during the period leading up to 1914 and then throughout the war (and indeed through 1944), the deep background fantasy of German colonial visions of the East was that of the Teutonic knights (Liulevicius 2009).

There was, however, a much more recent and valid back-story to a German fantasy of colonial settlement in the region. In the wake of the first Polish partition of 1772, Frederick the Great began a program in West Prussia to encourage the settlement of German farmers in this newly acquired land along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea:

By 1777 he had taken the decision, pregnant with consequences for the subsequent history of Prussian Poland, to commit state money to the purchase of Polish estates in order to sell or lease them to Germans. As a beginning he ordered 120,000 thalers spent ‘to get rid of the bad Polish stuff (schlechtes polnisches Zeug)’; he added that ‘the German noblemen are to be maintained in their estates, since they are altogether good and orderly.’ A few months later, he wrote to West Prussian Provincial President von Domhardt, saying that those Poles with estates in both West Prussia and Poland would have to declare for one or the other state and liquidate their holdings accordingly within four years. . . . In the same year [1783] he urged his officials once again to buy up *szlachta* estates “so that gradually we will get rid of all the Poles.” (Hagen 1980, p. 41)

Thus, for the first time, government monies were used to subsidize and entice ‘colonists’ (in this case 3,200 families, mainly from the southwestern German lands) to come into the Baltic sphere and take the place of ‘untrustworthy’ Polish nobles. Another attempt in the 1830s to seize land from wealthy Poles continued in the same vein, in that ‘colonization’ in Prussian Poland was more concerned with the political control of land and people than with the strongly nationalistic, ethno-linguistic hallmarks of later imperialism (Wandycz 1984, ch. 6).

It was under the direction of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, however, that modern colonialism, akin to that occurring overseas, would first appear in the Baltic region. Bismarck was firmly grounded in the traditional *Junker* understanding of the Poles: the nobility were inferior and untrustworthy while the peasants were good, cheap seasonal labor. Yet, by the 1880s there were many powerful elements in Germany that saw the East more purely in terms of nationalism, ethnicity and race. The Poles were not ethnic Germans and thus their increasing numbers in Prussian Poland was seen as an existential, national threat. Their higher birthrate alongside the

German peasants' *Ostflucht*, or 'flight from the East', was leading to very serious 'imbalances' in the demographics of the East, and Bismarck was under great pressure to do something about it (Hagen 1980, pp. 132–4; Wandycz 1984).

Tens of thousands of those Germans migrating westwards did not stop in western Germany, but continued across the Atlantic. The Prussian government decided in 1883 to send a young agrarian scientist named Max Sering on a six-month tour of North America in order to investigate both why American farmers were producing so much grain so cheaply, as well as the reasons why this land was so attractive to immigrants. Although Sering visited California and the Pacific Northwest, he was most interested in the land that looked most like Germany's East, the American Great Plains and the Canadian prairies. There he visited German farming communities, rode the Canadian Pacific Railway, and saw 'halfbreeds' (Métis) being taught 'western' methods of tilling the soil. But most importantly for Germany's future, he saw in both countries a vast program of 'inner colonization', a government-organized program encouraging citizens from the metropole of the East to 'go west' and colonize the 'empty' land *within* the nation's borders. Max Sering had an epiphany and saw the future of Germany's East while standing in the North American West (Sering 1887).

Upon his return, Sering wrote up a short version of his findings and published it in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reiche* in 1884, making the case that westward expansion was key to America's growing power, and that it was a great shame that Germany was not pursuing a similar program, as adjacent territorial expansion was the only way a land power could become a Great Power (Sering 1884). Such an argument dovetailed nicely with Bismarck's anti-Polonism, and when the Chancellor was presented with such a program, in January 1886, he jumped at it. That same year the Royal Prussian Colonization Commission, with a 100-million-mark fund, began its work. It used this fund to help German 'colonists' outbid Poles when Polish-owned farms in Posen and West Prussia came up for sale. The direct, ethnically based, settlement colonization of Germany's East had begun. And lest anyone forget the transnational roots of this program: in a booklet produced in October 1886 to help civil servants better understand their role in the new program, a helpful list of seven books was provided. The initial six books concerned the land and history of Posen and West Prussia. The seventh was entitled *Manitoba and the Western Territories*.¹

Max Sering soon became the recognized doyen of Germany's program of inner colonization, publishing, in 1893, *The Inner Colonization of Eastern Germany*. In 1908 the journal *Archiv für innere Kolonisation* (hereafter AfIK) was founded, bringing politicians and scientists together into one forum to exchange ideas. By 1912, the Society for the Advancement of inner Colonization (*Gesellschaft zur Förderung der inneren Kolonisation*, hereafter GFK) was set up by concerned academics and politicians, and was chaired by the *Reichspräsident* of Brandenburg, Friedrich von Schwerin, as well as Alfred Hugenberg, and Max Sering. Hugenberg had in fact worked as a civil servant for the Settlement Commission in Posen in the 1890s, and was a major booster of the program (Smith 1986, p. 98). Although the leading lights of inner colonization were being taken seriously in Berlin, the large, land-owning elite of Eastern Germany, the *Junker*, remained a fundamental stumbling block. It was difficult to hide the fact that most of the academic backers of inner colonization wanted to break up *Junker*

estates (and therewith *Junker* power), settle small German farmers on the old estates, and thus keep out the *Junker's* traditional, seasonal Polish labor. The *Junker*, however, were still very powerful in the government, and were a constant check on the full governmental acceptance of the inner colonial vision.

By 1914 inner colonization in Prussian Poland was deemed by many to have been a failure. The 22,000 German families that had been settled were not enough to fully stem the tide of the so-called 'Slavic Flood'. After all, Poles bought farms as well, and had a higher birthrate. The bidding war over every piece of land was frustrating, and the lack of support from the *Junker* in the Prussian Diet did not help.²

World War One and the Opening Up of the East

1914–1916: conquests, travels, plans

The inner colonial visions and practices of the pre-1914 era became increasingly radical during the First World War with the advance of the German army along the Baltic coast. Soon after the German victories in the East in 1914, at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes, Hindenburg invited Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to the former's headquarters in Posen, the heart of the inner colonial project. There, in early December, discussions were had and maps drawn up for a re-formation of the eastern frontier. They came up with the idea of a 'Polish strip', a long frontier to the East of Prussian Poland, to be emptied of Poles and Jews and populated with hardy German colonists:

the motives behind the idea of the 'frontier strip' were very various: to get strategic security and facilitate the defence of the eastern provinces; to round off the Upper Silesian industrial area; to separate the Prussian Poles from their countrymen in a future Polish state by a Germanised 'frontier wall' and thus to isolate them; to acquire free land on which to settle Germans from Germany proper (*das Altreich* – the Old Territories) as well as families of German Russians brought back from Russia, especially from the Volga. This last consideration pointed to a transformation of the old Prusso-German patriotism into a neo-German racialist nationalism which, by withdrawing the outposts of 'Deutschtum,' threatened to disrupt Eastern Europe's old political and ethnic frontiers. (Fischer 1967, p. 116)

What is most fascinating for our purposes is to whom exactly the regime immediately turned for expertise on such radical colonial plans: the inner colonial thinkers. Indeed, the very three chairmen of the GFK, Hugenberg, Schwerin, and Sering, were asked to write up memoranda, or 'think pieces' (*Denkschriften*).

Although Hugenberg's response was perhaps the most radical, calling for the 'clearing' of the space and the forcing of Germans back onto the land as farmers, it was Schwerin's two key memoranda of March and December 1915 that caught the attention of those in power, ensuring, in Fritz Fischer's words, that he 'belonged to the inner circle of the high Prussian bureaucracy' (Fischer 1967, p. 116).

Erich Keup, the editor of *AfiK*, helped Schwerin write both memoranda, and even though Schwerin was told to keep these plans top secret it is clear that many members of the inner colonization elite were in on the discussions. Schwerin went so far as to tell his new bosses that the GfK had suggested that if newly won territories were won for colonization, then the authorities should make sure to keep the land free of all the speculation seen in Posen and West Prussia, something they believed had driven up the price of land (Geiss 1960, pp. 78–90).³ A colonial project was definitely how Schwerin and his allies conceived of the frontier strip at this time, as can be seen in the language used in his memoranda: ‘The German *Volk*, the greatest colonizing people on Earth, must again be called to a great work of colonization. They must be given enlarged borders within which to fulfill this work.’ After referring to the Germans as a ‘*Herrenvolk*’, he claims that the newly acquired land ‘must be treated as a colonial land, equipped with a new independent authority and not just another branch of the Prussian provincial administration’ (Geiss 1960, p. 82; Meyer 1955). Fascinating further proof of the shifting gaze of the inner colonizers throughout 1915 appears in the pages of the Keup-edited *AfiK*, where a new colonial space was imagined. In articles appearing as late as 1914, Prussian Poland had always been described as ‘empty’, beckoning German settlers into this ‘inner’ colonial space. Suddenly, in a series of 1915 articles, Prussian Poland was declared ‘full’, and the newly conquered lands to the East, outside Prussian Law and *Junker* meddling, were declared empty and awaiting German colonization (Nelson 2009).

An actual plan for settling the newly conquered Baltic lands, specifically the placing of up to two million German colonists in Courland, not far behind the German lines just short of Riga, was drawn up and submitted in September 1915 by none other than Max Sering. Since his train rides through the vast open West of North America 32 years earlier, Sering had always equated large spaces of fertile, temperate soil with world empire, be it the British in the Americas or Russia in its adjacent colonial lands, from Poland to Siberia. *Lebensraum* meant power and it was his greatest frustration that Germany had none. Yet, until the Great Advance of 1915, he had never personally pushed for aggressive expansion. Only in the headiness of victory and the ‘empty’ Latvian farms he saw in the Summer of 1915 after being sent on a fact-finding mission did he see how many ‘problems’ war appeared to solve (Sering 1916).

Indeed, forced population transfers seemed to be the answer to everything. While on a second mission to Poland and White Russia in the Summer of 1916, Sering put together a complicated deal: in order for the Polish politicians involved in the soon-to-be-founded Polish Kingdom to accept the idea of a German frontier strip (evacuated of Poles), Sering offered the new Polish state a large slice of war-torn White Russia as a place to settle the newly uprooted Poles and indeed allow Poland to partake in the new free-for-all colonization going on in the Eastern Space.⁴ Throughout 1915 and 1916 the Baltic German Silvio Broedrich was publishing articles in the *AfiK* pushing a more intensive German colonization of the Baltics,⁵ and in October 1916 Sering made public his extensive plans for mass German settlement in Courland and Lithuania in an article in *Der Panther* (Sering 1916).

1917–1918: *Race, Fantasy, Loss*

By 1917 the colonizers were increasingly fantastical in their plans for massive demographic shifts and long-term German hegemony and settlement in the Baltic Region. Sering produced an edited volume in 1917, *Western Russia and its Importance in the Development of Central Europe (Westrußland in seiner Bedeutung für die Entwicklung Mitteleuropas)*, in which he first states that Germany is now in possession of a new Eastern European region stretching throughout the Baltics and White Russia that is three-fifths the size of the German Reich. Although he repeats his belief in the necessity for colonial settlement expansion in order for Germany to be a Great Power, he also feels the need to construct a German Empire in the Baltics as a gigantic *mission civilisatrice*: from Lithuania all the way to the Pacific Ocean, Sering claims, one finds the same ‘wood-grey long village’ (holzgraues Reihendorf) full of people the Great Russians have enslaved (unterjocht). Russians as colonial masters have simply left ‘the same dreary monotony with its dearth in schools, streets and sanitation’ (Sering 1917, p. xxi). Thus, there is a great need for the Germans to lord over this land and raise these *kulturlos* people. As mentioned earlier, Sering saw the Kingdom of Poland as a useful ally, and in any case found Poland to be ‘thickly settled’. Further, land directly to the east of Poland, in White Russia, was to be given to the Poles. This left for the Germans a rather large swath of territory, from the 1915–1916 fantasized *Kolonialland* of Courland through to the thinly settled Grodno and Bialystok regions. This was, of course, the northern end of the Jewish Pale of Settlement, and Sering described it thus: ‘Here reigns that type of small, dirty and horrible Jewish town with its congestion of retailers, peddlers, and a wretched artisan’ (Sering 1917, p. xxx). Sering called this entire area *Ostland*, and claimed that it was Germany’s ‘holy duty’ to fill it with the two million ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) uprooted from their various centuries-old homes throughout Eastern Europe. Of course, this directly echoes Hitler’s later dreams, the main difference being that Sering’s mind was not that of an eliminationist anti-Semite, and thus he did not share the Nazi fantasy of first truly ‘emptying’ this land of its Jewish element.

Sering’s close ally Schwerin did, however, possess rather strong anti-Semitic attitudes but managed to suppress these among larger racialized statements. Both he and Sering pushed the idea that a temperate *Kolonialland* in the Baltics, as opposed to the tropics, was much more important to the breeding future of the *Herrenvolk*. In terms of the long-term trajectory of Germany’s occupation of the East in the First World War and its turn towards ever more radical conceptions in the final two years of conflict, Schwerin’s (and by extension, Sering’s) influence upon the German master of the East, Erich von Ludendorff, is perhaps most crucial. In the winter of 1916–1917 Schwerin twice traveled to *Ober Ost*, Ludendorff’s ‘fiefdom’ in the Baltics, to convince the *Generalquartiermeister* of the need for vast colonial settlement. In February and March 1917, two major conferences on settlement were held in Berlin, with the resulting approval of Sering’s idea of a second frontier strip running from Lithuania all the way to Brest-Litovsk (Fischer 1967, pp. 277–8).

In late 1917, another scientist associated with the ‘inner colonizers’, and tellingly an expert on colonization in the Baltics, Dr. Fritz Curschmann, was pulled out of his field artillery regiment and sent on a fact-finding mission. He traveled from

Brest-Litovsk to Kaunas in a seemingly futile attempt to disentangle national loyalties and count populations. In 1899, Curschmann received his doctorate at Leipzig, where one year earlier his *Doktorvater*, Karl Lamprecht, had founded a historical geography seminar with a focus on settlement (Knobelsdorff-Brenkenhoff 1997). Curschmann became fascinated with maps and demographics, and his early academic focus was on Swedish colonization in the Baltics. Now, in 1917, he was asked to put that colonial Baltic expertise to use for *Ober Ost*, specifically to help Ludendorff in his desire to 'find' and separate the seemingly 'loyal' Ruthenians from the Jewish, Polish, Russian and Baltic populations with which they were so frustratingly intermixed. An example of the 'problem' Curschmann was asked to sort out: Curschmann was told of a member of the Duma, from Pinsk, who spoke Polish, had a Lithuanian name, claimed he was a Ruthenian, but was born and raised in the Ukraine and had mainly Ukrainian interests at heart!⁶

On 14 December 1917, Curschmann received Bishop Bocian at the train station in Brest-Litovsk, and traveled the next ten days with him. Bocian was an important ally of the Germans as he was attempting, from his base in Lviv, to revive the Eastern Catholic (*Unierte*) church as a vehicle to unite Ruthenians and Ukrainians against the Orthodox Russians. But as Curschmann soon discovered, religion was as much a 'mess' as nationality in this region, with peasants declaring allegiance to whatever religion/nationality they believed the figure of authority speaking to them wanted to hear. It is difficult to tell whether Curschmann and Bocian feared Russians or Poles more, and the move towards an Eastern Catholic church was clearly an attempt to win Ruthenians away from both Orthodox and Polish Catholic influence. Curschmann notes with sympathy that one of the main memories of the old Eastern Catholic Church among the Ruthenian peasants was that the keys to the churches were always in the hands of Poles and Jews. Indeed, near the end of the trip in Kaunas, Bocian was very pleased to speak to the Lithuanian Catholic Bishop Karevičius, as they both belonged to churches oppressed by the Poles! In the book-length memorandum that Curschmann then wrote and submitted, he spent a lot of time drawing the long historical links between the Lithuanian and Ruthenian peoples, claiming that in the 1500s, despite Polish power, Ruthenian was the language of court in Vilnius. In further pointing out the deeply anti-Polish, anti-Russian nature of the Lithuanian-Latvian-White Russian corridor, and arguing that the eight million Ruthenians would unite and accept the Eastern Catholic Church once they were 'free', Curschmann nicely laid out a 'scientific' argument for the annexation of this second strip into the German Empire.⁷

But we are not yet finished with Curschmann, as he took part in the final, and perhaps most bizarre, chapter of Germany's increasingly desperate colonial fantasy of the Baltics: the Reich University of Dorpat. After the Germans took Riga in September 1917, and upon the suggestion of Max Sering, professors were invited to give lectures in Riga, Reval and Dorpat. In April 1918, it was decided that the 're-founding' of a 'German' university in Dorpat would provide the cultural (colonial) imprint so required in the area, and that although only one-third of the students attending the current university in Dorpat were German-speakers, and despite the clearly skyrocketing nationalist aspirations of the educated elite in the Baltics, all instruction was to be in German. A staff of 63 was collected (many directly from the

ranks of the army like Curschmann), and the eminent Baltic German Professor Theodor Schiemann was brought in to be curator at the university's founding on 15 September 1918 (Rimscha 1980.)

In a series of three letters sent to his wife, Curschmann has left us a surreal description of this event, coming as it did while the German Empire was being brought to its knees on the Western Front. In a hall decorated with German and fraternity flags, Curschmann writes that the other local nationalities were 'absent' and asks why any recognition at all should be given to the 'small or left-behind folk of Eastern Europe'. In a move redolent of the imperial aspirations of this new university, Curschmann was very pleased that the minister of culture referenced the opening of the University of Strasbourg 40 years earlier. Curschmann's detailed description of the dinner that followed and of the guests whose company he enjoyed (noble Baltic Germans) or had to endure (Estonians) is telling. After this, Curschmann followed German students drunkenly goose-stepping to an old fraternal-order house and partied with them into the night. He lamented the old boring life back in the German metropolis, claiming that only here, at the edge of Empire, did these noble old Balts know how to live, and that this experience was deeply felt by '[us] new immigrants and observers'. A week later, Curschmann wrote that he avoided looking at newspapers from home, afraid to read how bad things were.⁸ There, at that place and time of total German victory in the East, it must have been unthinkable for Curschmann and his ilk that it all might soon disappear.

Conclusion

In his seminal study of the Eastern Front in the First World War, Vejas Liulevicius reminds us of the words of the German historian Golo Mann: 'Brest Litovsk has been called the forgotten peace, but the Germans have never forgotten it. They know that they defeated Russia and sometimes they look upon this proudly as the real, if unrewarded European achievement of the war' (Liulevicius 2000, p. 249). Indeed, Liulevicius's study traces with alacrity the impact of the occupation, victory and ultimate loss in the East. His main thesis argues that what began as an understanding of the East in terms of 'land and people' (*Land und Leute*) transformed over years of ever-increasing frustration with irrationally intermixed groups, to an understanding of 'race and space' (*Rasse und Raum*). One can follow the trajectory of this thesis in the story told here, from the early, naive ideas of Schwerin and Sering that contemplated the simple population transfers of people easily labeled Germans and Poles into areas identified as empty, in Courland or White Russia, to the hair-pulling bewilderment encountered by Curschmann as he found nothing but a confusion of ethnicities and loyalties from Kaunas to Brest-Litovsk. In the spasm of *Freikorps* violence that would envelop this part of the world after 1918, the German mindscape of the East went one step further with the proto-fascist identification and murder of all who could be labeled Bolshevik, and, in some cases, Jewish (Liulevicius 2000).

Of course, Germany lost both the war and all of the land it had so painstakingly attempted to settle, Posen and West Prussia, to the new state of Poland. Sering spent the Weimar years as an academic star, and his prophecies were seen to have come

true: ‘proper’ inner colonization of the East would have prevented the land from being taken away even in the event of defeat, and the food security of such a true settlement program would have prevented the starvation of Germany by the Allied Blockade. Although he consistently pressed for the return of the ‘lost lands’, and pushed for renewed colonization, Sering was removed from the academic scene in 1934 by the racist agrarian and Nazi Minister for Food and Agriculture, *SS-Obergruppenführer* Walther Darré. He saw Sering’s nineteenth-century colonial worldview, which retained the idea that Poles and Baltic peoples could one day be assimilated into the German Volk, as hopelessly naive (Stoehr 2002). Heinrich Himmler and the *Raumplaner* Konrad Meyer guaranteed that the next German occupation of the East would push the racial and spatial driving forces of modern imperialism to their absolute ‘logical’ limit. They would attempt to create truly ‘empty’ space in the East (Mai 2002).

But what, if any, is the legacy today of this earlier German colonial fantasy of the Baltic Region? It is of course simple to dismiss the Nazi occupation in all its bloody radicalism as having nothing at all to do with the twenty-first-century relationship of the European Union with its newest Eastern members. Yet, when one traces the earlier, more ‘European’ (as opposed to German) nature of Germany’s relationship with the Baltic Region, an understanding of the Baltics that was robustly part and parcel of the global new imperialism within which Western Europe viewed the ‘lesser peoples’ of the Earth, one begins to see some similarities, however faint. When the Baltic Space is defined as yet another site of capitalist/imperialist exploitation, as both it and the North American West were in Sering’s eyes, the use of the colonial trope becomes more fascinating. For many years now, at least since Larry Wolf’s seminal study, we have known of a lengthy trajectory of Westerners looking down the long ‘cultural gradient’ that begins somewhere on the right bank of the Oder and disappears in the Pripet marshes (Wolf 1994). Now, with the ‘inner colonizers’ and both their actions pre-1914 and then their fantasies from 1914 to 1918, we have concrete colonial plans for the Baltic Region that go well beyond the fancy of Voltaire’s letters. Further, two to three million German soldiers experienced *Ober Ost* as a colonial playground and understood Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians as colonial subjects. These men (and some women) returned to Germany in the interwar years with powerful ideas of a proper ‘European’ relationship with the Baltics. It is plain to see that for some, traces of this relationship have never fully disappeared.

Notes

- 1 Königlicher Landrath Von Wittenburg, ‘Bericht des Unterzeichneten zu Punkt 6 der Tagesordnung vom 11. Oktober 1886’ (Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfeld, N/2308, no. 65).
- 2 It is crucial to note here, however, that Scott Eddie has convincingly demonstrated that although there was widespread ‘belief’ that the inner colonial project was responsible for a significant rise in the price of land, it was not. See Eddie (2008).
- 3 Indeed, Schwerin was scolded for telling the other members of the GFK, to which he furiously responded that they would keep their mouths shut! (Geiss 1960, p. 90).

- 4 See the many letters and documents regarding these negotiations in: Bundesarchiv-Koblenz, N1210/121.
- 5 See, for example, Broedrich (1915).
- 6 From a rough draft of: 'Denkschrift zu einer geplanten Volkszählung im Operationsgebiete der 10. Armee' von Hauptmann d.L. Curschmann', Volume 2, Universitätsbibliothek Greifswald — Handschriftenabteilung, Curschmanns 'Kleine Schriften'.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 All quotes come from handwritten letters in the Curschmann 'Kleine Schriften' noted above.

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